Peo in Interest of SM

24CA1865 Peo in Interest of SM 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1865
Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30033
Honorable Lindsay Van Gilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.M., a Child,

and Concerning J.H.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
J. Jones and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 17, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Claire M. Czajkowski, Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Eric Truhe, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 J.H. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating her parent-child legal relationship with S.M. (child). We

affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families

(Division) filed a petition in dependency and neglect due to concerns

about mother’s substance use and mental health, as well as

violence in the home between mother and maternal grandmother.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan designed to address

mother’s substance use and mental health issues.

¶4 Eight months later, the Division moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. But after a contested hearing, the juvenile court

denied the motion, finding that mother could become fit with

additional time because she had entered inpatient substance abuse

treatment for the second time and had plans to discharge to sober

living.

¶5 Two months later, after mother failed to enter sober living,

relapsed, and stopped visiting the child, the Division again moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing held over

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two days nearly a month apart, the court granted the second

motion and terminated mother’s parental rights.

II. General Law and Standard of Review

¶6 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. See

id.; People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

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¶8 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

III. Additional Time

¶9 Mother contends that the juvenile court erroneously concluded

that she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 10 “Once a treatment plan has been devised for a parent, a court

may only terminate parental rights when, among other things, the

court finds that parent unfit and unable to become fit in a

reasonable time.” People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 27.

An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental

care to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting

sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and

mental health needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2).

¶ 11 When determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider

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whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶ 12 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must

be determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. Id. at ¶ 25. A “reasonable time” is

not an indefinite time. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 The juvenile court concluded that mother was unfit and

unlikely to change within a reasonable time because, over the

eighteen months the case had been pending, she continued to

exhibit the same problems addressed in the treatment plan without

making adequate progress. Specifically, the court found that

mother never engaged consistently in mental health therapy, nor

did she develop any tools to manage her emotional dysregulation

and escalation. The court also found that while mother attended

inpatient substance use treatment on three occasions, she failed to

participate in the required aftercare, leading to relapses and

ongoing use. The record supports the court’s findings.

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¶ 14 The Division initiated this case due to concerns about

mother’s mental health. According to the caseworker, mother

experienced a mental health crisis in front of the child, during

which mother became dysregulated, was verbally abusive, and

physically lashed out at maternal grandmother. As a result, mother

was charged with child abuse, and the Division opened this case.

The criminal court stayed mother’s criminal cases due to

competency concerns and ordered outpatient restoration. To

address her mental health concerns, mother’s treatment plan

required her to engage in individual therapy, follow the treatment

recommendations, and manage her medication.

¶ 15 Mother did not adequately address her mental health issues.

The caseworker testified that although mother took her

medications, she never engaged in individual therapy or learned to

de-escalate and self-regulate.

¶ 16 The caseworker also testified about a pattern of disruptive

behavior that never improved throughout the case. For example,

during mother’s last visit with the child, four months before the

termination hearing, mother’s behavior escalated and “really

frightened” the child, who ran to the caseworker “and said mommy

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scares me.” Two months later, while visiting the caseworker,

mother became “enraged” and yelled expletives at the caseworker.

The caseworker opined that mother’s behavior prevented her from

providing appropriate care for the child and that mother exhibited

the same mental health concerns as when the case was opened.

¶ 17 The record also shows that mother did not demonstrate an

ability to maintain sobriety. Her treatment plan required her to

abstain from drugs, complete a substance abuse assessment and

follow any recommendations, and undergo two random urine

screens per week. The caseworker testified that mother

“emphatically indicated that she was not going to be doing the UAs,

so she didn’t,” and that she completed only three urine screens

outside of an inpatient setting. Mother testified that she used drugs

early in the case “just because I wanted to” and admitted to daily

use during the three months before her last inpatient stay. And she

admitted to relapsing between the first and second day of the

second termination hearing.

¶ 18 True, mother participated in inpatient treatment on three

separate occasions, but she did not follow recommendations to

discharge to sober living and could not maintain sobriety outside of

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a structured setting. The caseworker testified that mother relapsed

after every successful discharge. At the conclusion of the second

termination hearing, mother had finally entered sober living but

had already relapsed on methamphetamine while there.

¶ 19 Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that the

juvenile court did not err by concluding that mother could not

become fit within a reasonable time.

IV. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 20 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in

concluding that no less drastic alternatives, such as an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) to the paternal aunt and uncle,

existed. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 21 In considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 29. In doing so, the court may consider, among other

things, whether (1) an ongoing relationship between the parent and

child would be beneficial, People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA

195M, ¶ 38; (2) an APR provides adequate permanence and stability

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for the child, People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo

App. 2005); and (3) the placement provider prefers adoption over an

APR, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App.

2011).

¶ 22 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Long-term or permanent placement with a

family member may not be in the child’s best interests if it does not

provide the permanence that adoption would provide or otherwise

meet the child’s needs. A.R., ¶ 41. If a juvenile court considers a

less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the alternative and order

termination. A.M., ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

¶ 23 In addition, when a child is under six years old at the time of

the filing of the petition, as in this case, the case is subject to the

expedited permanency planning provisions, and the court must

consider the child’s need to be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

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B. Analysis

¶ 24 The juvenile court considered mother’s argument that an APR

could be a less drastic form of permanency but concluded that it

was not the form of permanency that would serve the child’s best

interests. The court found that, given the child’s “physical, mental,

and emotional needs, . . . the best option for her is to receive the

permanency and stability . . . that she is receiving in the paternal

aunt and uncle’s home,” which could only be achieved “through an

adoption to her current placement.” The court also found that

there was too much uncertainty about mother’s future and that “an

APR is simply not permanent . . . and can really result in future

litigation.” The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 25 The caseworker testified that the paternal aunt and uncle,

with whom the child was placed, preferred adoption to an APR. The

child thrived in the placement, and the paternal aunt and uncle

accommodated her physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs. The caseworker testified that mother had no contact with

aunt or uncle regarding the child’s speech and mental health needs.

The caseworker opined that adoption would be in the child’s best

interests because this placement was the only family the child had

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known, the child felt safe with them, they understood how to

address the child’s needs, and removing the child from their care

would be traumatic for her.

¶ 26 In addition to the uncertainty created by mother’s unresolved

substance abuse and mental health concerns discussed above,

mother did not consistently participate in family time, preventing

her from establishing a relationship with the child. The family time

facilitator testified that mother’s family time with the child became

increasingly inconsistent as the case progressed. Mother would

attend family time for three to four weeks but then miss all visits for

the next three to four weeks. Visitation services were closed at least

twice in a thirteen month span due to mother’s lack of

participation. The facilitator testified that after family time was

missed, mother’s and the child’s “connection would be broken[,]

and they would have to spend more time getting reacquainted with

each other.”

¶ 27 As mentioned above, mother’s last visit with the child occurred

four months before the termination hearing. The caseworker

testified that even before this last visit, the child would become

upset and “cry inconsolably” after visits, and visits were “very hard”

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on the child. Given this negative impact on the child, mother

agreed to participate in a therapeutic assessment before resuming

family time. But mother did not follow through with scheduling

that assessment and family time never resumed. At the second

termination hearing, the caseworker opined that mother did not

know the child or have a relationship with the child.

¶ 28 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s

determination that there was no less drastic alternative and that

termination was in the child’s best interests, we will not disturb its

decision. See B.H., ¶ 81; A.M., ¶¶ 32, 49.

V. Disposition

¶ 29 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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