Peo v. Brooks

24CA0966 Peo v Brooks 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0966
Weld County District Court No. 09CR959
Honorable Julie C. Hoskins, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jason Trevor Brooks,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jason Trevor Brooks, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Jason Trevor Brooks, appeals the district court’s

order denying his most recent Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a

hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2010, Brooks pleaded guilty to four counts of securities

fraud. As part of the plea, he agreed to pay restitution. The district

court accepted the plea, sentenced Brooks to an aggregate sentence

of thirty-two years in the custody of the Department of Corrections,

and ordered him to pay $5,131,760.96 in restitution. Brooks filed a

direct appeal but later dismissed it. The mandate issued in 2011.

¶3 Thereafter, Brooks filed numerous unsuccessful

postconviction motions and appeals. See People v. Brooks, (Colo.

App. No. 12CA1781, Mar. 6, 2014) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(f)) (Brooks I); People v. Brooks, (Colo. App. No. 16CA0755,

June 29, 2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Brooks II);

People v. Brooks, (Colo. App. No. 18CA0366, Mar. 28, 2019) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Brooks III); People v. Brooks,

(Colo. App. No. 19CA1032, Feb. 6, 2020) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)) (Brooks IV); People v. Brooks, (Colo App. No.

22CA0316) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Brooks V).

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¶4 In April 2024, Brooks filed the postconviction motion

underlying this appeal. In it, he alleged that (1) his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to advise him that his restitution

obligation would remain enforceable even after he discharged his

sentence; (2) the district court provided a constitutionally deficient

Crim. P. 11 advisement concerning his obligation to pay restitution;

and (3) the interest imposed on the restitution amount violated the

Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Brooks

acknowledged that his motion was untimely and successive but

argued that it fell within exceptions to those procedural bars.

¶5 The district court denied the motion in a written order,

concluding that it was both untimely and successive. Brooks

appeals, claiming that the district court erred by denying his motion

without a hearing. Because his motion was untimely and

successive, we disagree.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 Crim. P. 35(c) permits defendants to challenge their

convictions and sentences on multiple grounds. See Crim. P.

35(c)(2). But such a motion is subject to two procedural bars.

First, absent justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, the claim must

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be brought within three years of the date the conviction became

final (for non-class 1 felonies). § 16-5-402(1), (2)(d) C.R.S. 2024;

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I). And second, subject to certain exceptions, the

district court is required to deny any claim that is successive —

that is, a claim that was raised and resolved, or that could have

been presented, in a previous appeal or postconviction proceeding.

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII).

¶7 We review de novo the denial of a motion for postconviction

relief without an evidentiary hearing. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO

20, ¶ 14. Likewise, we review de novo whether a motion for

postconviction relief alleges facts that, if true, would establish

justifiable excuse or excusable neglect to warrant a hearing on the

application of this exception to the time bar set forth in section 16-

5-402(1), see People v. Hinojos, 2019 CO 60, ¶ 12, and whether a

postconviction claim is successive, see People v. Thompson, 2020

COA 117, ¶ 42.

III. Analysis

¶8 Initially, we reject Brooks’s contention that the district court

abused its discretion by not reading the brief attached to his Form

4 motion. That is because, as noted, our review is de novo, and we

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may affirm the district court’s order for any reason supported by

the record. People v. Hamm, 2019 COA 90, ¶ 23. Having reviewed

the record, we conclude that the district court did not err by ruling

that Brooks failed to establish justifiable excuse or excusable

neglect to excuse the untimely filing and successive nature of his

Crim. P. 35(c) motion.

¶9 First, Brooks asserts that he had a justifiable excuse or

demonstrated excusable neglect for the late filing because he could

not have brought his present constitutional challenges until after

the United States Supreme Court decided Class v. United States,

583 U.S. 174 (2018). But Brooks made this same argument in

Brooks V. See Brooks V, slip op. at ¶ 5. We agree with the division

in Brooks V that Brooks could have collaterally attacked his

conviction on constitutional grounds before the United States

Supreme Court announced Class. See id. at ¶ 13.

¶ 10 Next, Brooks asserts there was justifiable excuse or excusable

neglect for his late filing because he was not aware that his

restitution obligation would remain enforceable even after he

discharged his sentence and “$3.6 million was stolen from him by

the State on March 26, 2024.”

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¶ 11 The record shows that restitution has been an important issue

for Brooks throughout the more than thirteen years of

postconviction proceedings in this and the related cases. For

example, in the supplement to Brooks’s first Crim. P. 35(c) motion,

filed in 2011, he claimed that “one of the key reasons he took the

plea offer was to limit his criminal and financial exposure” and, had

he been advised that “his criminal and financial exposure would

include all the charges, including dismissed ones, he would not

have [pleaded] guilty and would have gone to trial.” In Brooks’s

second postconviction motion, filed in 2014, he clarified that “he

was aware of the financial restitution exposure” but did not

understand that his plea included an admission that he

proximately caused damage to all the listed victims. In his 2015

Crim. P. 35(b) motion requesting reduction of his sentence, Brooks

noted that “he has his entire life to pay back restitution.” And in

the series of postconviction motions he filed between 2015 and

2019, Brooks challenged the interest that had accrued on his

restitution obligation. See Brooks II; Brooks III; Brooks IV.

¶ 12 This record supports a finding that, long before 2024, Brooks

had reason to question the validity of his conviction as it relates to

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the claims raised in the underlying postconviction motion before

2024, and that there were no circumstances or outside influences

that hindered him from pursuing these issues much earlier. See

People v. Slusher, 43 P.3d 647, 651 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[R]ecent

discovery of a legal basis for a collateral attack on a conviction does

not constitute excusable neglect where the defendant has not

otherwise demonstrated some unavoidable hindrance that would

cause a reasonably prudent person to neglect to pursue timely

collateral relief.”). Because Brooks did not allege facts that, if true,

would justify his decade-late Crim. P. 35(c) motion, the district

court properly denied it as time barred.

¶ 13 We also conclude that the denial of Brooks’s motion was

appropriate under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII) because, to the extent he

raised new claims in the motion, he could have raised them in one

of his prior postconviction motions or appeals. We are

unpersuaded by Brooks’s argument that these claims have never

previously been litigated “as they were premised on new evidence”

that “could not have been presented previously through the exercise

of due diligence.” True, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(b) provides an

exception for claims “based on evidence that could not have been

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discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.”

However, as discussed above, Brooks did not allege sufficient facts

to show that he could not have previously discovered these claims

through the exercise of due diligence.

¶ 14 Nor are we persuaded that Brooks’s claim relating to the

change in the law addressing the accrual of interest on restitution

orders for inmates serving a sentence in the Department of

Corrections “cannot be procedurally barred.” As Brooks points out,

the addition of section 18-1.3-603(4)(b.5)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2024, which

effected this change, took effect in 2019. See Ch. 303, secs. 1, 3, §

18-1.3-603, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 2778-79. And because he could

have raised, but failed to raise, this claim in his prior 2021

postconviction motion, the district court did not err by denying it.

See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII).

¶ 15 Accordingly, because the exceptions to Rule 35(c)’s time

limitations and successiveness bar do not apply to Brooks’s claims,

the district court properly denied his motion.

IV. Disposition

¶ 16 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.

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