Peo in Interest of AGK

25CA0180 Peo in Interest of AGK 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0180
Summit County District Court No. 22JV30005
Honorable Reed W. Owens, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of A.G.K., a Child,

and Concerning K.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

No Appearance for Petitioner

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.C. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for A.G.K. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Summit County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect alleging concerns about

mother’s mental health and the child’s emotional well-being. At

that time, mother and the child’s father shared equal parenting

time. But mother’s time was supervised by maternal grandfather

pursuant to orders entered in a domestic relations case.

Approximately three months later, the parties agreed to remove the

supervision requirement.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

Among other things, mother’s treatment plan required that she

support the child’s mental health, well-being, and relationships

with family members and professionals.

¶4 Later on, due to concerns that mother was intentionally trying

to disrupt the child’s relationship with father, the juvenile court

transferred the child’s primary residence to father and ordered

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mother’s family time to be therapeutically supervised. Mother’s

family time remained supervised for the remainder of the case.

¶5 Nineteen months after filing the petition, the Department

moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to father.

Following a three-day contested hearing, the juvenile court awarded

mother four overnights of unsupervised parenting time every two

weeks and ordered that extraordinary expenses be divided equally

between the parties. Mother appeals.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to

enter an APR and address child support when it maintains

jurisdiction in a case involving a dependent or neglected child.

§ 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA

118, ¶ 10. When allocating parental responsibilities in a

dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must

consider the purposes of the Children’s Code articulated in section

19-1-102, C.R.S. 2024. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278,

1281 (Colo. App. 2005). The overriding purpose of the Children’s

Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing

procedures through which the child’s best interests can be served.

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L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). As a result, the

court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the

child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d

1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996).

¶7 An APR is within the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A

juvenile court abuses its discretion “when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies or

misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

It’s for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to

assess the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243

P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). And when the juvenile court’s

findings have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is

binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the

correct legal standard in making its findings is a question of law

that we review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6,

¶ 10.

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III. Parenting Time

¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by failing to provide her with a path to equal parenting time. We

disagree.

¶9 The juvenile court specifically considered mother’s request for

a plan, or step-up schedule, to get her to equal parenting time. But

given mother’s historical lack of progress with her treatment plan,

her “continuing cycle of . . . conflict or dysregulation” with the

child’s providers and schools, and the uncertainty regarding

mother’s future progress, the court declined to order such a plan.

In so doing, the court conveyed that expanding mother’s parenting

time from supervised was “a bit of a risk.” But the court ultimately

concluded that the schedule was in the child’s best interests

because it promoted her safety while also allowing the parents to

develop their own routines. The record supports the court’s

findings.

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¶ 10 The caseworker noted several concerns, including mother’s

ongoing (1) “future talk”1; (2) inability to follow guidelines and

expectations; (3) insinuations that father wasn’t properly caring for

the child; (4) conflict with the child’s schools; and (5) lack of

appropriate support of the child’s therapy. The caseworker reported

that mother “continue[d] to struggle to communicate openly and

respectfully with professionals regarding [the child’s] education,

development, and behavior,” describing mother’s contact with the

child’s principal, school counselor, and family therapist as

“combative.” Ultimately, the caseworker opined that until mother

could understand the impact of her behavior on the child’s

emotional well-being and the importance of supporting the child’s

positive therapeutic relationships, future improvement was

unlikely.

¶ 11 The court also received testimony from many professionals

involved with mother during the case. The most recent family

1 During the APR hearing, a family time supervisor described

“future talk” as making future promises to or discussing future
plans with the child when the future is unknown. For example,
“future talk” included talking to the child about when she would
return home to mother. The child’s former play therapist explained
that type of discussion could cause stress for the child.

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therapist testified that mother had told her that she believed family

therapy was “pointless.” And the therapist was unable to continue

working with mother and the child due to mother’s failure to sign

her treatment plan. While both family time supervisors —

therapeutic and nontherapeutic — in place at the time of the

hearing provided positive reports regarding mother’s visits with the

child, they indicated that further evaluation was needed before they

could recommend a reduction in the level of supervision. Similarly,

mother’s therapist discussed mother’s therapeutic progress but also

acknowledged that mother had more work to do, such as

eliminating her negative reactions to situations in the community.

¶ 12 Mother asserts that, because she made significant strides

toward addressing the issues raised in her treatment plan and had

a strong bond with the child, the APR wasn’t in the child’s best

interests. But this argument effectively requires us to reweigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,

which we can’t do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 29 (recognizing that we may not reweigh the court’s resolution of

conflicting evidence). Mother also argues that the APR limited her

“exposure” to the child. But in allocating parental responsibilities

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the court’s primary focus must be on the protection and safety of

the child, and not the “custodial interest” of the parent. People in

Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 12.

¶ 13 Because the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the

record, we discern no error.

IV. Extraordinary Expenses

¶ 14 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by ordering

extraordinary expenses to be divided equally between the parents.

We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 15 Regarding extraordinary expenses, the court ordered:

Extraordinary expenses including summer day
camps or after school programs should be split
50/50. Father to provide a request for
reimbursement within 30 days [of] receipt, and
[m]other shall provide payment within 30 days
thereafter. If [m]other objects to a particular
extraordinary expense, she may file a motion
with the [c]ourt within the 30-day response
period. Failure to timely object will preclude
future disputes.

¶ 16 Mother asserts that this order wasn’t in the child’s best

interests. Specifically, mother argues that, because father had sole

decision-making responsibility, the division of expenses gave father

financial control and could cause her to become financially

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overextended. Following the juvenile court’s oral ruling, mother’s

counsel raised these same concerns.

¶ 17 While the court acknowledged mother’s concerns, it ultimately

found that the order was in the child’s best interests. In so finding,

the court considered that (1) joint payment by agreement would give

mother veto power by default; and (2) historically, father had

enrolled the child in activities consistent with a typical child in the

community.

¶ 18 The court’s findings are supported by the record. The

caseworker reported that father demonstrated an ability to

encourage the child’s involvement in activities. She also noted that,

although father made efforts to involve mother in the child’s daily

activities, mother simply responded that she wasn’t in agreement

without providing further explanation.

¶ 19 Mother doesn’t point us to any evidence, other than findings of

mutual domestic violence made by the district court over two years

prior, in support of her assertion that the juvenile court’s order

wasn’t in the child’s best interests. In this case, after hearing the

evidence, the juvenile court concluded that the history of domestic

violence wasn’t the problem. And, as noted before, we can’t reweigh

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the evidence. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. Furthermore, in consideration of

mother’s concerns, the juvenile court added a provision allowing

mother to request court intervention for any disputed expense,

thereby alleviating any potential financial control the order would

have given father.

¶ 20 Thus, we discern no basis for disturbing the court’s division of

extraordinary expenses.

V. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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