Peo v. Amoako-Asiamah

22CA0825 Peo v Amoako-Asiamah 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0825
Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR1019
Honorable Jason D. Carrithers, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Riddick Jones Amoako-Asiamah,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Schutz and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Riddick Jones Amoako-Asiamah, appeals his

convictions for intent to manufacture or distribute more than fifty

pounds of marijuana, conspiracy to do the same, and cultivation of

more than thirty marijuana plants. Because Amoako-Asiamah did

not receive a fair trial, we reverse the judgment and remand for a

new trial. Nevertheless, we address the court’s rulings on the

motion to suppress and motion to dismiss for a speedy trial

violation because they are likely to arise in the same context on

remand.

I. Background

¶2 The evidence the jury heard at trial would have allowed it to

find the following facts. Amoako-Asiamah and his wife, Melina

Chacon,1 rented a home in Jefferson County. After several people

in the neighborhood submitted complaints regarding a constant

very strong odor of marijuana emanating from the home, West

Metro Drug Task Force (WMDTF) Detective Janie Enriquez began an

investigation. She conducted surveillance on Amoako-Asiamah’s

1 Melina Chacon was a codefendant with Amoako-Asiamah, but

their cases were severed before trial. She is not a party to this
appeal.

1
home for approximately six months before the WMDTF obtained a

warrant and searched the home and his vehicle. The search found

approximately 362 marijuana plants, 53 pounds of marijuana

product, approximately $47,500 in cash, expenditure lists regarding

the marijuana grow, and ledgers detailing business operations and

transactions.

¶3 The prosecution initially charged Amoako-Asiamah with intent

to manufacture or distribute more than fifty pounds of marijuana in

violation of section 18-18-406(2)(b)(I), (III)(A), C.R.S. 2024, and

cultivation of more than thirty marijuana plants in violation of

section 18-18-406(3)(a)(I), (III)(A). It later added charges for

conspiracy to manufacture or distribute marijuana in violation of

section 18-18-406(2)(b)(I), (III)(A), and harassment in violation of

section 18-9-111(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. The prosecution dismissed the

harassment charge during trial.

¶4 Over the course of the proceedings, Amoako-Asiamah had

three attorneys but eventually elected to proceed pro se. On the

day of his trial, Amoako-Asiamah requested counsel, but the trial

court found that he had waived his right and denied his request to

revoke that waiver. Amoako-Asiamah then decided to remain in his

2
holding cell instead of participating in the trial. On the second day

of trial, he returned to the courtroom and made an unsworn

statement to the jury. But aside from that statement, he was

absent for the entire trial, and the defendant’s table lay empty. The

jury convicted him on all submitted charges, and he was sentenced

to twelve years in prison, with all counts running concurrently.

II. Analysis

¶5 Amoako-Asiamah contends that the trial court erred by

(1) permitting him to make an unsworn statement to the jury,

resulting in a fundamentally unfair trial; (2) denying his motion to

suppress evidence obtained from the search of his home;

(3) violating his right to a speedy trial; (4) failing to obtain a waiver

of his right to be present for trial and violating Crim. P. 43; and

(5) denying his day-of-trial request to appoint counsel. We address

each of these contentions in turn.

A. Amoako-Asiamah Did Not Receive
a Fundamentally Fair Trial

¶6 Amoako-Asiamah contends that the trial court erred when it

allowed him to make a statement to the jury, violating his rights to

due process and a fair trial. Viewing the statement within the full

3
context of his trial, we agree that the result was so prejudicial that

it violated his right to a fair trial.

1. Additional Background

¶7 The course of this case was difficult, and the trial court

managed multiple contentious situations as the case progressed

toward trial. The day of trial arrived after multiple continuances,

delays, appearances and withdrawals of counsel, and interlocutory

appeals. On that day, Amoako-Asiamah refused to leave his cell

and go to court. So he was extracted from his cell and arrived for

the trial wearing his jail clothes.

¶8 The court called the case outside the presence of the

prospective jurors, and Amoako-Asiamah immediately asked to be

represented by an attorney, specifically the deputy public defender

who had appeared at a previous hearing. He said, “It is my

constitutional right to be represented by an attorney. And I am not

waiving my Sixth Amendment right, right to counsel.” Additionally,

he asked to be released on a personal recognizance bond and to

again waive the speedy trial deadline. The court found that he had

previously waived the right to counsel and that he was making the

request for the purpose of delay.

4
¶9 Amoako-Asiamah then engaged in an exchange with the court

about whether he would change into civilian garb for the trial.

Amoako-Asiamah asserted that he was “not here to go to trial or

anything.” And after another back-and-forth conversation,

Amoako-Asiamah stated, “I want you to proceed this trial without

me. Please take me back to my cell, as I have — I was trying to do.

I am — not without a lawyer, I’m not going to participate in the

trial.”

¶ 10 The trial court inquired further regarding Amoako-Asiamah’s

intent to be absent from the trial. Amoako-Asiamah then spoke to

“make the record” regarding speedy trial and his right to counsel.

He then said, “I don’t want to see the jury. I want to go back to my

cell.” The court found that Amoako-Asiamah made a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be present for the

trial. And Amoako-Asiamah was then returned to his cell.

¶ 11 After this decision, the court sent a deputy to ask if he wanted

to return to trial every hour throughout the trial. On the second

day of trial, Amoako-Asiamah decided to return to make a

statement to the jury, but after a recess he again went back to his

cell. So other than the trial statement — described below —

5
Amoako-Asiamah was absent from the trial proceedings, without

counsel, and the defense table was empty throughout the course of

the trial.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 “The due process clauses of the United States and Colorado

constitutions guarantee every criminal defendant the right to a fair

trial.” Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo. 2000); see also

U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 25. And the

right to a trial by jury “comprehends a fair verdict, free from the

influence or poison of evidence which should never have been

admitted, and the admission of which arouses passions and

prejudices which tend to destroy the fairness and impartiality of the

jury.” Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1962). We review

de novo whether a defendant’s due process rights were violated.

People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54, ¶ 40.

¶ 13 “The order of proof at trial is a matter within the trial court’s

sound discretion, and courts are given wide latitude in deciding

these matters.” People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 376 (Colo. App.

2009) (citing CRE 611(a)). However, a court’s discretion is always

6
limited by the requirements of the Colorado and Federal

Constitutions. Id.

3. Amoako-Asiamah’s Trial Statement
Deprived Him of Due Process

¶ 14 We view the overall fairness of a trial retrospectively and

recognize that this is “an advantage which the trial court does not

have.” Oaks, 371 P.2d at 447. We also recognize the difficult

choices these proceedings presented to the trial court and the pains

it took to manage the case.

¶ 15 During the middle of the prosecution’s case, Amoako-Asiamah

requested that the trial court allow him to make a statement to the

jury. The trial court inquired as to what he meant by a statement

and explicitly clarified the following:

THE COURT: Okay. And so sir, I want . . . to
make sure I understand you. You’re intending
to -- when I bring the jury in, you want to
make a statement to them, not under oath,
and not as part of closing, and then you would
like to be let out of the courtroom and
returned back to your cell voluntarily; . . . am I
understanding?

[AMOAKO-ASIAMAH]: Yes.

¶ 16 The court informed Amoako-Asiamah that it believed the

action he was requesting would be prejudicial to his case. But after

7
Amoako-Asiamah persisted in wishing to address the jury, the trial

court nevertheless allowed him to make the statement after advising

him that doing so would waive his right to remain silent. The court

also advised him that it would instruct the jury that his statement

was not under oath and that the jury should disregard any portion

of the statement that went outside of the evidence presented. The

prosecution objected to the idea, noting that the case was “still on

the People’s [case-in-chief] at [that] moment in time.” The trial

court noted the objection, and then it permitted Amoako-Asiamah

to make his unsworn statement.2

¶ 17 It is at this point, in our view, that the trial went off the tracks.

Amoako-Asiamah’s statement was rambling and incoherent,

triggered over thirty objections from the prosecution, and contained

numerous instances of Amoako-Asiamah arguing with the

2 The People argue that Amoako-Asiamah invited any error arising

from the trial statement. We are not convinced that this is the
correct lens through which to view this issue. Amoako-Asiamah’s
argument does not turn on the statement in isolation. Instead, we
look at the entirety of the trial with the benefit of hindsight. See
Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1962). In doing so, we
determine that his trial was no longer fundamentally fair and
violated his due process rights. While Amoako-Asiamah
undoubtedly kindled the flame, we cannot ignore the resulting blaze
or conclude that it was entirely a result of his actions.

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prosecutor and the court about what topics he was allowed to

discuss. It was unclear what, if anything, Amoako-Asiamah was

actually allowed to say to the jury. The end result is a garbled

record reflecting the trial court’s valiant, but ultimately futile,

attempts to address the objections, keep Amoako-Asiamah within

the bounds of trial procedure, and maintain control over the

proceedings. The statement ultimately concluded with the trial

court excusing the jury in the midst of an argument between

Amoako-Asiamah, the prosecution, and the court about the

presentation of evidence.3

¶ 18 At this point in the trial, the jurors had seen the following:

• an empty defendant’s table during voir dire;

• no opening statement from the defense;

• an empty defendant’s table during the entirety of the trial

except for the unsworn statement;

• Amoako-Asiamah appearing in jail garb and giving an

unsworn, incoherent, rambling statement devoid of

3 We note that Amoako-Asiamah did not argue that he was in fact

permitted to testify about the multitude of objected-to topics he
sought to raise.

9
connection to the evidence presented so far, which drew

constant objections from the prosecutor that the trial

court sustained;

• Amoako-Asiamah yelling, screaming, and arguing with

the court and the prosecutor; and

• an empty defendant’s table upon the jurors’ return to the

courtroom.

¶ 19 In effect, the only impression that jurors were left with of

Amoako-Asiamah himself was that of him ranting.4 The trial court

recognized this fact, noting that “[it] would not be surprised if a

reasonable juror certainly drew some impressions upon Mr.

Amoako[-Asiamah]’s presence here today. And they’re probably not

favorable, because he was yelling and screaming.” Further, there is

evidence in the record that, after the statement, the jurors were

actually confused by the trial’s procedures. When the jury

re-entered the courtroom, the trial court received a jury question

asking why Amoako-Asiamah did not have a defense attorney. And

while the court correctly answered it, that question demonstrated

4 We note that Amoako-Asiamah’s competency to stand trial was

not raised in this appeal.

10
that the impact of Amoako-Asiamah’s statement was front and

center in the jurors’ minds. See Oaks, 371 P.2d at 446

(“[N]umerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be

deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair

trial, in which event a reversal would be required.”).

¶ 20 Additionally, the statement was outside the boundaries

prescribed for a trial. CRE 611(a) requires that a “court shall

exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating

witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the

interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the

truth.” But Amoako-Asiamah’s statement could not serve as

testimony, as he was not sworn to tell the truth. See CRE 603

(“Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that

the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation

administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness’s

conscience and impress on the witness’s mind the duty to do so.”).

Yet it was also not a closing argument because the evidence had not

closed, Amoako-Asiamah had not observed any of the evidence and

testimony admitted at trial, and the jury had not yet been

instructed. See People v. Rojas, 181 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Colo. App.

11
2008) (“Closing argument must be confined to the evidence

admitted at trial, the inferences that can reasonably and fairly be

drawn from it, and the instructions of law submitted to the jury.”).

¶ 21 Further the statement itself could never have been beneficial

to Amoako-Asiamah’s case. At best, the jury could not consider it,

and at worst, as the trial court correctly predicted, it would

prejudice Amoako-Asiamah to the jury. See People v. Avila, 2019

COA 145, ¶ 53 (“A jury’s exposure to extraneous information

implicates a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.”), overruled

on other grounds by Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1. The end result

was that the jury’s only exposure to Amoako-Asiamah (or his case)

was a highly prejudicial rant with no grounding in the evidence or

appropriate trial procedure. See Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125

P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005) (The right to a fair trial “includes the

right to have an impartial jury decide the accused’s guilt or

innocence solely on the basis of the evidence properly introduced at

trial.”).

¶ 22 We recognize that, by allowing the statement, the trial court

was attempting to protect Amoako-Asiamah’s right to present his

case. Nonetheless, the attempt failed, and the result was too great

12
a deviation from the rules of evidence and standard procedure of a

criminal trial. See CRE 603; CRE 611(a)(1). When viewed alongside

the other irregularities during the trial — such as the lack of

counsel and Amoako-Asiamah’s absence from the proceedings — we

cannot conclude that Amoako-Asiamah received a fundamentally

fair trial, and thus due process. See People v. Dahl, 160 P.3d 301,

304 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Due process is satisfied by ‘a jury capable

and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a

trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to

determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.’”

(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982))).

¶ 23 Given all of this, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is

“to put the train back on the tracks [before] the point [at which] it

derailed.” People v. Chalchi-Sevilla, 2019 COA 75, ¶ 23. Thus, we

reverse for a new trial. See Oaks, 371 P.2d at 446.

B. The Motion to Suppress

¶ 24 We address two of Amoako-Asiamah’s remaining contentions

as they are likely to arise in the same context on remand. He first

contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to

13
suppress evidence obtained from the search of his home because

the underlying affidavit lacked probable cause. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 25 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit

unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Cox, 2018 CO 88,

¶ 7. “Under both constitutions, ‘a search warrant may only be

issued upon a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the

things to be seized.’” Id. (quoting People v. Kerst, 181 P.3d 1167,

1171 (Colo. 2008)).

¶ 26 “Probable cause exists when an affidavit for a search warrant

alleges sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to

believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located at

the place to be searched.” People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1112

(Colo. 2003). “An affidavit is considered ‘bare-bones,’ and therefore

an officer cannot reasonably rely on it, where the affidavit fails to

establish a ‘minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity

and the place to be searched.’” People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925,

14
941 (Colo. 2009) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591,

596 (6th Cir. 2004)).

¶ 27 “A magistrate’s probable cause determination is generally

given ‘great deference’ and is not subject to de novo review.” Cox,

¶ 10 (quoting People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 481 (Colo. 2002)).

Therefore, our task is to assess whether the magistrate had a

“substantial basis” for issuing the search warrant. Id. And “[a]ny

doubts must be resolved in favor of the magistrate’s probable cause

determination.” Id.

¶ 28 When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to

the court’s factual findings and will not disturb those findings if

they are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v.

Brown, 217 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo. 2009). However, we review the

trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Id.

2. The Magistrate Did Not Err
in Finding Probable Cause

¶ 29 Amoako-Asiamah argues that the affidavit to support probable

cause for the search warrant was so bare bones that it failed to

establish a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity

and the place to be searched.

15
¶ 30 The affidavit, sworn by Detective Enriquez, detailed her

investigation and included the following statements:

• Detective Enriquez and nearby neighbors observed the

very strong odor of marijuana emanating from the home.

• Detective Enriquez surveilled the home for six months,

from September 2019 to March 2020.

• Detective Enriquez noted a dramatic decrease in the

smell of unburned marijuana from October 2019 until

late February 2020.

• Detective Enriquez then noted a dramatic increase in the

smell of unburned marijuana in March over the course of

a week, which was also observed by two other law

enforcement officers.

• Based on Detective Enriquez’s training and experience, a

cyclical decrease in the smell of unburned marijuana

over a period of months, followed by a dramatic increase,

was indicative of growing and harvesting plants.

• The home had two visible electrical boxes and a modified

or aftermarket system, indicating increased electricity

usage.

16
• The home had seven cameras, with one pointed directly

at the electrical box, indicating a high concern for

security.

• Based on Detective Enriquez’s training and experience, it

was unusual for those who grow the legal amount of

twelve plants to have a modified or aftermarket electrical

system on the home, as well as such a high concern for

security.

¶ 31 None of these statements, in isolation, conclusively

demonstrate criminal activity. However, “the totality of the

circumstances test for probable cause is an ‘all-things-considered

approach,’ and its ‘ultimate touchstone’ is reasonableness.” People

v. Zuniga, 2016 CO 52, ¶ 20 (first quoting Florida v. Harris, 568

U.S. 237, 244 (2013); and then quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S.

373, 381 (2014)).

¶ 32 Amoako-Asiamah argues that having two electrical boxes and

many cameras is wholly innocent and doesn’t suggest criminality.

That may be true in some circumstances, but our courts have noted

that “hydroponic growing equipment and excessive electrical usage

can be inherently suspicious activities known to indicate indoor

17
marijuana cultivation.” People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1171

(Colo. 1998). Regardless, “[a] possible innocent explanation or

lawful alternative may add a level of ambiguity to a fact’s probative

value in a probable cause determination, but it does not destroy the

fact’s usefulness outright and require it to be disregarded.” Zuniga,

¶ 20.

¶ 33 Multiple law enforcement officers and other individuals

corroborated the consistent smell of unburned marijuana,

indicating cultivation. And in her affidavit, the detective described

the cyclical nature of the unburned marijuana odor, how that

cyclical odor indicates cultivation, the aftermarket electrical

equipment, and how that additional electrical equipment indicates

an impermissible number of plants. Given these circumstances, we

conclude that the affidavit was not “bare-bones” and that the

magistrate had a substantial basis for issuing the search warrant.

See Cox, ¶ 10; see also Kerst, 181 P.3d at 1172 (“Due consideration

should be given to a law enforcement officer’s experience and

training in determining the significance of the observations set forth

in the affidavit.”).

18
¶ 34 Thus, we discern no error in the trial court’s denial of

Amoako-Asiamah’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the

search of his home.

C. Speedy Trial

¶ 35 Amoako-Asiamah next contends that the trial court violated

his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The People

argue that Amoako-Asiamah failed to present any argument or

analysis explaining how the trial court abused its discretion by

continuing trial or violated his statutory or constitutional rights.

We agree with the People.

¶ 36 Amoako-Asiamah first cites the speedy trial statute, section

18-1-405, C.R.S. 2024. But the sum total of his argument

regarding his statutory right is: “The court here granted the State’s

continuance owing to witness availability issues. See

[§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(I)]. The defendant contends that the court abused

its discretion when it did so, violating his right to speedy trial, and

that the convictions should therefore be vacated.”

¶ 37 He next cites Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972),

which contains the factors used to evaluate whether a defendant’s

19
constitutional speedy trial right has been violated. He argues in

support:

Here, Mr. Amoako-Asiamah was out of custody
at the time and the length of the delay was
unreasonable. Second, the reason for the
delay — the unavailability of witnesses for the
case — constituted an insufficient reason for
delay. Third, Mr. Amoako-Asiamah had
asserted his right to a speedy trial. Fourth,
the prejudice to Mr. Amoako-Asiamah was
significant as he was out of custody and a
prompt resolution of the case very important
under the circumstances. The defendant
contends that the court abused its discretion
when it did so, violating his right to speedy
trial, and that the convictions should therefore
be vacated.

¶ 38 In the answer brief, the People point out that these arguments

are bare bones and undeveloped. But Amoako-Asiamah doesn’t

respond to those arguments in his reply brief or attempt to expand

his argument by explaining how the court’s actions violated his

statutory or constitutional speedy trial rights. Instead, he lets his

arguments stand as bald assertions.

¶ 39 “[W]e will not consider a bald legal proposition presented

without argument or development.” People v. Rios, 2020 COA 2, ¶ 7

n.1; see C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B); see also People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551,

555 (Colo. App. 2003). And while we don’t do so here, we note that

20
“[a]n appellant’s failure to respond in the reply brief to an argument

made in the answer brief may be taken as a concession.” People v.

Bondsteel, 2015 COA 165, ¶ 61 n.6, aff’d, 2019 CO 26, and

overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6. Under

these circumstances, we decline to review this issue further.

D. Remaining Contentions

¶ 40 Finally, Amoako-Asiamah contends that the trial court

(1) violated his right to be present at trial under the Colorado and

Federal Constitutions and Crim. P. 43; and (2) erred by denying his

day-of-trial request to appoint an attorney to represent him or, in

the alternative, by failing to sua sponte appoint him advisory

counsel. We conclude that these contentions of error are unlikely

to arise in the same context on remand. We therefore decline to

address them. See People v. Newton, 2022 COA 59, ¶ 7 n.1.

III. Disposition

¶ 41 Thus, we perceive no error in the trial court’s rulings on the

motion to suppress and the motion to dismiss for a speedy trial

violation. See Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 906 P.2d 72, 79

(Colo. 1995) (“Conclusions of an appellate court on issues presented

21
to it as well as rulings logically necessary to sustain such

conclusions become the law of the case.”).

¶ 42 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is

remanded for a new trial.

JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

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