Peo in Interest of LD

25CA0608 Peo in Interest of LD 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0608
El Paso County District Court No. 21JV502
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.D., a Child,

and Concerning W.D.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Sara Sonsalla, Assistant County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, W.D. (father)

appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for L.D.

(the child) to maternal grandparents. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2021, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the

child and her sister, K.D., who is not the subject of this appeal.

The Department received reports that father had threatened to kill

himself, the child, and K.D., and later learned that father had been

placed on a mental health hold. In addition, the Department

alleged in the petition that father had a history of mental health

issues, substance abuse, and family violence.

¶3 Father moved to Texas shortly after the case opened and

remained there for the duration of the case. After father admitted

the allegations in the petition, the juvenile court adjudicated the

then eight-year-old child dependent or neglected and adopted a

treatment plan for father. Among other terms, father’s treatment

plan required him to address his mental health issues and

substance abuse. The child was placed with her maternal

grandmother and maternal grandmother’s husband (maternal

1
grandparents) in Michigan in May 2022, where she remained for the

remainder of the case.

¶4 The Department moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandmother. After conducting

an evidentiary hearing in February 2025, the court granted the

motion and ordered that father would have supervised parenting

time.

¶5 Father appeals, claiming the court erred by awarding an APR

to maternal grandparents. We affirm.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative

purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S.

2024. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding

purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and

safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best

interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, if a court allocates

parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the

child’s best interests, People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208

2
(Colo. App. 2011); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, and must

focus on the protection and safety of the child and not the parents’

custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.

¶7 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within

the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. The credibility of witnesses, the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as

the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are within the

juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d

244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). And when the juvenile court’s findings

have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding

on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct

legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. People in

Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶8 In support of his contention that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by awarding an APR to maternal grandparents, father

3
points to his progress on his treatment plan and the child’s

“expressed wishes to be returned home to [f]ather or placed with her

paternal grandmother.” We perceive no error.

¶9 The court found that maternal grandparents met all the child’s

needs, including the child’s mental health concerns. Noting the

child had “been through a lot of trauma,” the court found that

maternal grandparents provided the child with stability,

consistency, and commitment during the child’s nearly three-year

placement with them. And the court found that maternal

grandparents had also supported the child’s relationship with her

parents and K.D.

¶ 10 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

testified that maternal grandparents were consistent caregivers who

met the child’s needs, and that the child had been stable during her

placement with them. For instance, the child was participating in

individual therapy at the time of the hearing. Maternal

grandparents also supported the child’s relationship with her

parents and K.D., all of whom lived outside Michigan at the time of

the APR hearing.

4
¶ 11 The court also found compelling reasons not to return the

child home to father. See People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121,

¶ 43 (“[T]he department must establish a compelling reason why it

is not in the child’s best interests to return home before the court

may award permanent custody to a nonparent.”). Specifically, the

court found that while father had made progress during the case,

he was not “fully to the place” where he could meet the child’s

needs. The court also found that the child was still working on her

relationship with father.

¶ 12 The record supports these findings, as well. The caseworker

testified that she had not been made aware that father had

completed a mental health evaluation. And, though father

completed a substance use evaluation in Texas, the caseworker

testified that there were “issues” with the evaluation because it did

not recommend treatment even though father had been diagnosed

with significant use disorder, and did not require a urinalysis test

or consider collateral information. Thus, the caseworker testified

that before considering father as a potential placement option, he

would need to complete a mental health evaluation and a

5
“legitimate substance abuse” evaluation to determine his treatment

needs.

¶ 13 Moreover, the caseworker testified that father wasn’t yet able

to parent at the time of the hearing because he was “still getting

stable himself.” She noted that father was incarcerated for five

months during the case due to charges related to substance use.

And she characterized the child’s relationship with father as

“strained,” noting that during portions of the case, the child refused

to speak with father due to her anger toward him.

¶ 14 Based on these findings, the court concluded that granting an

APR to maternal grandparents was in the child’s best interests.

And because the court rested its determination on findings that

enjoy record support, its resolution of the evidence is binding on

review. See B.R.D., ¶ 15. On this record, we perceive no abuse of

discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14.

¶ 15 Nor are we persuaded by father’s argument that the court

erred by entering the APR given his progress on his treatment plan

and the child’s wishes about placement.

¶ 16 To be sure, the court heard testimony that father made

progress during the case. The court also heard testimony that the

6
child periodically mentioned she would be willing to be placed with

father, so long as K.D. was also placed with him. But, upon

weighing all the evidence — including evidence suggesting that

father could not yet meet the child’s needs — the court determined

that returning the child home to father was not appropriate for the

reasons described above. It is exclusively within the juvenile court’s

discretion to weigh the evidence. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50.

¶ 17 The court also considered the child’s wish, expressed to her

guardian ad litem a few days before the hearing, to be placed with

her paternal grandmother. According to the guardian ad litem (who

nonetheless supported an APR to maternal grandparents), the child

expressed this wish because maternal grandparents took away her

internet privileges for a month for not cleaning her room.

Additionally, paternal grandmother had never volunteered to the

Department to act as a placement and had not undergone a

background check or kinship study at the time of the APR hearing.

¶ 18 The court ultimately found that the child’s report about

maternal grandparents’ discipline did not raise safety concerns,

such as emotional or physical abuse. Rather, the court found that

the child’s dissatisfaction with her placement coincided with the

7
loss of her internet access, deeming this a case of the child

“pushing . . . boundaries.” Again, because the court’s findings

enjoy record support, we defer to its resolution of the evidence. See

B.R.D., ¶ 15.

¶ 19 In essence, father asks us to reweigh the evidence and to

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we

cannot do. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62; see

also A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250 (“[I]t is important to defer to the

[juvenile] court . . . when it hears contradictory testimony on

material issues . . . .”).

¶ 20 Finally, to the extent that father asserts the court should have

delayed its APR ruling to allow further investigation regarding the

child’s placement preference, we are not persuaded. Based upon

the evidence, the court determined that further delaying the

resolution of the case was not in the child’s best interests. And,

indeed, the case had already been open for over three years by the

time of the APR hearing.

¶ 21 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, and

its APR based on those findings was neither a misapplication of the

8
law nor manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Accordingly,

the court did not abuse its discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.

9