Marriage of Kowalik

24CA1136 Marriage of Kowalik 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1136
Arapahoe County District Court No. 21DR800
Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Anne Patricia Kowalik,

Appellee,

and

Thaddeus Stefan Kowalik,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Allen Vellone Wolf Helfrich & Factor P.C., James S. Helfrich, Denver, Colorado;
Meyers Family Law, Thomas A. Meyers, III, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellee

Anne Whalen Gill, LLC, Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Thaddeus

Stefan Kowalik (husband) and Anne Patricia Kowalik (wife),

husband appeals the district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision holding husband liable for a loss of funds resulting from a

fraudulent wire transfer. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

A. Dissolution Proceedings

¶2 After twenty-six years of marriage, wife petitioned for

dissolution in 2021. The parties executed a separation agreement

in which husband agreed to pay wife roughly $375,000, as follows:

(1) $120,000 due within fourteen days of entry of the dissolution

decree, and (2) $255,000 representing her share of the proceeds

from the sale of the marital home (with no set due date). The

agreement indicated that husband’s attorney, Randy Corporon, held

those funds in his Colorado Lawyer Trust Account Foundation

(COLTAF) account. The agreement also required each party to

indemnify the other for any assigned debts or obligations, including

costs, interest, penalties, and attorney fees incurred to enforce the

agreement.

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¶3 The parties filed an affidavit asking that the district court

enter the dissolution decree without their appearance at a hearing.

¶4 On May 19, 2022, the district court issued the decree and

incorporated the separation agreement.

B. Fraudulent Wire Transfer

¶5 The parties stipulated to the following facts.

¶6 On May 17, 2022, an unknown hacker gained unauthorized

access to wife’s attorney’s email account. The attorney did not see

emails exchanged between the hacker and others.

¶7 On May 19, after the dissolution decree entered, the hacker

(posing as wife’s attorney) emailed Corporon, indicating that wife

could not accept a $375,000 physical check and requested that he

wire the funds to an “escrow bank account.” Less than an hour

later, the hacker sent another email, asking that the funds instead

be wired to a “trading account” in Hong Kong because wife was

“travelling out for some business.”

¶8 That same day, the hacker (posing as wife) emailed Corporon

and attached wire instructions, which named, as the sole recipient,

“Sonicmaster Corporation Limited,” with a “principal address at a

Hong Kong shopping arcade.” The signature block included wife’s

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name followed by the title, “Instructor Fair Trade Partner,” and the

email address that the hacker used differed from the one wife had

previously disclosed to Corporon.

¶9 The hacker’s emails contained grammatical and spelling errors

and used “unique” phrasing. The emails deviated from wife’s

attorney’s earlier communications with Corporon and were

“inconsistent with [wife’s] position as an English teacher and her

prior correspondence with [husband].”

¶ 10 On the morning of May 20, Corporon called husband to

discuss the wire transfer. Husband “expressed surprise,” stating

that it made “no sense” that wife was on her way to Hong Kong or

had an investment account there. Husband then told Corporon to

verify the legitimacy of the wire instructions. Corporon represented

that he “had made or would make a call to [wife’s attorney].”

Relying on Corporon to confirm the transfer, husband took no

further action.

¶ 11 Later that day, the bank questioned if the wire transfer should

be sent in U.S. dollars. Corporon left voicemails for wife and her

attorney. (Corporon used a phone number for wife provided by the

hacker.) The hacker (posing as wife) returned his call, spoke with a

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foreign accent, and said that the transfer should be in U.S. dollars.

Corporon had never spoken to or met wife at any point. Deducting

certain fees, Corporon wired $374,290 to the Hong Kong account.

¶ 12 Almost immediately, Corporon “forwarded the two email

strings containing his correspondence with the hacker” to husband.

Husband texted back that the transfer to Hong Kong was

understandable, rationalizing that wife had a friend involved in

Southeast Asian trading, who likely helped her open the account.

According to Corporon, his text put his “mind at ease.”

¶ 13 On May 21, husband texted the parties’ adult daughter,

stating that wife was out of the country. The daughter quickly

responded that wife was, in fact, in Denver.

¶ 14 On May 23, three days after the wire transfer, husband

informed Corporon that wife was in Denver. When Corporon asked

whether she had a foreign accent, husband replied no. Corporon

then realized the transfer was fraudulent. Despite Corporon’s

efforts, the funds could not be recovered.

¶ 15 Without admitting liability, wife’s attorney’s malpractice

carrier paid about $94,900 to settle wife’s claim, reflecting the

policy limits minus defense costs.

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C. Motion to Enforce

¶ 16 Wife moved to enforce the separation agreement against

husband, arguing that he was liable for Corporon’s actions under

an agency theory. See § 14-10-112(5), C.R.S. 2024 (a party cannot

sue in contract for breach of a separation agreement but can only

seek enforcement); see also Scott v. Scott, 2018 COA 25, ¶ 56 n.7; In

re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 64.

¶ 17 On October 13, 2023, after an evidentiary hearing, a

magistrate granted the motion, reasoning that

[Corporon] was [husband’s] agent when he
caused the funds . . . to be transferred to Hong
Kong. [Corporon] did not withdraw from
representation until January 18, 2023.
[Husband] and [Corporon] communicated
about the transfer before and after [Corporon]
initiated [it], demonstrating that it was a
subject of the agency. [Corporon] was not
acting as [wife’s] agent when he caused the
funds at issue to be transferred to Hong Kong.

[Corporon] acted within the scope of his agency
when he caused the funds . . . to be
transferred to Hong Kong. The funds held by
[him] related to his representation of
[husband]. [Husband] delegated investigation
of his suspicions and decision making relating
to the funds to [Corporon]. [Husband] never
directly instructed [Corporon] not to make the
transfer. [Corporon] acted within the scope of
his authority both because it was part of [his]

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customary duties and because [husband] was
knowledgeable about the requested transfer
and delegated the decision making to him.
[Corporon] thought he was transferring the
funds to [wife], which is different from acting
outside the scope of his authority.

The magistrate entered judgment in favor of wife and against

husband in the amount of $280,211 plus interest at eight percent

annually, accruing from May 20, 2022, the date of the fraudulent

wire transfer (and one day after the court’s decree approving the

separation agreement). The district court adopted the magistrate’s

decision.

¶ 18 Husband now appeals.

II. Appellate Standard of Review

¶ 19 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we

must accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25; see

C.R.M. 7(a)(9). A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only

if there is no record support for them. Thorburn, ¶ 25. Legal

conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.

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III. Discussion

A. Scope of the Agency

¶ 20 Husband challenges the magistrate’s finding that Corporon

acted within the scope of his agency when he wired the funds to the

hacker. We disagree.

¶ 21 The existence of an agency relationship is generally a question

of fact, but it may be determined as a matter of law when the

underlying facts are undisputed. Fresquez v. Trinidad Inn, Inc.,

2022 COA 96, ¶ 14.

¶ 22 An agency relationship exists when one person, the

“principal,” authorizes another, the “agent,” to “act on the

principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.”

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Am. L. Inst. 2006); see

Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357, 362

(Colo. App. 2007) (An agency relationship “results from the

manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other

shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by

the other so to act.”) (citation omitted).

¶ 23 Attorneys are agents of their clients when acting within the

scope of their representation. See Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426,

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436 (2005) (“The attorney is an agent who is dutybound to act only

in the interests of the principal,” his client.); see also Siener v. Zeff,

194 P.3d 467, 471 (Colo. App. 2008); Colo. RPC 1.2.

¶ 24 As pertinent here, a principal is liable for the acts of an agent

performed within the scope of the agent’s actual authority,

regardless of whether the principal knows of the agent’s conduct.

Craig Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 2024 COA 74, ¶ 27.

¶ 25 An agent has actual authority when the agent reasonably

believes, based on the principal’s manifestations, that the principal

authorizes the agent to act in a certain way. Restatement (Third) Of

Agency § 2.01; Craig Hosp., ¶ 27. This authority may be either

express or implied. Fresquez, ¶ 21.

¶ 26 Express authority arises from specific directions from the

principal. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO

68, ¶ 21.

¶ 27 Implied authority, on the other hand, includes actions that are

“incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or

perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent.”

Fresquez, ¶ 21 (citation omitted).

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¶ 28 Ultimately, “[t]he focal point for determining whether an agent

acted with actual authority is the agent’s reasonable understanding

at the time the agent takes action.” Id. at ¶ 19 (citation omitted).

¶ 29 Here, there is no dispute that Corporon was husband’s

attorney and therefore his agent. See Banks, 543 U.S. at 436.

Corporon was tasked with ensuring that husband complied with his

financial responsibility to wife under the separation agreement and

was holding her funds in his COLTAF account for that purpose. A

wire transfer was a common act incidental to fulfilling that

obligation. See Fresquez, ¶ 21. As a result, Corporon’s conduct fell

within the scope of his implied actual authority. See id.

¶ 30 Although husband expressed some concern about the Hong

Kong destination and wife’s purported investment account there, he

did not revoke Corporon’s authority or tell him not to proceed with

the transfer. Instead, husband deferred to Corporon, directing him

to verify the wiring instructions. Husband’s conduct supports the

determination that Corporon reasonably understood he had

authorization to proceed upon verification. And husband never

followed up with Corporon before the transfer occurred.

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¶ 31 Husband’s subsequent text to Corporon, stating that the wire

transfer seemed reasonable, reinforces the inference that Corporon

acted within the scope of his authority.

¶ 32 That Corporon was deceived does not change the outcome.

Acts of an agent within the scope of their authority are binding on

the principal, even if negligently or erroneously performed. See City

of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 622 (Colo. 2005); see

also Craig Hosp., ¶ 27; Settle v. Basinger, 2013 COA 18, ¶ 32

(“Under the master-servant doctrine, an employer or principal may

be liable for the negligence of an employee or agent who acted

within the scope of his or her employment or agency.” The doctrine

applies when the employer or principal has “the power and right to

control the employee’s or agent’s actions within the scope of the

employment or agency.”). And as between an innocent third party

and a principal, the principal bears the risk of the agent’s

misjudgment because the principal had the power to select,

instruct, and supervise the agent. City of Aurora, 105 P.3d at 622.

¶ 33 In all, the magistrate correctly determined that Corporon acted

within the scope of his agency and that husband was liable for the

consequences of Corporon’s actions. See Craig Hosp., ¶ 27.

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¶ 34 Still, husband asserts that the magistrate improperly relied on

a stipulation that husband expressly approved the wire transfer.

Even assuming that the magistrate erred in this regard, the

remaining stipulated facts, discussed above, adequately support the

magistrate’s determination that Corporon acted within the scope of

his implied actual authority. Thus, any reliance on a

misunderstanding concerning husband’s express approval was

harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c).

B. Intervening Causation

¶ 35 Husband also contends that the hacker’s theft constituted an

unforeseeable intervening cause that broke the chain of causation

and thereby released him from any legal responsibility to wife. Wife

counters that the concept of intervening causation is a tort principle

and does not apply in this enforcement dispute. We agree with

wife.

¶ 36 Husband relies solely on Veolia Water Technologies, Inc. v.

Antero Treatment LLC, 2024 COA 126, to argue that intervening

causation is applicable because neither he nor Corporon owed wife

a contractual duty, and any obligation arose under common law.

That reliance is misplaced. In Veolia, a project owner sued its

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contractor for breach of contract and fraudulent concealment after

the contractor allegedly failed to deliver a functioning wastewater

treatment facility. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 31, 34. The division concluded that

the contractor’s duty not to conceal material risks was independent

of its contractual obligations, and therefore the economic loss rule

did not bar the fraud claim. Id. at ¶¶ 79, 98.

¶ 37 Veolia does not support the application of intervening

causation to contractual enforcement actions. It did not involve

agency relationships, third-party fraud, or excusal of liability due to

intervening acts. Instead, the case focused on whether a fraud

claim could coexist with a breach of contract claim. Id. at ¶ 107.

Nothing in Veolia addressed whether a principal can avoid

responsibility for an agent’s conduct based on the actions of a third

party.

¶ 38 Accordingly, because the concept of intervening causation

does not apply here, we decline to consider husband’s contention.

C. Ratification

¶ 39 Husband devotes one sentence to his next contention: “Even if

Corporon had been acting as [his] agent, [he] never ratified

Corporon’s actions.” The argument lacks sufficient development

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and is not supported by legal analysis. He references a single case

citation, “Siener, supra,” without elaborating on its relevance to the

facts of this case. And the only other instance in which he cites

Siener is to support the general principle that an attorney-client

relationship is one of principal and agent. We decline to address

this undeveloped argument. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019

COA 149, ¶ 27 (appellate court will not consider an argument not

supported by any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see

also Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo.

App. 2007) (declining to review appellants’ arguments under

C.R.C.P. 59 and 60 because they reflected a “shotgun approach”

and set forth “little analysis”). To the extent that he expands on his

argument in his reply brief, we do not address those new arguments

either. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

D. Colo. RPC 1.15A(a)

¶ 40 Husband next contends that he should not be liable for the

lost funds because Corporon was not acting as his agent, but rather

as a fiduciary to both parties by holding the funds in his COLTAF

account and that he “complied” with that duty by “disbursing” the

funds. In support, he cites Colo. RPC 1.15A(a) cmt. 8, which

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provides that “[a] lawyer should hold property of others with the

care required of a professional fiduciary.”

¶ 41 A party appealing a magistrate’s decision must first raise a

particular issue in the district court in a petition for review and

allow thereby allow the district court to correct any error before

raising the issue on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148

P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 42 Husband did not raise this specific contention in his petition

for review. At most, he maintained that the magistrate erred by

failing to recognize Corporon as wife’s agent when she placed her

share of the funds into Corporon’s “possession and control” and

that any mistake should be blamed on her. But now he is

contending that he should not be held responsible because

Corporon was not serving as his agent but as a fiduciary to both

parties and that he properly carried out that role (even though the

funds went to the wrong person). That is a different issue.

Moreover, his petition for review of the magistrate’s decision made

no mention of Colo. RPC 1.15A(a).

¶ 43 Because the contention is not preserved, we decline to address

it. See K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403.

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E. Prejudgment Interest

¶ 44 Finally, husband contends that the magistrate erred by

awarding prejudgment interest. We are not persuaded.

¶ 45 Under section 5-12-102(1), C.R.S. 2024, prejudgment interest

begins accruing from the time the money is wrongfully withheld.

See Collins, ¶¶ 65, 70. “The statute recognizes the time value of

money and is broadly construed to effectuate its purpose of

compensating a party for the deprivation of the ability to use

property when the party is entitled to have received it.” Id. at ¶ 65.

¶ 46 The magistrate awarded prejudgment interest at an annual

rate of eight percent, accruing from May 20, 2022. The magistrate

found, and the record supports, that Corporon wired the funds that

day — including the martial home proceeds, which had no set

deadline — and that wife never received them. Thus, the magistrate

appropriately awarded prejudgment interest from that date. Id. at

¶ 72 (in the absence of a date certain for a transfer, the district

court may rely on the date of wrongful withholding, and under

section 5-12-102(1), the period of wrongful withholding is measured

from the time the injury occurs, namely, when the party, under the

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circumstances, had a reasonable expectation of receiving the

property but did not).

¶ 47 As to the $120,000 that husband was required to pay wife

within fourteen days of entry of the dissolution decree, he asserts

that prejudgment interest should not have accrued until June 2,

2022. Even assuming that is correct, he does not explain how

thirteen days’ worth of interest creates more than a de minimis

impact on him or how his substantial rights were prejudiced.

Absent this necessary showing of prejudice, he has not established

a basis to reverse. See People in Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845

(Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that an alleged error, without a valid

allegation of prejudice, is not grounds for reversal); see also C.A.R.

35(c).

IV. Disposition

¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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