Marriage of Bellinsky

24CA0355 Marriage of Bellinsky 07-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0355
Gilpin County District Court No. 15DR7
Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

In re the Marriage of,

Rachel Bellinsky, n/k/a Rachel Galan,

Appellee,

and

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 17, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-decree proceeding, involving Rachel Bellinsky,

n/k/a Rachel Galan (mother), and Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky (father),

father appeals the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s

decision granting mother’s motion to relocate with the minor

children and her motion to modify decision-making. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties’ marriage ended in 2016. Their separation

agreement, which included a parenting plan, was incorporated into

that decree, and provided for shared parental responsibilities for the

parties’ six unemancipated children.1

¶3 In 2021, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court

imposed supervised parenting time requirements for father. A

division of this court concluded that the district court did not make

sufficient findings under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024, to

justify the restrictions; the division thus reversed the parenting time

orders and remanded the case for reconsideration of father’s

parenting time. In re Marriage of Bellinsky, (Colo. App. No.

21CA0634, Aug. 4, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

1 Two of the parties’ eight children had turned eighteen before

permanent orders.

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On remand, after a hearing at which father did not appear, the

district court made findings for each of the four remaining minor

children2 affirming that their physical or emotional health would be

impaired absent a restriction on father’s parenting time and granted

father supervised parenting time up to two times per month.

Father did not appeal this ruling.

¶4 Several months later, mother filed a motion to relocate the

four minor children to Florida and a motion to modify

decision-making to grant mother sole decision-making

responsibility over the minor children. Mother filed a proposed

amended parenting plan in conjunction with the motions.

¶5 Approximately a month and a half later, in response, father

filed a notice of removal of the state court action to the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado. Two days after

father filed the notice, the magistrate presiding over this case

issued a post-decree case management order (CMO) to set a hearing

on the motions. The CMO acknowledged the notice of removal but

2 The parties’ third and fourth oldest children emancipated between

the initial order restricting parenting time and the post-remand
order.

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noted that “the court recognizes no authority referenced . . . that

removes this Court’s jurisdiction and, thus, this Court maintained

initial and continuing jurisdiction.” Later that year, the court

stayed the proceedings as it waited for a final order from the federal

court on father’s removal request. After the federal court remanded

the issue to the state court, a district court magistrate conducted

an evidentiary hearing on mother’s motions, at which father again

did not participate.3 Due to father’s nonparticipation, the court

noted that it was “proceed[ing] in default.”

¶6 Following the hearing, the magistrate made oral findings

regarding the best interests of the children, the applicable

relocation factors, and the interests of the parents. In a written

order, the magistrate granted mother’s motions and adopted her

proposed parenting plan with an amendment that the plan would

only apply to the three remaining minor children.4 Father filed a

3 The record reflects that someone appeared at the virtual hearing

using a telephone number that mother said “look[ed] like [father’s]
number.” However, when the court asked that individual to identify
themselves, no one responded.
4 The parties’ fifth child turned eighteen during the proceedings in

the district court. We further note that their sixth child turned
eighteen while this appeal was pending.

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petition for review with the district court, which adopted and

affirmed the magistrate’s order granting mother’s motions.

Simultaneously, father filed an appeal with this court, and his

appeal was allowed to proceed after the district court resolved his

petition for review.

II. The Scope of This Appeal

¶7 At the outset, we note what is — and what is not — properly

before us. Father appeals a multitude of issues including his belief

that (1) all post-decree orders in this proceeding from August 2019

to the present are void due to fraud upon the court;5 (2) the state

court acted without jurisdiction when it issued the CMO after father

filed for removal of the action to federal court; (3) the motions

hearing was jurisdictionally flawed and created jurisdictional and

due process violations against father; (4) the magistrate’s

5 Notably, the crux of father’s argument highlighting this alleged

“fraud upon the court,” relies on a single motion to modify
parenting time filed by mother in 2019, which father contends
misrepresented the scope of her requested modification. This, by
itself, does not constitute fraud upon the court. In re Marriage of
Gance, 36 P.3d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 2001) (“Fraud on the court
must involve more than injury to a single litigant; it is limited to
fraud that ‘seriously’ affects the integrity of the normal process of
adjudication.”) (citation omitted).

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involvement in the case after father named him as a defendant in a

federal lawsuit created structural error;6 and (5) the trial court’s

failure to address the jurisdictional challenges rendered the

proceedings fundamentally unfair.

¶8 The only order on appeal is the district court’s order adopting

the magistrate’s order granting mother’s motions. Furthermore,

because the question of whether the state court acted without

jurisdiction when issuing the CMO directly impacts the order on

appeal, we will address it accordingly. Finally, father’s claims

regarding the jurisdictional defects of the motions hearing are

properly before us and we will address them in turn. Any earlier

6 Father named the magistrate as a defendant in a federal lawsuit

after the judicial officer chose to “proceed in this known void case
without ‘competent jurisdiction and authority,’” and argues that
this action required the magistrate to recuse himself from the
proceedings. However, father offers no evidence to support his
claim that the magistrate’s impartiality was in question. And “a
motion which merely alleges opinions or conclusions,
unsubstantiated by facts supporting a reasonable inference of
actual or apparent bias or prejudice, is not legally sufficient to
require disqualification.” Prefer v. PharmNetRx, LLC, 18 P.3d 844,
850 (Colo. App. 2000).

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unappealed orders father seeks to challenge are not properly before

us.7

A. The CMO

¶9 Father argues the magistrate acted without jurisdiction when

he issued the CMO after father filed a notice of removal of the action

to federal court. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Civil actions may be removed to federal district court if the

action involves a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A federal

question is presented when a civil action arises under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id. “An action

‘arises under’ federal law when the vindication of a right under state

law necessarily turns on the construction of a federal law.”

Telluride Co. v. Varley, 934 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo. App. 1997).

7 Father filed a “Notice of Continuing Objection” to this court’s panel

assignment alleging Judge Tow and Judge Sullivan “had prior
involvement in related appellate proceedings that demonstrated
bias against [father].” Because father has stated no legal basis for
the disqualification of these judicial officers, his objection is
overruled. See Bocian v. Owners Ins. Co., 2020 COA 98, ¶ 23 (“[I]t
is well established that adverse legal rulings, standing alone, do not
constitute grounds for claiming prejudice or bias.”).

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¶ 11 “[A] Colorado court is not deprived of jurisdiction where a

party’s notice of removal to a federal court indicates, on its face and

as a matter of law, that the party’s attempt to remove the case was

without the slightest color of right or merit.” McDonald v. Zions

First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 26. Traditionally, the state

has an interest in, and exercises jurisdiction over, domestic

relations cases. See Viernes v. Dist. Ct., 509 P.2d 306, 308 (Colo.

1973).

2. Analysis

¶ 12 Father contends that “upon filing a notice of removal,

28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) automatically divests the state court of all

jurisdiction and authority to proceed.” Father misconstrues the

nuances of removal proceedings. As noted, removal is proper when

a federal question is presented. See § 1331. But filing a notice of

removal without meeting that requirement does not automatically

divest the state court of jurisdiction. See § 1446.

¶ 13 In his notice of removal, father argued that the action

presented a federal question based on the state court’s failure “to

refute [f]ather’s claims of numerous frauds upon and by the court,

numerous deprivations and violations of rights, and numerous state

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and federal crimes.” None of father’s claims explains how these

alleged fraudulent actions and purported deprivations of rights

arise under federal law. Instead, father simply cites the general

requirements for removal proceedings and the federal question

requirement without addressing how they are applicable in this

case.

¶ 14 Moreover, father’s attempt to remove the matter was not

timely. Removal must occur, if at all, within thirty days of receipt of

the complaint. § 1446(b). Father filed his notice of removal on July

17, 2023. Even if we consider the relevant date to be the date

mother filed her motions — as opposed to the date the initial

petition was filed more than eight years earlier — father did not

attempt to remove the case until forty-six days after mother filed the

motions at issue. The state court did not lose jurisdiction because

father’s attempt to remove the case was facially meritless, see

McDonald, ¶ 26, and the magistrate was entitled to issue the CMO.8

8 In any event, father does not explain why the court’s purely

procedural order somehow taints the substantive order that was not
entered until the federal court had already rejected father’s efforts
to remove the case.

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B. The Evidentiary Hearing

¶ 15 Father claims the motions hearing was jurisdictionally flawed

and violated father’s due process rights. We note initially that the

bulk of father’s contentions appear to address the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. But his challenge to the court’s having

proceeded “in default” at the evidentiary hearing on mother’s

motions might be an attack on personal jurisdiction. Liberally

construing his pro se pleading as such, we address both types of

jurisdiction.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 16 If the facts on which jurisdiction is based are not disputed, we

review de novo whether the trial court had jurisdiction. Tulips Invs.,

LLC v. State ex rel. Suthers, 2015 CO 1, ¶ 11. If those underlying

facts are disputed, we review the court’s resolution of the factual

disputes for clear error. Id. Under a clear error review, we will

disturb the court’s findings only if there is no record support for

them. Levine v. Katz, 192 P.3d 1008, 1012 (Colo. App. 2006).

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2. Analysis

a. Personal Jurisdiction

¶ 17 Personal jurisdiction means the court’s legal authority over a

party’s person. Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 126 (Colo. 2000).

When a party enters a general appearance and seeks relief from the

court in a form that acknowledges the court’s authority, that party

has consented to personal jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Haddad,

93 P.3d 617, 650 (Colo. App. 2004). Thus, when father filed the

petition for dissolution as a co-petitioner in 2015, the court

acquired personal jurisdiction over him.

¶ 18 To the extent father contends that personal jurisdiction had to

be separately acquired for the post-decree motion, he cites no

authority for such a proposition. Nor are we aware of any. To the

contrary, personal jurisdiction remains throughout a domestic

relations case; it is not reassessed for each post-decree motion. See

Brown v. Brown, 516 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Colo. 1973) (“Once having

obtained jurisdiction over [the father in a dissolution of marriage

action], the district court’s power over his person continues until all

matters arising out of that litigation are resolved.”). Consequently,

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the court had personal jurisdiction over father when it conducted

the evidentiary hearing on mother’s motions.

b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 19 “A court has subject matter jurisdiction where it has been

empowered to entertain the type of case before it by the sovereign

from which the court derives its authority.” In re Marriage of Roth,

2017 COA 45, ¶ 14 (quoting Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1140

(Colo. 2011)). Unlike personal jurisdiction, a party is entitled to

challenge a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction at any time,

including for the first time on appeal. Gestner v. Gestner, 2024

COA 55, ¶ 20 n.4.

¶ 20 Father raises several challenges to the court’s jurisdiction to

conduct the motions hearing. He argues that (1) mother committed

a fraud on the court vitiating jurisdiction; (2) the removal of the

proceeding to federal court eliminated the district court’s

jurisdiction; (3) he did not consent to the magistrate presiding over

the proceedings; and (4) the court did not address father’s

jurisdictional challenges. Each contention is without merit.

¶ 21 Father contests the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the proceeding based on an alleged “fraud upon the court”

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committed by mother and several other nonparties. But, as noted,

fraud upon the court “is limited to fraud that ‘seriously’ affects the

integrity of the normal process of adjudication.” In re Marriage of

Gance, 36 P.3d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 2001) (citation omitted).

Father has failed to prove that any such fraud occurred. Instead,

father’s allegations largely rely on his continued, conclusory, and

unsubstantiated assertion that the judicial system as a whole is

biased against him. In short, the district court had, and continues

to have, jurisdiction over the parties and their post-decree disputes

involving their children.

¶ 22 We have already addressed the effect of father’s unsuccessful

attempt to remove the matter to federal court. Supra, Part II.A.2.

For the same reason this maneuver had no effect on the court’s

authority to enter the CMO, it did not divest the court of

jurisdiction to resolve mother’s motions — particularly in light of

the fact that the federal court had already rejected the removal

attempt at the time of the hearing.

¶ 23 Next, father’s consent to the magistrate presiding over the

proceedings was unnecessary. Magistrates have the authority to

preside over post-decree motions to modify parental responsibilities

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without the consent of the parties. C.R.M. 6(b)(1)(B). Moreover, as

the district court noted when reviewing the magistrate’s order, “[i]f

Father had appeared and objected, the court then could have

appropriately dealt with that objection.”

¶ 24 And finally, contrary to father’s argument, the court did not

merely acknowledge father’s jurisdictional challenges during the

motions hearing but, rather, resolved them when it found that

father’s notice “contained no legal authority” and that the court

“could not find authority for why [it] has no jurisdiction over this

case . . . especially after the attempted removal to Federal Court

was brought back to the State of Colorado.” The court addressed

this issue again after a brief recess when it ultimately found that it

did “have personal and subject matter jurisdiction with respect to

the parties and contents here today.”

¶ 25 In sum, we cannot find any legal authority supporting father’s

allegations that the district court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the

motions hearing.

C. Merits of the Motions

¶ 26 Turning to the merits of the court’s ruling, we note that father

does not appear to argue that the magistrate applied an incorrect

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legal standard or that his ultimate analysis granting mother’s

motions was legally flawed. Nevertheless, because the scope of his

argument is not entirely clear, we will briefly address those issues

here in an effort to address all of father’s challenges.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 27 “Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review.” In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25. Like the district court,

we will accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous, meaning they have no support in the record. In

re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. But we review de novo

questions of law, including whether the magistrate properly applied

the correct legal standard. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA

29, ¶ 22.

¶ 28 In addressing a relocation request, the court must consider

the best interests factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024,

the relocation factors in section 14-10-129(2)(c), and the parents’

interests relative to the requested relocation. See In re Marriage of

Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005) (holding the court must

balance the right to travel, the right to parent, and the best

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interests of the child in a relocation request). Both parents equally

share the burden of demonstrating how a child’s best interests will

be served by relocation. Id. at 147. And “a court may not presume

either that a child is better off or disadvantaged by relocating with

the majority time parent.” Id.

¶ 29 As relevant here, a district court may modify the allocation of

decision-making responsibility if there has been a modification in

parenting time pursuant to section 14-10-129 that warrants

reallocating decision-making responsibilities. § 14-10-131(2)(b.5),

C.R.S. 2024; see also In re Marriage of Graham, 121 P.3d 279, 281

(Colo. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Ciesluk, 113 P.3d

at 146. The court must find, on the basis of facts that have arisen

since the prior order or that were unknown to the court at the time

of the prior order, that (1) a change has occurred in the

circumstances of the child or the party to whom decision-making

responsibility was allocated, and (2) the modification is necessary to

serve the child’s best interests. § 14-10-131(2).

2. Analysis

¶ 30 When approving mother’s request to relocate with the minor

children, the court made specific findings on each of the relocation

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factors in section 14-10-129(2)(c) and then made additional findings

under the best interests factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a). The

court also made findings balancing the interests of the parents and

children. See Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142. After weighing the various

factors, the court found “there [was] a preponderance of evidence

that supports the relocation of [mother and the minor children].”

¶ 31 As for mother’s request to modify decision-making, the court

incorporated its previous findings for the best interests of the

children. The court also made specific findings under section

14-10-131(2)(b.5), noting that the restriction imposed on father’s

parenting time warranted a modification of the allocation of

decision-making responsibilities.

¶ 32 The magistrate applied the correct legal standard, and we

discern no clear error in its factual findings.

III. Disposition

¶ 33 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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