Peo v. Hagan

23CA0412 Peo v Hagan 07-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0412
Adams County District Court No. 21CR1519
Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Tyler James Hagan,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Andrew Gargano, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Tyler James Hagan, appeals the district court’s

sentencing order. We dismiss the appeal in part and otherwise

affirm the sentence.

I. Background

¶2 Hagan, a man in his late twenties, had sexual intercourse with

his underage niece, E.H., many times over several years. E.H.

became pregnant when she was fourteen years old, and she

delivered Hagan’s child. Hagan was later charged with four

felonies, including one count of sexual assault on a child (SAOC) as

part of a pattern of sexual abuse — a class 3 felony. In exchange

for dismissal of the remaining charges, he pleaded guilty to one

count of attempted SAOC and one added count of second degree

assault — class 5 and class 4 felonies, respectively.

¶3 Although Hagan’s convictions carry an aggregate statutory

sentencing range of five to twenty-two years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC), the parties stipulated to a

sentencing range of five to sixteen years. See §§ 18-3-203(1)(g), 18-

3-405(1), 18-2-101, 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A)-(A.1), (6), (8)(a)(I),

(10)(b)(XII), 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(II)(c), C.R.S. 2024. The district court

imposed a fifteen-year DOC sentence.

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¶4 Hagan appeals, contending that when the district court crafted

his sentence, it improperly (1) emphasized aggravating over

mitigating sentencing factors and (2) considered inaccurate and

inapplicable information. The People argue that Hagan’s first

contention is not reviewable because he was sentenced within the

range specified in his negotiated plea agreement and that the record

refutes his second contention. We agree with the People.

II. Sentencing Factors

¶5 Section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2024, guarantees a person

convicted of a felony offense the right to one appellate review of “the

propriety of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense,

the character of the offender, and the public interest.” A review of

the propriety of the sentence “involves the intrinsic fairness or

appropriateness of the sentence itself.” People v. Malacara, 606

P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Colo. 1980). But “if the sentence is within a

range agreed upon by the parties pursuant to a plea agreement, the

defendant shall not have the right of appellate review of the

propriety of the sentence.” § 18-1-409(1). This exception to the

right to appellate review is referred to as the “plea proviso.” Sullivan

v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 1.

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¶6 Hagan alleges that the district court improperly emphasized

his criminal history and noncompliance with previous court orders,

while discounting that this was his first felony conviction; he has

support in the community; and he had recently been compliant

with probation, protection orders, and treatment. This challenge to

the court’s consideration of sentencing factors is, at its core, a

challenge to the weight accorded various sentencing factors, which

implicates the “intrinsic fairness or appropriateness” of his

sentence. See Malacara, 606 P.2d at 1302-03; Sullivan, ¶ 13; see

also People v. Carey, 701 P.2d 89, 90 (Colo. App. 1984)

(Considerations such as “the gravity of the offense, the defendant’s

history of prior criminal conduct, the likelihood of future

criminality, and the prospects of rehabilitation . . . go to the

appropriateness of the sentence itself.”).

¶7 Because Hagan’s first contention challenges the propriety of

his sentence, which is within the range contemplated by the plea

agreement, we conclude that the plea proviso bars our review of this

contention. See People v. Scofield, 74 P.3d 385, 386-87 (Colo. App.

2002) (dismissing the appeal under section 18-1-409(1) because the

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defendant sought review of the propriety of her sentence, which was

within the agreed-upon range in the plea agreement).

III. Information Considered

¶8 Next, Hagan contends that the district court improperly used

two types of information in deciding his sentence. First, he argues

that the court relied on inaccurate findings about his criminal

history. And second, he argues that it used information about a

separate crime as a basis for his sentence, violating his

constitutional right against double jeopardy. We reject both

arguments because the record demonstrates that the district court

crafted Hagan’s sentence based on accurate information and

appropriate considerations.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 Although the plea proviso in section 18-1-409(1) limits our

review of the propriety of the sentence itself under the

circumstances of this case, it permits our review of “the manner in

which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and

accuracy of the information on which it was based.” In other

words, it permits our review of the propriety of the sentencing

proceeding. Sullivan, ¶ 4. A review of the manner in which the

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sentence was imposed “involves the extrinsic factors and

procedures which affect the determination of the sentence.”

Malacara, 606 P.2d at 1303.

¶ 10 A district court has broad discretion when imposing a

sentence, and we will not overturn the sentence imposed absent a

clear abuse of that discretion. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708

(Colo. 1990). Sentencing determinations must be based on reliable

evidence, not speculation or unfounded allegations. People v. Tuffo,

209 P.3d 1226, 1231 (Colo. App. 2009). A court may, however,

“consider conduct for which the offender was never charged,

conduct for which charges were filed but later dismissed as part of

a plea agreement, or even conduct for which the offender was

charged and subsequently acquitted.” People v. Tallwhiteman, 124

P.3d 827, 837 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 11 “If the sentence is within the range required by law, is based

on appropriate considerations as reflected in the record and is

factually supported by the circumstances of the case, an appellate

court must uphold the sentence.” Fuller, 791 P.2d at 708.

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B. Hagan’s Criminal History

¶ 12 Hagan challenges the district court’s finding that he had

“consistent law enforcement contact and convictions and a lack of

compliance.” He suggests that this finding is inaccurate because (1)

for four years, he had only traffic and protection-order-related

offenses that resulted in fines; and (2) during certain windows of

time, he “did well” on probation.

¶ 13 We discern ample evidence in the record to support the

challenged finding. The district court relied on the Presentence

Investigation Report (PSIR), which Hagan did not dispute. The PSIR

shows that Hagan was charged with criminal misdemeanors, a drug

felony, and a felony in eight other cases in 2015, 2017, 2020, 2021

and 2022. In four of the cases, the charges included violation of a

protection order, establishing a lack of compliance with court

orders. Hagan pleaded guilty in five cases, and in three of them he

was sentenced to probation. His probation was revoked multiple

times, establishing a history of noncompliance with probation.

C. Double Jeopardy

¶ 14 Next, Hagan speculates that the district court “effectively

imposed a harsher sentence upon him in this case as a means to

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indirectly punish him” for a harassment conviction in a separate

case. He points to the following facts:

• Hagan’s probation revocation resentencing hearing for the

harassment case was combined with the sentencing hearing in

this case.

• The victim in the harassment case, N.B., who was also the first

person to report Hagan’s sexual assault of E.H. to police,

spoke at the hearing.

• During her statement, N.B. described her harassment-related

experiences with Hagan, in addition to the circumstances of

E.H.’s disclosure that Hagan was the father of her baby and

how she reported the disclosure to police.

• N.B. noted that she had witnessed Hagan “be given leniency”

by the courts and yet he repeatedly violated protection orders

and probation conditions.

• N.B. asked the court to give Hagan the maximum prison

sentence.

• The district court imposed a sentence that was close to the

maximum of the stipulated range.

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¶ 15 The record refutes Hagan’s argument that the district court

inappropriately considered facts from the harassment case in

imposing a sentence for this case. The court explicitly stated that

although it had “heard about more facts” than those in this case, it

found “very aggravating facts . . . just in considering the facts as it

relates to the victim in this case.” The court then listed the

aggravating facts related only to this case: Hagan’s ongoing

manipulation of E.H., E.H.’s youth, the years-long duration of

sexual assaults, Hagan’s position of trust role, and the fact that

Hagan impregnated E.H. It said nothing to suggest that facts from

the harassment case factored into its sentence for this case.

¶ 16 Because Hagan’s sentence is legal, based on appropriate

considerations in the record, and factually supported, we will not

disturb it. See id.

IV. Disposition

¶ 17 The appeal is dismissed in part, and the sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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