Peo v. Coleman

23CA2026 Peo v Coleman 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2026
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR3800
Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Racaun Shavod Coleman,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jenna Baker, Assistant Attorney General
Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 In this domestic violence case, Racaun Shavod Coleman

appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding

him guilty of first degree assault and harassment. He contends

that (1) the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that it

“may” consider evidence of self-induced intoxication; (2) the district

court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his two prior

acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (3) the cumulative

effect of these two errors denied him the right to a fair trial. We

affirm the conviction.

I. Background

¶2 Coleman and the victim had been in an on-again, off-again

relationship since high school and had a child together. One

afternoon in 2022, Coleman was fired from his job and began a

four-day binge of excessive drinking, from Wednesday through

Saturday. During that time, he and the victim continuously

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argued. By Friday, the victim told Coleman she was breaking up

with him and took her children1 to her mother’s house.

¶3 On Saturday night, Coleman texted the victim that he had left

their apartment and that it was okay for her to return home. The

victim took the children back to the apartment and put them to bed

before going outside to smoke, whereupon she saw Coleman

returning to the apartment building. She tried to lock the

apartment door but did not manage to do so in time, and Coleman

forced his way into the apartment.

¶4 Feeling unsafe, the victim knocked on a neighbor’s door.

While she was waiting for the neighbor to answer, Coleman

approached her, shoved her into the wall, stabbed her in the

shoulder with a knife, and then walked away. Coleman testified

that he was blackout drunk and had no recollection of anything

that happened that Thursday through Saturday, including the

stabbing.

¶5 The People charged Coleman with, as relevant here, first

degree assault, harassment, and second degree assault as a lesser

1 The victim also has a daughter from a previous relationship.

2
included offense. At trial, Coleman did not dispute that he had

stabbed the victim; instead, he claimed that his level of intoxication

prevented him from forming the specific intent needed to commit

first degree assault or harassment. The jury convicted him of both

charges.

II. Voluntary Intoxication Instruction

¶6 At Colman’s request, the district court instructed the jury on

the defense of voluntary intoxication:

The evidence presented in this case has raised
the question of self-induced intoxication with
respect to the offenses of Assault in the First
Degree and Harassment.

For those offenses, you may consider evidence
of self-induced intoxication in determining
whether or not such intoxication negates the
existence of the element of “with intent” or
“intentionally”.

The prosecution has the burden of proving all
the elements of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant
was intoxicated to such a degree that he did
not have the mental state of “with intent” or
“intentionally”, which is a required element of
the crimes of First Degree Assault and
Harassment, you should find the defendant
not guilty of those charges.

This defense does not apply to the crime of
Assault in the Second Degree (Recklessly).

3
(Emphasis added.) This language essentially tracks the model

criminal jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. See

COLJI-Crim. H:34 (2024).

¶7 Coleman contends that the district court plainly erred by

using the permissive word “may,” rather than the mandatory word

“must,” in the instruction. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 The district court has a duty to accurately instruct the jury on

all matters of law applicable to a case. People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO

83, ¶ 15. We review jury instructions de novo, examining them as a

whole, to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of

the governing law. Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶¶ 8, 14.

¶9 Because Coleman did not object to the instruction, we would

typically apply a plain error standard in determining whether any

error warrants reversal. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.

However, we need not determine if there was plain error because we

conclude that no error occurred. See Cardman v. People, 2019 CO

73, ¶ 19 (“[P]lain error occurs when there is (1) an error, (2) that is

obvious, and (3) that so undermines the fundamental fairness of the

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trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment

of conviction.”).

B. Discussion

¶ 10 Two divisions of this court have held that the use of the term

“may” in a voluntary intoxication instruction does not constitute

error. See People v. Lucas, 232 P.3d 155, 163-64 (Colo. App. 2009)

(concluding that a jury instruction stating, “You may consider

evidence of self-induced intoxication,” was not erroneous), overruled

in part on other grounds by People v. Miller, 2024 COA 66; see also

People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429, 433 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding

that a jury instruction stating, “You may consider evidence of

self-induced intoxication,” did not constitute error affecting the

defendant’s substantial rights). In both Lucas and Rosales, the

divisions reasoned that the jury instructions, taken as a whole,

“adequately informed the jury of the applicable law,” did not lower

the prosecution’s burden “to prove each element of an offense

beyond a reasonable doubt,” and required the jury to consider all

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the evidence. Lucas, 232 P.3d at 162-64; see Rosales, 134 P.3d at

434.

¶ 11 Undeterred, Coleman correctly notes that we are not bound by

decisions from other divisions of this court, see Chavez v. Chavez,

2020 COA 70, ¶ 13, and argues that we should not follow Lucas

and Rosales. He asserts that the voluntary intoxication instruction

using the permissive word “may” was erroneous because (1) “it

permitted the jury to disregard all evidence of Mr. Coleman’s sole

defense”; (2) it lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof; and (3) it

did not “track any statutory language.” But we see no reason to

depart from Lucas and Rosales, especially given that they addressed

and rejected two of the arguments Coleman raises here.

¶ 12 First, as in Lucas and Rosales, the jury instructions in this

case, when read as a whole, clearly required the jury to consider all

the evidence presented during trial. See Rosales, 134 P.3d at 434;

Lucas, 232 P.3d at 163. For example, the definitional instructions

for first degree assault and harassment each twice instructed the

jury to consider “all the evidence” when deciding whether the

prosecution proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt, and another instruction told the jurors, “In making your

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decision, you must consider all of the evidence that has been

presented.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the instructions used some

variation of the phrase “after considering all of the evidence” no less

than fifteen times. See People v. McKeel, 246 P.3d 638, 641 (Colo.

2010) (“We presume that jurors follow the instructions that they

receive.”).

¶ 13 We acknowledge that the prosecutor’s statement during

closing argument, “[The voluntary intoxication instruction] says you

may consider it. You do not have to. It’s up to you,” could be read

in isolation as suggesting that the jury was not obligated to

consider evidence of voluntary intoxication.2 But when the

statement is viewed in context with the prosecutor’s subsequent

statements — for example, that “[d]runk minds can still form

intent” and that “[Coleman] intended to [stab the victim] even

though he was drunk, if he even was drunk” — it is clear that she

was not telling the jury that it could ignore voluntary intoxication

evidence altogether; she instead was telling the jury that Coleman

had the requisite intent despite his intoxication. And the jury’s

2 Coleman did not object to the prosecutor’s statement during trial

and does not raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal.

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submission of a question about Coleman’s blood alcohol content

during deliberations demonstrates that it did consider evidence of

his voluntary intoxication.3 In any event, a potentially

inappropriate statement by counsel during closing argument does

not render a correct jury instruction erroneous.

¶ 14 Second, using the permissive word “may” in the voluntary

intoxication instruction did not lower the prosecution’s burden of

proof. The instruction itself stated that the “prosecution ha[d] the

burden of proving all the elements of the crimes charged beyond a

reasonable doubt.” See Lucas, 232 P.3d at 163. It also instructed

the jurors, “If you find [Coleman] was intoxicated to such a degree

that he did not have the mental state of ‘with intent’ or

‘intentionally’, which is a required element of the crimes of [f]irst

[d]egree [a]ssault and [h]arassment, you should find [him] not guilty

of those charges.” And as in Lucas and Rosales, multiple other

instructions emphasized that the prosecution carries the burden of

proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, including one

3 The jury’s question itself is not included in the appellate record,

but the district court’s discussion with the parties about how to
respond to the question is.

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that stated, “The culpable state of mind is as much an element of

the crime as the act itself and must be proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” See id.; Rosales, 134 P.3d at 434.

¶ 15 Moreover, unlike an affirmative defense, which the prosecution

must separately disprove beyond a reasonable doubt, Ray v. People,

2019 CO 21, ¶ 13, voluntary intoxication is an element-negating

defense and, thus, is necessarily disproved when the jury convicts

the defendant of the crime to which the defense applies, Montoya v.

People, 2017 CO 40, ¶ 29.

¶ 16 Third, we are not persuaded by Coleman’s argument that

using “may” in a voluntary intoxication instruction is erroneous

because it does not “track any statutory language.” The pertinent

statute provides as follows:

Intoxication of the accused is not a defense to
a criminal charge, except as provided in [the
subsection addressing involuntary
intoxication], but in any prosecution for an
offense, evidence of intoxication of the
defendant may be offered by the defendant
when it is relevant to negative the existence of
a specific intent if such intent is an element of
the crime charged.

§ 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2024. This statute allows a defendant to

introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication — though not as an

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affirmative defense — in certain circumstances; it simply does not

touch on how the jury should be instructed to consider such

evidence. In other words, there is no relevant statutory language

for the instruction to track.

¶ 17 In sum, the district court did not err by instructing the jury

that it “may consider evidence of self-induced intoxication in

determining whether such intoxication negates the existence of the

element of ‘with intent’ or ‘intentionally.’”

III. Admission of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence

¶ 18 Over Coleman’s objection, the prosecution elicited testimony

from the victim that Coleman had committed the following two prior

acts of domestic violence:

• Approximately six years before the stabbing, Coleman,

after drinking for “a good portion of that day,” got into

an argument with the victim, struck her with an open

hand, and then “wrestl[ed] [her] to keep [her] in the

house” when she tried to flee.

• Approximately four years before the stabbing, Coleman

and the victim got into an argument while in the

victim’s car; when they got home, he went inside to grab

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a pocketknife and then stabbed the car’s rear tires. The

victim “had red marks and swelling” from a “little tusk

[sic] that [they] had in the car.” This incident did not

involve alcohol.

Immediately before the victim provided this testimony and again at

the conclusion of trial, the district court instructed the jury that it

could consider the testimony only for the limited purpose of

showing Coleman’s intent.

¶ 19 Coleman contends that the district court abused its discretion

by admitting this evidence. We are not persuaded.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

¶ 20 CRE 404(b) prohibits using evidence of a defendant’s prior

acts to prove his character to show that he acted in conformity with

that character on a particular occasion. However, evidence of a

prior act may be admissible for another purpose, “such as proving

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” CRE 404(b)(2).

¶ 21 Additionally, when the prior act is an act of domestic violence,

the evidence is generally considered “helpful and . . . necessary” to

establish, among other things, the “escalating levels of seriousness”

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of the domestic violence. § 18-6-801.5(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also

People v. Cross, 2023 COA 24, ¶ 22 (In enacting section 18-6-801.5,

the legislature intended to “place[] its finger on the scale in favor of

admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in prosecutions

involving domestic violence.”).

¶ 22 Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) or section

18-6-801.5 only if it satisfies the four-part test articulated in

People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). First, the

evidence must relate to a material fact. Id. at 1318. Second, the

evidence must be logically relevant to that material fact: It must

tend to make the existence of the material fact more or less

probable. Id. Third, the logical relevance must be independent of

the prohibited character inference. Id. Fourth, the evidence’s

probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice. Id.

¶ 23 The district court has substantial discretion in deciding

whether to admit evidence of other acts. Perez v. People, 2015 CO

45, ¶ 22. We will not disturb the court’s decision absent a showing

that it was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or was

12
based on a misapprehension or misapplication of the law.

Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 25.

B. Discussion

¶ 24 Coleman challenges only the district court’s findings under the

third and fourth Spoto prongs: He contends that (1) the prior act

evidence was not logically relevant independent of a prohibited

propensity inference, and (2) the probative value of the evidence was

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

¶ 25 We begin by concluding that the district court did not abuse

its discretion by finding the prosecution satisfied the third Spoto

prong.

¶ 26 “[T]he requirement that the evidence have relevance

independent of an inference of conformity with bad character does

not ‘demand the absence of the inference’ entirely, but simply

means that the evidence cannot be relevant only to show a

propensity to commit crimes.” People v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23,

¶ 42 (quoting People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Colo. 1994)).

The third prong is satisfied when there is similarity between the

charged and uncharged acts, showing a specific tendency on the

part of the defendant. People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo.

13
App. 2009). A lack of similarity, in contrast, raises the risk that a

prior act does not show a specific tendency that can be separated

from the prohibited inference that the defendant acted badly in the

past and therefore must have committed the charged offense. Id.

¶ 27 In both prior acts of domestic violence, Coleman had a

physical altercation with the same victim after an argument. Thus,

evidence of the prior acts showed a specific tendency for Coleman to

respond to arguments with the victim by getting angry and acting

violently toward her. This specific tendency was logically relevant to

the critical disputed issue in the case — whether Coleman’s act was

intentional despite his intoxication — and its relevance was

independent of any propensity inference. See Cross, ¶ 24 (evidence

of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim

was admissible to prove motive, intent, and lack of accident);

People v. Vasquez, 2022 COA 100, ¶ 77 (evidence of the defendant’s

prior act of breaking the victim’s television during an argument was

admissible to prove lack of accident); McBride, 228 P.3d at 227

(evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of punching, beating, and

choking the victim was admissible to prove intent and to rebut a

claim of accident); People v. Gross, 39 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Colo. App.

14
2001) (evidence of prior acts of domestic violence against the victim

was admissible to prove motive and intent).

¶ 28 We are not persuaded otherwise by Coleman’s contention that

the two prior acts were too dissimilar to the charged offense to have

any relevance apart from a propensity inference. As with the

stabbing, Coleman committed both prior acts after having an

argument with the victim, and he committed the first of the prior

acts while he was drunk. See McBride, 228 P.3d at 227 (“The prior

and charged acts were similar because all involved defendant’s

violent behavior toward the same victim in an ongoing

relationship.”). Coleman points out that, unlike with the prior acts,

this argument with the victim occurred the day before the stabbing,

and he was allegedly blackout drunk. But these differences do not

outweigh the other similarities, particularly given that, through

section 18-6-801.5, “the General Assembly placed its finger on the

15
scale in favor of admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic

violence in prosecutions involving domestic violence.” Cross, ¶ 22.

¶ 29 Turning to the fourth Spoto prong, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in balancing the relevance of the prior acts

against the risk of unfair prejudice.

¶ 30 Although the evidence of prior acts carried a risk of undue

prejudice, we are not persuaded that this risk substantially

outweighed the probative value of the evidence. See People v.

Hamilton, 2019 COA 101, ¶ 70 (CRE 403 favors the admission of

relevant evidence and requires us to afford the evidence its

“maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact finder

and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected.”).

The prior acts evidence was relevant to whether Coleman had the

intent to stab the victim despite his intoxication — the central

dispute at trial — and therefore was highly probative.

¶ 31 Further, the district court minimized the prejudicial effect by

contemporaneously instructing the jury to consider the evidence

only for the purpose of assessing Coleman’s intent. Absent

evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the court’s

limiting instruction and did not consider the evidence for any other

16
purpose. See McKeel, 246 P.3d at 641. Thus, “while prior act

evidence always carries a risk of unfair prejudice, it was within the

district court’s discretion to find this risk did not substantially

outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” Denhartog, ¶ 47; see

McBride, 228 P.3d at 227.

¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion by admitting the evidence of Coleman’s prior acts of

domestic violence.

IV. Cumulative Error

¶ 33 Finally, Coleman contends that the cumulative effect of the

alleged errors in his trial mandates reversal. Under the cumulative

error doctrine, “numerous formal irregularities, each of which in

itself might be deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the

absence of a fair trial, in which event a reversal would be required.”

Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo. 1962). But “[f]or reversal

to occur based on cumulative error, a reviewing court must identify

multiple errors that collectively prejudice[d]” the defendant’s

substantial rights. Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25.

Because we conclude that the district court did not err, a

cumulative error analysis is not required, and reversal is not

17
warranted. See People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 359 (Colo. App. 2009)

(cumulative error analysis is required only when multiple errors

have been identified).

V. Disposition

¶ 34 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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