Peo in Interest of AH

25CA0578 Peo in Interest of AH 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0578
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV16
Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.H., a Child,

and Concerning S.V.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Román, C.J., and Taubman*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 4, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Sarah Simchowitz, Assistant County Attorney,
Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Alison Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, S.V. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child

legal relationship with A.H. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human

Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

after receiving reports that drugs were being trafficked out of the

family home. The Department further alleged concerns about

mother’s sobriety and compliance with the restrictions imposed by

her criminal cases.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The child was

placed in the care of maternal grandmother, where she remained

throughout the case. Later, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the court

granted the motion.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶4 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

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dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶5 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is

a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M.,

2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review a court’s factual findings for clear

error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those

facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

B. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Mother first argues that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.

Specifically, she asserts that the Department failed when it did not

(1) amend mother’s treatment plan to include a mental health

component; (2) timely investigate and approve kin to supervise

family time; and (3) offer services other than family time to mother

while she was incarcerated.

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1. Applicable Law

¶7 A department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate parents and reunite families before a court may

terminate parental rights pursuant to section 19-3-604(1)(c). See

§§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable efforts

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 In deciding whether a department has satisfied its reasonable

efforts obligation, a juvenile court should consider whether the

services provided were appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan. People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011). Whether a department made reasonable efforts

“must be measured holistically rather than in isolation with respect

to specific treatment plan objectives.” People in Interest of My.K.M.

v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 35. But the parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to obtain the assistance needed

to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining

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whether a department has made reasonable efforts. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

2. Analysis

¶9 The juvenile court found that the Department had “gone above

and beyond to provide reasonable efforts to assist [mother]” with

her treatment plan. We discern no reversible error.

¶ 10 First, we reject mother’s argument that the Department failed

to provide reasonable efforts when it did not amend her treatment

plan to include a mental health provision.

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that the Department reasonably

declined to amend the treatment plan because “it [made] sense to

not add additional terms and conditions onto [mother’s] treatment

plan, but to work collaboratively and coordinate with the terms and

conditions of her parole release.” The record supports the court’s

findings.

¶ 12 As mother asserts, the caseworker testified that she realized

shortly after the treatment plan was adopted that mother might

have mental health needs. The caseworker further believed

mother’s treatment plan needed a mental health component but

ultimately never sought to amend it. The caseworker reported that

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she did not do so because when the issue was raised, mother’s legal

team had already scheduled mother for a neuropsychological

evaluation and thus she believed the concern was already being

addressed. Later, after mother was released from incarceration,

obtaining mental health services was a part of her parole

requirements. The caseworker again did not seek to amend the

treatment plan because she wanted to work with mother’s parole

officer so the treatment plans could be collaborative and to avoid

doubling up on mother’s required treatment. Mother’s engagement

in her mental health treatment was “sporadic” and when the

termination hearing occurred she had not successfully completed

any mental health treatment services.

¶ 13 Notably, mother does not point to any authority specifically

obligating the Department to amend her treatment plan, nor are we

aware of any. Nevertheless, the record shows mother was offered

mental health treatment services through her parole requirements,

yet did not fully engage in or complete those services.

¶ 14 Second, mother argues that the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts when it declined to authorize kin supervised

family time. Specifically, she asserts that the Department

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inappropriately restricted family time and refused to authorize kin

supervised family time visits, despite kin being willing and able to

supervise.

¶ 15 Contrary to mother’s assertions, the Department never

restricted family time ― the court did. Mother had kin supervised

family time through roughly the first six months of the case. The

court restricted mother’s family time to supervised family time after

concerns arose for the kin supervisor’s safety following a purported

argument between mother and the kin supervisor. The court also

allowed for changes to family time to be made upon agreement of

the Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL). Mother appears

to argue that the court is never allowed to delegate family time

decisions to the Department and the GAL, but this is incorrect. See

§ 19-3-217(2), C.R.S. 2025 (allowing a court to grant “discretionary

authority to the department and [GAL] to increase opportunities for

additional parent-child contacts . . . without further court order”).

¶ 16 While the record shows the Department appeared to be open

to allowing kin supervised family time, the caseworker correctly

testified that she could not unilaterally make family time changes.

The Department and the GAL ultimately never agreed to expand

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family time to kin supervised family time given concerns about the

kin supervisor’s sobriety. Notably, mother refused to have her

family time kin supervised by maternal grandmother following her

release from incarceration.

¶ 17 Finally, mother contends that the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts when it provided no services, aside from family

time, while she was incarcerated.

¶ 18 The record reveals it was the Department of Corrections’

noncooperation, not the Department’s lack of efforts, that prevented

mother from accessing additional services while she was

incarcerated. The caseworker attempted to contact mother’s

counselor while she was incarcerated but never received a response.

The caseworker also testified that mother reported she did not

qualify for a more intensive treatment plan while she was

incarcerated. Importantly, the Department ensured in-person

family time was able to continue while mother was incarcerated.

¶ 19 Furthermore, as the juvenile court noted, mother was only

incarcerated for roughly six months of the nearly two years the case

was open. The court found mother had available to her at least

eighteen months when she was not incarcerated during which she

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could have engaged and complied with the treatment plan, yet she

did not. The record corroborates the court’s findings. When the

termination hearing occurred, mother had missed most of her

urinalysis tests, tested positive for illicit substances as recently as

three months earlier, had been recently arrested on felony charges,

missed most of her therapy sessions, was noncompliant with her

parole, and had never engaged in substance use treatment.

¶ 20 Given this record, we discern no basis for reversal.

C. Judicial Notice

¶ 21 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by taking

judicial notice of her prior criminal cases because they were

irrelevant and constituted improper character evidence. We discern

no basis for reversal.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 22 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is

not subject to reasonable dispute if the fact is either (1) “generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court” or (2) “capable

of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” CRE 201(a)-(b).

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¶ 23 “The occurrence of legal proceedings or other court actions are

proper facts for judicial notice.” People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161,

¶ 22 (citing Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, ¶¶ 2, 11). Because court

records are recognized as sources whose accuracy cannot be

reasonably questioned, a court may take judicial notice of them.

See id. at ¶ 24 (noting that the existence of a warrant issued in

another jurisdiction “was capable of accurate and ready

determination by referring to the statewide court database”); see

also People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (noting that

a court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a

related proceeding).

¶ 24 The decision to take judicial notice must be exercised

“cautiously because its purpose is to bypass the usual factfinding

process.” Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193, 1199

(Colo. App. 2002). We review the court’s decision to take judicial

notice for an abuse of discretion. Sena, ¶ 22. When the juvenile

court is the trier of fact, we presume that it disregarded any

immaterial or incompetent evidence that may have been introduced.

People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261 (Colo. App. 2007).

Under these circumstances, we will not disturb the judgment

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unless the court could not have reached the result but for the

incompetent evidence. People in Interest of M.M., 215 P.3d 1237,

1249-50 (Colo. App. 2009).

2. Analysis

¶ 25 At the termination hearing, the Department asked the juvenile

court to take judicial notice of five criminal court cases involving

mother. Mother objected to four of the five criminal cases because

they were “initiated . . . well before the present case involving [the

child] opening” and thus were “not relevant to [mother’s] status

today” or the court’s consideration of whether it should terminate

parental rights. In response, the Department asserted that they

were relevant because they related to the “long-lasting nature of

[mother’s] condition” and her “ability to lead a legal lifestyle.”

Rejecting mother’s contention, the juvenile court took judicial notice

of all the criminal cases.

¶ 26 As an initial matter, the Department and the GAL assert that

mother did not preserve her argument relating to improper

character evidence because at the hearing she only objected as to

relevance. We agree. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402,

403 (Colo. App. 2006) (generally, arguments never presented to,

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considered by, or ruled upon by a trial court may not be raised for

the first time on appeal). Therefore, we address mother’s judicial

notice argument only as it relates to whether the evidence was

relevant.

¶ 27 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” CRE 401.

¶ 28 We are not persuaded that the court erred in taking judicial

notice of mother’s convictions for illegal weapon possession,

criminal possession of a financial device, unauthorized use of a

financial transaction device, and unlawful use of a controlled

substance. During the pendency of this case, mother violated her

parole conditions related to one of those convictions, which resulted

in her incarceration for roughly six months. Mother’s criminal

history was relevant insofar as it showed her continued struggles to

comply with her parole and remain free from incarceration. See

People in Interest of R.J.A., 994 P.2d 470, 474 (Colo. App. 1999) (the

“best indicator of mother’s future success in treatment was her past

history”).

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¶ 29 Nevertheless, taking such notice was harmless. See C.R.C.P.

61; People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶ 21. Nothing in

the record suggests that the juvenile court afforded undue weight to

evidence of mother’s prior criminal convictions when it terminated

her parental rights. Rather than focusing on mother’s criminal

cases, the court focused on mother’s lack of compliance with her

treatment plan, her alleged substance use, and her inability to be a

protective parent.

¶ 30 Therefore, we will not disturb the judgment.

D. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 31 Lastly, mother contends that the juvenile court erred in

finding there were no less drastic alternatives to termination

because (1) termination was not in the child’s best interests; (2) the

court inappropriately focused on whether grandmother would

accept an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) in

contemplation of termination; and (3) the Department failed to

investigate mother’s cousin for placement.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 32 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before it terminates the parent-child relationship.

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People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. Determining

whether a less drastic alternative exists is not a separate criterion

and is instead “implicit in, and thus intertwined with, the statutory

criteria for termination.” Id.

¶ 33 In considering less drastic alternatives, the court must base

its decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). A court may consider and

weigh various factors in determining the viability of a less drastic

alternative, including whether the alternative placement option

favors adoption rather than an APR and whether an ongoing

relationship with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to

the child. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81; People in

Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31.

¶ 34 Ultimately, for a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do

more than “adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less

drastic alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M.,

¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic alternative but

finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it

must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at

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¶ 32. We must affirm the court’s decision if its findings are

supported by the record. B.H., ¶ 80.

2. Analysis

¶ 35 The juvenile court found that less drastic alternatives had

been considered and ruled out, “that APR is not appropriate,” and

that termination was in the child’s best interests. The record

supports the court’s findings.

¶ 36 Mother first argues termination was not in the child’s best

interests because, she alleges, there were concerns about maternal

grandmother’s ability to care for the child long term given her age

and limited financial resources.

¶ 37 However, the court expressly considered this factor and still

found it was not a reason to find a less drastic alternative. The

record supports this conclusion. The caseworker testified that she

had no concerns about maternal grandmother’s ability to meet the

child’s needs. The record additionally showed that the child was

bonded to maternal grandmother and was thriving in her care.

¶ 38 Mother’s argument that the court inappropriately focused on

whether grandmother would accept an APR is also belied by the

record. The court could properly consider whether maternal

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grandmother favored adoption over an APR in determining whether

a viable less drastic alternative existed and did so in its ruling. See

S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 919-20.

¶ 39 However, contrary to mother’s assertions, maternal

grandmother’s preference for adoption was only one factor among

many that the court considered. The juvenile court also noted the

long time the case had been open and found that “[w]hile there was

some compliance” with the treatment plan “it was not substantial

compliance, and not . . . in any way, shape or form close” to the

compliance needed to allow for reunification. Ultimately, the court

found that termination was in the child’s best interests.

¶ 40 True, the caseworker reported maternal grandmother would

not accept an APR. However, the caseworker also testified that she

did not believe an APR would be in the child’s best interests and

about her concerns for such an arrangement given mother’s history

of hostility and being demanding with maternal grandmother. The

caseworker opined that she did not believe mother had been

successful with her treatment plan and that mother was not fit.

The caseworker noted the case had been open for two years, and

further believed it was not in the child’s best interests to continue

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the case longer. Because of the child’s young age when the petition

in dependency and neglect was filed, the case was subject to the

expedited permanency planning provisions. § 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S.

2025. The statutory provisions require a placement “in a

permanent home as expeditiously as possible.” § 19-3-702(5)(c),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 41 Lastly, mother contends the Department failed to investigate a

maternal cousin as a possible placement, and therefore did not

“evaluate a reasonable number of persons suggested to it as

possible placements” as the Children’s Code requires. People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 42 Mother, however, did not preserve this issue. At the

termination hearing, she argued that an APR to maternal

grandmother was a less drastic alternative but did not raise the

Department’s failure to investigate the maternal cousin. Nor did

she argue that APR to the maternal cousin was a less drastic

alternative. People in Interest of T.S., 781 P.2d 130, 132 (Colo. App.

1989) (an issue raised on different grounds than those argued in

the trial court is unpreserved). In civil cases, we generally do not

review issues that were not presented to, and ruled on by, the

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juvenile court. People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14.

Therefore, we will not address the adequacy of the Department’s

efforts to investigate the maternal cousin on appeal.

¶ 43 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we

may not disturb its conclusion that there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. See People in Interest of N.A.T., 134

P.3d 535, 538 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that a finding that there

were no less drastic alternatives to termination will be upheld on

review if it is supported by the evidence).

III. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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