Marriage of Kuznetsov

24CA1129 Marriage of Kuznetsov 05-22-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1129
Eagle County District Court No. 22DR30032
Honorable Rachel Olguin-Fresquez, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Lauren Khouri Smith,

Appellee,

and

Dennis Kuznetsov,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Freyre and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 22, 2025

Harwich Brickey, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee

Dennis Kuznetsov, Pro Se
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Lauren Khouri

Smith (wife) and Dennis Kuznetsov (husband), husband appeals

those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital

property division, maintenance, and attorney fees. He also appeals

the district court’s modification of his child support obligation.

¶2 We affirm the judgment as to the property division. We

reverse the judgment as to maintenance and attorney fees, reverse

the portion of the permanent orders modifying child support, and

remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶3 In 2022, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage of

approximately ten years. In February 2023, the district court

adopted the parties’ jointly executed parenting plan and separation

agreement and entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage.

The parenting plan allocated parental responsibilities as to the

parties’ two children and provided that husband would pay wife

$1,942 per month in child support. The separation agreement

awarded wife the vast majority of the marital estate and waived

maintenance on behalf of both parties.

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¶4 In April 2023, husband filed a C.R.C.P. 60 motion to amend

both the parenting plan and the separation agreement, asserting

that the district court had failed to review the documents’

provisions for unconscionability and that he had executed the

documents during a mental health crisis. While his C.R.C.P. 60

motion was still pending, husband also moved to modify child

support. The district court then granted husband’s C.R.C.P. 60

motion in part and reopened the marital property division.

However, the provisions of the parenting plan were left in place,

subject to husband’s motion to modify child support.

¶5 After a hearing, the district court entered permanent orders.

The court indicated that it was dividing the approximately $950,000

marital estate, which consisted primarily of the parties’ four

properties, equally. Specifically, the court awarded wife one

property with $303,581 in equity and husband two properties with

$346,702 in total equity. The court ordered the parties’ fourth

property (Old Trail) to be sold with an equal division of the net

proceeds. After dividing the parties’ other assets and debts, the

court ordered husband to pay wife a total of $108,039, consisting of

a property equalization payment of $69,149, a $18,890 child

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support arrearage, and $20,000 in attorney fees that the court

awarded to wife.

¶6 The court ordered the equalization payment to be taken from

husband’s portion of the proceeds from the sale of Old Trail.

Shortly after the entry of the permanent orders, the district court

granted the parties’ joint motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b) to reduce the

total payment to wife to $79,686 because a debt that had been

allocated to wife had been inadvertently overstated by $28,353.

¶7 In the permanent orders, the district court also awarded wife

maintenance in the amount of $1,143.75 per month for a term of

five years and six months, and reduced husband’s child support

obligation to $1,534.59 per month.

II. Marital Property Division

¶8 We first consider and reject husband’s contention that the

district court reversibly erred when dividing the marital property.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 Upon dissolution, a district court divides marital property in a

way that is just and equitable, although such a division need not be

equal. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also In re Marriage of

Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001). The court enjoys

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broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of marital

property. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001).

Accordingly, we will not disturb the court’s division of property

unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of

Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). A district court

abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In re

Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.

B. Discussion

¶ 10 To start, because he inaccurately characterizes the marital

property division, we reject husband’s contention that the district

court abused its discretion by inequitably awarding wife a

disproportionate share of the marital property.

¶ 11 Arguing that anything less than a 50/50 division of the

marital estate was inequitable, husband erroneously claims that the

district court unequally, and therefore inequitably, divided the

marital property. But in asserting that the division of the marital

estate was unequal, husband incorrectly uses the full payment to

wife in his calculations. In using the full payment, husband ignores

the fact that only $40,796 of the $79,696 payment pertained to

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equalizing the marital property division; the remaining portion of

the payment consisted of his child support arrearage and the award

of attorney fees to wife. Similarly, husband’s calculations appear to

ignore and exclude from the marital estate the 50 percent of the

approximately $385,763 in marital equity from Old Trail that each

party will receive upon the property’s sale.

¶ 12 Indeed, contrary to husband’s assertion that the marital

property division was disproportionate, the district court explicitly

stated that it was equally dividing the marital estate as it allocated

the parties’ real estate, vehicles, bank accounts, and debt, while

calculating equalization payments corresponding to each category of

property.

¶ 13 We agree with husband, however, that the district court made

repeated errors in wife’s favor when calculating the equalization

payments for each category of marital property. Specifically, the

court failed to divide by two when calculating the equalization

payments as to the real estate, vehicles, and bank accounts,

resulting in a total miscalculation of $31,900 in wife’s favor.

¶ 14 However, errors in the marital property division are reversible

only when the aggregate effect of such errors affects the substantial

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rights of the parties, meaning that we disregard errors affecting only

a small percentage of the overall marital estate. See Balanson, 25

P.3d at 36; see also C.R.C.P. 61. And here, the errors in wife’s favor

affected less than 5 percent of the marital estate, so the errors were

harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61; cf. In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA

1, ¶ 8 (error involving loans comprising approximately one-third of

the marital estate required reversal). Moreover, lessening any

prejudice to husband, the parties and the district court made a

similar error in the amount of about $14,176 in husband’s favor

when amending the payment to wife postjudgment to account for

the $28,353 of debt that had been allocated to her, but which did

not exist.

¶ 15 We also reject husband’s assertion that the district court made

insufficient findings in support of the property division. While

section 14-10-113(1) requires the court to consider certain factors

when dividing the marital property, such as the contributions of

each spouse, the value of the parties’ separate property, and the

spouses’ respective economic circumstances, weighing the factors is

within the district court’s discretion, and the court need not make

specific findings on each factor. See Powell, 220 P.3d at 959; see

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also In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (a district court

must make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently

explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis

of its order).

¶ 16 Here, although the district court didn’t engage in a detailed

discussion of each statutory factor, we are satisfied that the court

considered the pertinent factors when dividing the marital estate.

See Powell, 220 P.3d at 959. For instance, at other points, the

court found that “both parties have worked and contributed to the

financial stability of the family during the marriage,” and it engaged

in a detailed discussion of the parties’ respective economic

circumstances, including each party’s present earning capacity.

See § 14-10-113(1)(a), (c).

¶ 17 Finally, we reject husband’s contention that the district court

erred by allowing wife to select the real estate agent for the sale of

Old Trail. The mechanism employed to effectuate an equitable

division of the marital property rests within the court’s sound

discretion, and it may enter a variety of orders to implement the

division, including orders imposing conditions on the sale of marital

property. See In re Marriage of Lafaye, 89 P.3d 455, 462 (Colo. App.

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2003). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the court’s orders

governing the sale of Old Trail.

III. Maintenance

¶ 18 While we reject husband’s challenge to the marital property

division, we agree with him that the district court made insufficient

findings when awarding wife maintenance, and we therefore

conclude that further proceedings are required.

A. Standards of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount

and duration of a maintenance award, and, absent an abuse of that

discretion, its decision will not be reversed. See § 14-10-114(2),

(3)(e), C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 15;

In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14.

¶ 20 Under section 14-10-114(3), the court must follow a specific

process when awarding maintenance. In re Marriage of Stradtmann,

2021 COA 145, ¶ 28. “[T]he court must first make written or oral

findings on each party’s gross income, the marital property

apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the

reasonable financial need as established during the marriage, and

the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” Herold, ¶ 25; see also

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§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I). Next, the court must determine the amount

and term of maintenance, if any, that is equitable after considering

the statutory advisory guidelines and a list of non-exclusive

statutory factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(a)(II)(B), (3)(b), (3)(c);

Wright, ¶ 15. Finally, before the court may award maintenance, it

must find that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient

property, including marital property apportioned to them, to provide

for their reasonable needs and is unable to support themself

through appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).

¶ 21 While the district court ultimately has discretion to enter a fair

and equitable maintenance award, it must “make specific written or

oral findings in support of the amount and term of maintenance

awarded.” § 14-10-114(3)(e); see also Gibbs, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of

Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Factual findings are

sufficient if they identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed

persuasive and determinative of the issues raised.”).

B. Discussion

¶ 22 We agree with husband that the district court made

insufficient findings to support the $1,143.75 per month in

maintenance awarded to wife.

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¶ 23 The district court’s findings in support of the maintenance

award were short and conclusory:

Given the lifestyle of the parties during the
marriage and [wife’s] limited ability to meet her
reasonable needs, and as her income is
significantly less than that of [husband], the
court finds that [wife] is eligible for and in need
of maintenance. . . . The marriage lasted
eleven years and 5 months. Therefore,
maintenance is ordered for five years and six
months. The amount of maintenance that
[husband] shall pay [wife] each month is
$1,143.75 as calculated using Colorado
guidelines.

¶ 24 While the district court then made significant, detailed

findings in support of its determination of the parties’ respective

incomes, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), the court made no findings as

to either party’s reasonable financial needs, despite concluding that

wife had a limited ability to meet her needs and thus qualified for

maintenance, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D), (3)(d). And although the

court then calculated the guideline amount of maintenance, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(b), and indicated that it had considered the parties’

lifestyle during the marriage, the court made no findings as to what

the parties’ lifestyle actually was or the costs that were associated

with their lifestyle, see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(III).

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¶ 25 Likewise, except for the district court’s findings concerning the

parties’ respective incomes and the duration of the marriage, we

lack sufficient findings to meaningfully review the extent to which

the court considered the numerous other maintenance factors

under section 14-10-114(3)(c). See Gibbs, ¶ 9; Garst, 955 P.2d at

1058; cf. Wright, ¶ 20 (recognizing that while a district court need

not make specific factual findings on every factor under section

14-10-114(3)(c), a generalized statement that the court considered

the statutory criteria is insufficient).

¶ 26 Wife cites portions of the record that she contends otherwise

support the award of maintenance, such as her financial needs as

reflected in her sworn financial statement. But given that it was the

district court’s role to make credibility determinations, as well as to

synthesize and resolve any contradictions in the evidence, we

decline wife’s invitation to infer our own findings in support of the

maintenance award. Cf. In re Marriage of Wollert, 2020 CO 47, ¶ 23

(“[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather

than appellate courts,” because a “cold record is a poor substitute

for live testimony.” (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.

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273, 291 (1982), and People v. Scott, 600 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1979),

respectively)).

¶ 27 Accordingly, we reverse the maintenance award and remand

the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court

must reconsider wife’s request for maintenance using the procedure

specified by section 14-10-114(3), making findings where required,

and addressing the factors relevant to its determination. See

Herold, ¶¶ 29-34; Stradtmann, ¶¶ 33-35. The court must make

sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give us a clear understanding

of the basis of its order. See Wright, ¶ 20; Gibbs, ¶ 9. Because

maintenance is based on the spouses’ financial circumstances at

the time an order is entered, the court on remand must consider

the parties’ current financial circumstances, which means it must

take additional evidence. See Wright, ¶ 24; Stradtmann, ¶ 35.

IV. Modification of Child Support

¶ 28 Asserting that the district court erred in determining the

parties’ respective incomes, husband also challenges the district

court’s order modifying child support that set his monthly child

support obligation at $1,534.59 per month.

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¶ 29 Because maintenance and child support, including the

determination of the parties’ incomes, are “inextricably intertwined,”

In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005), and

because we have reversed the maintenance award, we also reverse

the portion of the permanent orders modifying husband’s child

support obligation. We remand for reconsideration of husband’s

motion to modify child support under section 14-10-122(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2024, including the recalculation of child support consistent

with section 14-10-115(2)(b), (3)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 30 Here, too, the district court must consider the parties’ current

financial circumstances on remand. See In re Marriage of Schaefer,

2022 COA 112, ¶ 41. Therefore, we decline to address husband’s

contention that the court erred in determining the parties’

respective incomes for both maintenance and child support

purposes, given that the parties will have an opportunity to present

evidence as to their current financial circumstances on remand.

See Wright, ¶ 24; Stradtmann, ¶ 35.

V. Attorney Fees

¶ 31 Husband lastly challenges the district court’s award of

$20,000 in attorney fees to wife under section 14-10-119, C.R.S.

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2024, which it based on the parties’ disparate financial resources

and a finding that husband had prolonged the proceedings.

Because a determination of attorney fees must be reviewed in light

of the parties’ financial resources after any maintenance award, the

court must also reconsider its determination of attorney fees given

our reversal of the maintenance award. See In re Marriage of

Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 62. Therefore, we decline to consider

husband’s contention that the district court erred in awarding wife

attorney fees.

¶ 32 However, in the event that the district court awards attorney

fees on remand, the court must make findings sufficient for us to

determine whether it awarded attorney fees under section 14-10-

119, section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024, or both. See Gibbs, ¶ 9; see

also § 14-10-119 (affording the court discretion to award fees in a

dissolution proceeding “after considering the financial resources of

both parties”); §§ 13-17-102, -103, C.R.S. 2024 (governing awards

of attorney fees for maintaining a substantially frivolous,

groundless, or vexatious action); In re Marriage of Trout, 897 P.2d

838, 840 (Colo. App. 1994) (although the court may consider a

party’s actions in initiating unwarranted proceedings when

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determining whether to award attorney fees under section 14-10-

119, the award should be primarily a means of apportioning the

costs and fees of an action equitably between the parties and not a

means of punishing a party).

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 33 Asserting that husband’s appeal is frivolous, wife requests an

award of her appellate attorney fees under C.A.R. 38(b). Given our

disposition, we deny wife’s request for appellate attorney fees and

we also decline to award her costs on appeal. See C.A.R. 39(a) (if a

judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall

be allowed only as ordered by the court).

¶ 34 Wife also requests her appellate attorney fees under section

14-10-119 due to the alleged financial disparities between the

parties. Because the district court is better equipped to determine

the factual issues regarding the parties’ current financial resources,

we direct it to address this request on remand. See C.A.R. 39.1;

In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 54.

VII. Disposition

¶ 35 The portions of the judgment concerning the property division

are affirmed. The portions of the judgment concerning maintenance

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and the award of attorney fees to wife are reversed. The portions of

the judgment modifying child support are reversed. The case is

remanded for further proceedings as to maintenance, the

modification of child support, wife’s request for attorney fees, and

her request for appellate attorney fees. Those portions of the

judgment not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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