Peo in Interest of ED-C

25CA0043 Peo in Interest of ED-C 06-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0043
Adams County District Court No. 23JV30185
Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.D-C., a Child,

and Concerning K.A.C-P.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 26, 2025

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Deborah Kershner, Assistant County Attorney,
Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant
¶1 K.A.C-P. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationship with E.D-C. (the child). Among other

arguments, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that her treatment plan was appropriate. We agree, reverse the

judgment, and remand the case to the juvenile court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2023, the Adams County Human Services

Department alleged in a petition in dependency or neglect that

mother had given birth to a substance-exposed child. Mother

admitted the allegations, and the juvenile court adjudicated the

child dependent or neglected. After a dispositional hearing, the

juvenile court adopted a treatment plan for mother that required

her to (1) address her substance abuse issues; (2) participate in

family time; and (3) cooperate with the Department and treatment

providers.

¶3 In August 2024, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing in

December 2024. After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court

1
granted the motion and terminated the parent-child legal

relationship between mother and the child.

II. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶4 Mother asserts that her treatment plan was inappropriate

because it should have included, but did not include, a domestic

violence (DV) component. We agree.

A. Applicable Law, Standard of Review, and Preservation

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds,

among other things, that the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2024. Whether the

juvenile court erred by terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c) presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error but review its legal conclusions de

novo. Id.

¶6 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the

problems that required the government’s intervention. K.D. v.

People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006). A treatment plan is

2
appropriate if it is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to

provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time

and relates to the child’s needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 The Department and guardian ad litem (GAL) assert that

mother’s appellate argument is not properly before us because she

invited the error, or in the alternative, she waived or forfeited her

right to challenge the appropriateness of the treatment plan. See

People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 34, 39-40 (discussing the

doctrines of invited error, waiver, and forfeiture). Although the

holdings in People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 354 (Colo. App.

2007), and People in Interest of M.S., 129 P.3d 1086, 1087-88 (Colo.

App. 2005), support their position, we decline to follow those

opinions. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13 (noting that

one division of the court of appeals is not bound by the decision of

another division). Rather, we are persuaded by the analysis in

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 913-18 (Colo. App. 2011),

which concludes, among other things, that the “estoppel doctrines”

of invited error, waiver, and forfeiture do not bar a parent in a

dependency or neglect proceeding from bringing substantive

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. As the division noted

3
in S.N-V., “we cannot fault a parent for failing to assert an error in

the treatment plan, which he or she had no duty to assert, to avoid

forfeiting the constitutional and statutory right to have the juvenile

court consider whether the petitioner met its constitutional and

statutory burden of proof.” Id. at 918. We therefore reach the

merits of mother’s claim.

B. Relevant Facts and Applicable Law

¶8 As noted above, at a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court

adopted a treatment plan for mother that did not include a DV

component. However, at a review hearing conducted about nine

months later, the GAL explained that the “the power and control

dynamic” between mother and father had been “discussed

repeatedly in family team meetings and staffing,” and the GAL

“want[ed] to make sure that those [issues were] addressed.”

Mother’s counsel said that she “share[d] some of the concerns”

about DV and would “follow up with the parties and with [her] client

to see” whether the treatment plan needed to be amended to

include a DV component. No one ever moved to amend the

treatment plan, however, and the juvenile court did not address this

issue again until the termination hearing.

4
¶9 At the termination hearing, the caseworker testified that she,

too, had concerns about DV because mother had been “put in

situations where she was being controlled by” father. She said that

her concerns were based on mother’s reports that she felt “unsafe”

at times, as well as the caseworker’s telephone calls with mother in

which father would “hop in” and listen to their conversations. The

caseworker also testified that mother never asked for DV services —

even when the caseworker offered those services to her — and

mother continued to deny “that she was in a DV relationship.”

Nonetheless, the caseworker opined that mother could not be

successful without addressing DV.

¶ 10 In closing argument, mother’s counsel maintained that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts because it did not

provide mother with DV services. The juvenile court disagreed

because (1) DV was not an initial concern and only arose much

later in the case and (2) mother refused to provide the caseworker

with any information to substantiate those concerns. However, the

juvenile court did not directly address whether mother’s treatment

plan was appropriate without a DV component.

5
¶ 11 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

treatment plan was appropriate because the Department (1) knew

about DV concerns from the beginning of the case but did not

propose a treatment plan with a DV component and (2) did not

request to amend the treatment plan, even though the professionals

in the case identified DV as an issue that needed to be addressed.

Although we are not persuaded that the Department knew about

DV from the case’s inception, we nevertheless conclude that the

juvenile court erred by finding that the treatment plan was

appropriate. Compare People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067,

1071 (Colo. App. 2005) (We measure the appropriateness of a

treatment plan by assessing it “in light of the facts existing at the

time of the plan’s approval.”), with People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016

COA 20, ¶ 26 (“[C]hanged circumstances may render a treatment

plan, previously approved at a dispositional hearing, no longer

appropriate.”).

¶ 12 Notably, the record shows the Department knew or had reason

to know before the termination hearing that mother was involved in

a DV relationship, but it never raised the issue or asked to amend

the treatment plan. See People in Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160,

6
¶ 9 (noting that, to satisfy the reasonable efforts obligation, a

department must develop an appropriate treatment plan). We

recognize that mother denied DV for most of the case, but her

denial did not relieve the Department of its duty to propose an

appropriate treatment plan. Regardless of mother’s position, if the

Department believed that a DV component was necessary, it should

have asked to amend the treatment plan and presented the juvenile

court with evidence of the DV. Cf. People in Interest of L.M., 2018

COA 57M, ¶ 51 (noting that a court may require treatment “when it

is warranted by the record before the court”).

¶ 13 Nor did mother’s denial of DV absolve the Department of its

burden to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

treatment plan was appropriate. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 914 (The

department “has the duty of proving, by clear and convincing

evidence, the treatment plan’s appropriateness.”). As noted, the

caseworker testified that mother could not become fit without

addressing concerns about DV. And the juvenile court agreed that,

had it known about DV sooner, it would have amended the

treatment plan to include a component addressing it. In other

words, the record shows that the treatment plan — absent a DV

7
component — was not reasonably calculated to render mother fit to

provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time.

See People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶¶ 13, 23 (remanding to

the juvenile court for a determination whether “the safety concerns

about domestic violence were adequately addressed” during the

case).

¶ 14 Finally, we disagree with the Department and GAL’s assertion

that any error associated with the juvenile court’s failure to amend

the treatment plan to include a DV component was harmless. See

C.A.R. 35(c) (allowing an appellate court to “disregard any error or

defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties”).

Specifically, they contend that the error is harmless because mother

had not complied with the other aspects of her treatment plan. To

be sure, under some circumstances, a parent’s failure to comply

with certain components of a treatment plan may render harmless

an error associated with a different component. See People in

Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 79 (recognizing that an error

related to the lack of family time might be harmless “in light of [a

parent’s] noncompliance with other parts of [the] treatment plan”).

In this case, however, the record suggests that mother’s inability to

8
address her DV relationship was a barrier to her compliance with

the other components of her treatment plan. Said another way, if

mother had received treatment for DV, then she may have been able

to comply with the other components of her plan and become a fit

parent. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court’s error is not

harmless.

¶ 15 In sum, because mother did not have an appropriate

treatment plan, the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department had established the termination criterion in section 19-

3-604(1)(c)(I) by clear and convincing evidence.

III. Other Contentions

¶ 16 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that (1) the Department made reasonable efforts; (2) she could not

become fit within a reasonable time; and (3) there was no less

drastic alternative to termination. Because we have concluded that

the judgment must be reversed so the juvenile court can adopt an

appropriate treatment plan for mother, we need not address these

other contentions.

9
IV. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.

10