Peo in Interest of CLH

25CA0465 Peo in Interest of CLH 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0465
Montrose County District Court No. 23JV30029
Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.L.H. Jr., Jas.L.H., and Jax.L.H., Children,

and Concerning A.L.R. and C.M.H. Sr.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Welling and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

Julie R. Andress, County Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee

Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Colorado, for
Appellant A.L.R.

Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.M.H. Sr.
¶1 A.L.R. (mother) and C.M.H. Sr. (father) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with C.L.H. Jr.,

Jas.L.H., and Jax.L.H. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2023, the Montrose County Department of

Human Services (the Department) received a report that law

enforcement had conducted a welfare check at father’s home and

observed an infected wound on the youngest child’s chin. After the

child was admitted at the hospital, the caseworker suggested a

safety plan to father, but he refused and threatened to discharge

the child from the hospital. Based on concerns of medical neglect,

as well as father’s substance use, the Department removed the

children and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

¶3 The parents admitted to the petition, and the juvenile court

adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. The court then

held a dispositional hearing and adopted treatment plans for the

parents. The parents’ treatment plans required them to cooperate

with the Department and treatment providers, address their

substance abuse and mental health issues, attend family time,

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participate in parenting education and life skills, provide a safe and

stable home for the children, and comply with their criminal cases.

¶4 In August 2024, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held a three-day

evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court granted the Department’s

motion and terminated the parent-child legal relationships between

the parents and the children under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.

2025.

II. Mother’s Appeal

¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by admitting into

evidence the children’s hair follicle test results. We need not reach

the merits of mother’s contention because assuming that the

juvenile court erred, any error is harmless.

¶6 An error in the admission of evidence is harmless if it does not

affect a party’s substantial rights. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. An

error affects a substantial right if it can be said with fair assurance

that it substantially influenced the case’s outcome or impaired the

basic fairness of the trial. People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109,

¶ 22.

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¶7 At the termination hearing, the juvenile court admitted

documents showing that all three children tested positive for

methamphetamine in September 2023, shortly before the

Department initiated this case. It is undisputed that the children

were in father’s care during this time. The caseworker testified

that, when the test results came back positive, the Department

knew that father was responsible for the children’s exposure

because mother “had not even been in the State.” Ultimately, father

admitted that he had exposed the children to methamphetamine,

resulting in the positive test results.

¶8 Therefore, the record shows that father, not mother, exposed

the children to methamphetamine. Neither the Department nor the

guardian ad litem argued that mother had exposed them, and the

juvenile court did not mention the children’s drug tests in its ruling,

much less attribute their positive results to mother’s actions. We

therefore cannot see how this evidence could be used against

mother to justify termination. Indeed, on appeal, mother provides

no explanation as to how this evidence caused her any prejudice.

¶9 And regardless of the court admitting this evidence, the record

supports the juvenile court’s ruling to terminate mother’s parental

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rights. The court acknowledged mother’s inpatient treatment, but it

had concerns with mother’s ability to remain sober given her long

history of use. At the time of the termination hearing, mother did

not have a job, nor did she have a place to live where the children

could live with her. Mother acknowledged that she did not have

permanent housing, admitting she did not know long it would take

for her to secure a job and stable housing following inpatient

treatment and a period of time at sober living. The court also noted

that mother had failed to make all family visits. The court reasoned

that the recent engagement — while commendable — was “simply

too late in the case to know whether” mother’s treatment would

rehabilitate her “and address the issues that led this case to open.”

¶ 10 Therefore, we conclude that any putative error in the

admission of this evidence is harmless, and we reject mother’s

contention.

III. Father’s Appeal

A. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 11 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.

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1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

under section 19-3-604 is a mixed question of fact and law. People

in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶ 13 To terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the

juvenile court must find, among other things, that (1) the parent is

unfit and (2) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), (III). A parent is unfit

if the parent’s conduct or condition renders the parent unable or

unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care. People in

Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). When

deciding whether a parent can become fit within a reasonable time,

the court may consider whether any change has occurred during

the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic or

long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. People in

Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).

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2. Analysis

¶ 14 The juvenile court found that father was unfit based, in large

part, on his substance abuse issues. See § 19-3-604(2)(e) (a parent

may be unfit based on “[e]xcessive use of intoxicating liquors or

controlled substances”). Although the court recognized that father

had made some progress by entering an inpatient treatment facility

forty-five days before the termination hearing, it did not believe that

he could become fit within a reasonable time. See People in Interest

of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. 1998) (even “increased

compliance” over the course of a case may not justify additional

time). In doing so, the court noted father’s overall lack of progress

over nearly sixteen months and the children’s need for permanency,

and it concluded that it was not in the children’s best interests to

“keep the case open to see if [father’s] late engagement [would]

permanently rehabilitate” him. See People in Interest of A.J., 143

P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006) (a court must consider the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs in

deciding what constitutes a reasonable time).

¶ 15 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. It is

undisputed that father had a long history of substance abuse and

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that he was using methamphetamine when the children were

removed from his care. Father did not successfully comply with

outpatient treatment, and he admitted to using substances during

the case. Father tested positive for methamphetamine when he

entered inpatient treatment in December 2024. The caseworker

also testified that the children needed permanency as soon as

possible and that they could not wait for father to continue working

on his sobriety.

¶ 16 Although father made progress toward becoming fit during the

case’s final two months, the evidence indicates that he still had

work to do. The deputy director at father’s inpatient treatment

facility testified that father had successfully completed phase one

(detoxication) and moved on to phase two (cognitive behavioral

therapy) of the three-phase program. Still, the deputy director

noted that, after graduating, father would need to enroll in intensive

outpatient treatment and reside in a sober living facility. Likewise,

the caseworker testified that, even if father successfully completed

inpatient treatment, he still needed to demonstrate sobriety outside

of a structured program, which could take significant time

considering father’s history of substance abuse.

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¶ 17 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that he

could not become fit within a reasonable time because the record

shows that he made “substantial progress” during the case.

Specifically, he points to the evidence establishing his progress over

the case’s last two months, along with other favorable evidence,

such as evidence that he completed parenting education, had stable

housing, and performed well at family time with the children. He

also asserts that, because the record shows that he was on the

“cusp of becoming fit,” the children’s need for permanency was not

a “sufficient justification” to terminate his parental rights.

¶ 18 Although we acknowledge that there is evidence supporting

father’s position, there is also ample evidence, as described above,

supporting the juvenile court’s decision. We must therefore reject

father’s argument because it would require us to reweigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,

which we cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 29.

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B. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 19 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify

him with the children. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

¶ 21 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the juvenile

court must consider whether the department made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the parent with the

child. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025.

The reasonable efforts standard is satisfied if the department

provides appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208.

§ 19-1-103(114). These services may include (1) screening,

assessments, and individual case plans; (2) home-based family and

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crisis counseling; (3) information and referral services; (4) family

time; and (5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

2. Analysis

¶ 22 Relying on the caseworker’s testimony, the juvenile court

found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate father, but he did not adequately participate in the

services to become a fit parent. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012

COA 210, ¶ 12 (the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in determining whether the department made

reasonable efforts). The record supports the court’s findings.

Among other things, the record shows that the Department

provided father with a substance abuse evaluation and referred him

to outpatient treatment services, but as described above, father did

not comply with those services. The Department also provided

father with sobriety monitoring, parenting classes, and supervised

family time.

¶ 23 Still, father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts because the

Department did not timely provide him with substance abuse

resources. We are not persuaded.

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¶ 24 In January 2024, father’s treatment provider closed, and some

of the therapists who had worked there formed a new business.

Father told the caseworker that he wanted to remain with his

therapist at the new business, but the caseworker said that the

Department could not pay for treatment services there because it

did not have a contract with the new business. The caseworker

offered to refer father to an approved provider so the Department

could pay for his treatment, but he declined.

¶ 25 Father asserts that the Department delayed his treatment

because it did not give him a clear answer on whether it would pay

for his services at the new business. To the contrary, the

caseworker testified that she specifically told father that the

Department did not have a contract with the new business and

offered to refer him to a different provider. Father chose to remain

with his therapist, even though he knew that the Department could

not fund those services. Under these circumstances, we cannot say

that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Department made

reasonable efforts.

¶ 26 Father also submits that the Department (1) delayed referring

him to inpatient treatment after he requested it in July 2024 and (2)

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refused to pay for that treatment after his Medicaid lapsed. As to

the former, the caseworker testified that when she discussed

inpatient treatment with father in July 2024, he said that “he

wanted to prove to the Department that he could do it without being

in-patient.” As to the latter, the caseworker said that the

Department did not have additional funds to pay for inpatient

treatment services and had to rely on Medicaid for those services.

See § 19-3-208(2)(b)(V) (requiring departments to provide “[d]rug

and alcohol treatment services” only if additional funding is

available). Regardless, the caseworker testified that father did not

request inpatient services or tell her about the Medicaid issue until

November 2024, and she could not do anything at that point

because she did not have contact with father again until she

discovered that he was already enrolled in treatment.

¶ 27 Finally, father argues that the Department failed to develop an

appropriate treatment plan because the plan did not address

domestic violence. The caseworker testified that domestic violence

was not included as a separate component because it was not one

of the issues that necessitated the case’s filing. The caseworker

said that those issues became a concern later in the case but noted

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that they could be addressed through father’s mental health

component and his individual treatment requirement. Therefore,

the record shows that, although the treatment plan did not include

a domestic violence component, the Department made efforts to

address those issues by providing father with mental health and

substance abuse services. We therefore discern no error.

C. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 28 Finally, father submits that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We

disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 29 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 30 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic

13
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

2. Analysis

¶ 31 Initially, the Department placed the children with paternal

relatives, but it removed them in June 2024 and placed them in

foster care. The Department investigated maternal relatives for

placement, including two home studies in other states, but it did

not find any relatives who were appropriate and willing to accept

placement.

¶ 32 According to the caseworker, father requested that the

Department investigate his stepfather as a placement option after

the Department had already moved to terminate in August 2024.

The caseworker performed a preliminary background check and

discovered that stepfather had several referrals with his own

daughter for neglect and physical abuse. The Department also had

concerns that stepfather could not be a long-term placement

because he remained married to paternal grandmother, who had

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her own serious substance abuse issues. Ultimately, the

caseworker admitted that she never reached out to stepfather

because there were too many issues that could not be mitigated.

¶ 33 In contrast, father testified he had asked the Department to

investigate stepfather when the children were removed from the

relatives in June 2024. Likewise, stepfather testified that he had

called the Department and left several messages asking the

Department to consider him as a placement option, but no one from

the Department ever returned his calls.

¶ 34 Stepfather testified at the hearing that he was still willing to be

a placement for the children. Stepfather said that he had a good

relationship with the children, but he admitted that he had not had

any contact with them since 2023. He did not know about any of

the children’s special needs and claimed that the children “never

needed any behavioral things.” And in stepfather’s opinion, father

had always met the children’s needs.

¶ 35 Based on this record, the juvenile court rejected less drastic

alternatives to termination. In doing so, the court rejected an APR

to stepfather as a less drastic alternative to termination because (1)

the Department ruled him out and (2) “based on his testimony, he

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[did] not appear to be able to meet the children’s needs.” Finally,

based on the caseworker’s expert opinion, the court found that an

APR would not be in the children’s best interest because they

needed the permanency of an adoption. See People in Interest of

A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41 (an APR to a relative is not a less

drastic alternative to termination when it does not provide adequate

permanency or otherwise meet the children’s needs).

¶ 36 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination for two reasons.

We disagree with both.

¶ 37 First, father asserts that the Department did not adequately

investigate a less drastic alternative involving “other members of the

[c]hildren’s extended family.” But father’s assertion fails because,

for purposes of less drastic alternatives, the Department only has a

duty to evaluate family members identified by the parents. See

People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007) (The

department is not obligated to “independently identify and evaluate

other possible placement alternatives.”). And father has not pointed

us to anything in the record to show that he suggested other family

members for placement.

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¶ 38 Second, father maintains that the Department did not

adequately evaluate stepfather. Although father and stepfather

testified about the Department’s lack of efforts in this area, the

caseworker provided contrary testimony that supported the court’s

decision. Because we cannot override the court’s credibility

determinations to reach a different decision, we reject father’s

assertion. See A.M., ¶ 15 (noting that witness credibility

determinations are left to the juvenile court’s sound discretion). In

any event, we also reject father’s assertion because, even assuming

that the stepfather was an appropriate placement option, the

juvenile court found, with record support, that an APR was not a

less drastic alternative because the children needed the

permanency of an adoption. See People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 30 (An APR “is not a viable less drastic alternative if the

child needs a stable, permanent home that can only be assured by

adoption.”).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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