Peo in Int of WW

25CA0580 Peo in Interest of WW 09-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0580
Washington County District Court No. 23JV30002
Honorable Carl S. McGuire III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of W.W., a Child,

and Concerning H.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Tow and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 18, 2025

Bauer & Furman, P.C., Steven M. Furman, Fort Morgan, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, H.L. (mother) appeals

the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for W.W. (the child)

to J.W. (father). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the

case to the juvenile court with directions.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2023, the Washington County Department of Human

Services received a report from law enforcement after mother

allegedly attempted to run over father with her car while the child

was present. Mother was arrested, and a petition in dependency

and neglect was filed. The child, then two months old, was placed

into paternal grandmother’s home, where father also resided, and

remained there throughout the rest of the case.

¶3 The court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and

the Department developed treatment plans for the parents.

¶4 Two years after the case opened, a contested allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) hearing was held. Mother requested

that custody of the child be allocated equally between her and

father, or alternatively, that her family time be supervised by her

family. The Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL) argued

that father should have primary custody and mother should have

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three hours of supervised family time per week. Father requested

full custody of the child and that mother receive no family time

until she further engaged in treatment.

¶5 After the hearing, the juvenile court awarded primary custody

and decision-making authority to father. Mother was granted

therapeutically supervised family time once per week.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within

the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Resps. Concerning

B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A juvenile court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,

or is based on a misapplication of the law. People in Interest of

M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 12. The juvenile court, as the trier of fact,

assesses the credibility of witnesses and determines the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence. People in Interest of

A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). When its findings have

record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on

review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But we review de novo whether the court

applied the correct legal standard in allocating parental

responsibilities. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

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III. Relevant Law

¶7 The juvenile court is authorized to determine the legal custody

of a child who comes within its jurisdiction, People in Interest of

C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005), and when allocating

parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the

child’s best interests, People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208

(Colo. App. 2011).

¶8 Questions about a child’s health and safety, including family

time decisions, are entrusted to the juvenile court’s discretion.

People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006).

Because the court itself must make those decisions, it can’t

delegate to a third party decisions about family time. See People in

Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding

that the juvenile court can’t delegate family time decisions to

others); see also In re Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 621 (Colo.

App. 1997) (prohibiting the district court from delegating the

decision of when overnight visits can occur to the child’s

psychiatrist).

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IV. Analysis

A. The Court Didn’t Err by Ordering Mother’s Family Time to be
Therapeutically Supervised or Declining to Incorporate the
Child’s Siblings in Her Family Time

¶9 Mother first contends that, because there were safe and

appropriate family members willing to supervise her family time

with the child, the juvenile court’s decision to order therapeutically

supervised family time was contrary to the child’s best interests.

We disagree.

¶ 10 The record shows that there were legitimate safety concerns

about kin supervising mother’s family time. The caseworker

explained that she believed professionally supervised family time

was necessary for the child’s safety because mother’s family might

not be able to tell if mother was under the influence of illicit

substances or be able to maintain safety for the child during family

time as well as a professional could. Mother had reportedly

relapsed as recently as two months before the contested hearing.

And maternal aunt, who mother suggested as a potential

kin-supervisor, testified that she couldn’t “guarantee” that she

would be able to tell if mother was under the influence.

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¶ 11 A psychologist who evaluated mother and completed a

parent-children interactional evaluation of mother and the child

testified during the hearing. The psychologist was qualified by the

court as an expert in “clinical psychology, child psychology,

parent/child interactionals, and psychological evaluations.” He

testified that mother’s inadequately treated mental and behavioral

health presented risks to the child’s mental, physical, and

emotional well-being during family time. He opined that given these

risks, kin supervision wasn’t “an appropriate safety net.” Thus, the

record supports the court’s order requiring mother’s family time to

be therapeutically supervised. See People in Interest of E.D., 2025

COA 11, ¶ 46 (affirming court’s restriction of mother’s family time to

a therapeutic setting as “necessary for the [child’s] safety and

mental, emotional, and physical health”).

¶ 12 Mother next contends that the court failed to consider the

legislative intent behind preserving sibling groups, and that the APR

judgment effectively eliminated the child’s contact with her

maternal siblings. We reject this argument.

¶ 13 First, we note mother’s reliance on H.B. 19-1288 ― the “Foster

Youth Siblings Bill of Rights” ― which is codified at sections

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19-7-201 to -204, C.R.S. 2025, is misplaced. See § 19-7-202(1)

(“The general assembly finds and declares that it is beneficial for a

youth placed in foster care to be able to continue relationships with

the youth’s siblings, regardless of age, so that siblings may share

their strengths and associations in their everyday and often

common experiences.”) (emphasis added). This statute is

inapplicable in this case because the child wasn’t in foster care.

¶ 14 Regardless, the record supports the juvenile court’s order for

individualized family time between mother and the child. A

visitation specialist, who had supervised family time between

mother and the child, reported that mother’s relationship with the

child had recently declined and that most of mother’s focus during

family time was on the child’s infant sibling. Likewise, the

psychologist expert witness also supported one-on-one family time

because it appeared mother “mostly ignored” the child when the

child’s infant sibling was present. He further opined that “at this

point in time, it doesn’t seem like having a sibling present [during

family time] is helpful.”

¶ 15 In sum, the record shows that the juvenile court properly

considered the provisions of the Children’s Code in restricting

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mother’s parenting time. See N.G.G., ¶ 10. And, because the

record evidence also supports the court’s decisions requiring

therapeutic supervision and limiting family time to mother and the

child, without the child’s maternal siblings, we decline to disturb

them. B.R.D., ¶ 15.

B. The Court Erred by Granting the Therapeutic Family Time
Supervisor Unfettered Discretion to Determine the Duration of
Mother’s Family Time

¶ 16 Mother also contends that the juvenile court improperly

delegated its family time authority to a third party by ordering that

the duration of her family time be at the therapeutic supervisor’s

discretion. For reasons described below, we agree.

¶ 17 In section B.5 of the APR judgment (family time provision), the

court allowed mother family time once per week and ordered that

the “duration” of mother’s weekly family time session be “as

determined by the therapeutic visitation provider.” Mother argues

that in so ordering, the court improperly delegated “the decision of

when and how [she] could exercise family time to a third-party

therapist.” The Department and GAL disagree, arguing that the

family time provision isn’t an improper delegation of the court’s

authority because the court has already determined the “when” and

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“how” of mother’s family time to be once a week with a therapeutic

supervisor. We agree with mother.

¶ 18 As we discuss in Part IV.A. above, the juvenile court acted

well-within its discretion to order that mother’s family time be

therapeutically supervised. But the court erred by failing to provide

a future therapeutic supervisor with guidance regarding how to

determine the duration of mother’s family time. See B.C., 122 P.3d

at 1070-71. If, as the Department and GAL suggest, the court

intended to allow the therapeutic supervisor to use their

professional discretion determine the duration of mother’s

parenting time based upon the child’s safety, the court needed to

explicitly say so. As written, the family time provision could allow a

therapeutic supervisor to deny, stop or cancel parenting time at any

point, for any reason. And because the family time provision

doesn’t tether the therapeutic supervisor’s discretion to determine

the duration of mother’s family time to the child’s safety, it’s an

improper delegation of the court’s authority. See L.B., 254 P.3d at

1208; see also B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070 (noting that decisions

concerning family time may not be unconditionally delegated to

third persons).

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¶ 19 Accordingly, we reverse the family time provision of the APR

judgment and remand the case for the juvenile court to, at a

minimum, direct the therapeutic supervisor to exercise their

professional discretion, consistent with ensuring the child’s safety,

to determine the duration of mother’s weekly family time sessions.

V. Disposition

¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We

reverse the portion of the APR judgment that allows, without

additional direction, a therapeutic supervisor to determine the

duration of mother’s weekly family time. On remand, the juvenile

court must modify the family time provision to, at a minimum,

direct the therapeutic supervisor to exercise their professional

discretion, consistent with ensuring the child’s safety, to determine

the duration of mother’s weekly family time. The APR judgment is

otherwise affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.

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