Peo in Interest of BW

24CA1832 Peo in Interest of BW 04-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1832
Jefferson County District Court No. 20JV371
Honorable Lindsey Van Gilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of B.W., a Child,

and Concerning K.V-D.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 3, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Samantha Metsger, Counsel for Youth, Denver, Colorado, for B.W.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 K.V-D. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating his parent-child legal relationship with B.W. (the

youth). We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and

Families (Division) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

regarding the then-eleven-year-old youth. The petition alleged that

mother had emotionally and physically abused the child. It

contained no allegations as to father, who had never met the youth

and had been serving a prison sentence.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the youth dependent or

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for father requiring

that he, among other things, (1) complete a mental health

assessment and follow all recommendations; (2) complete an anger

management assessment and follow all recommendations; (3)

attend family time with the youth; and (4) understand and

demonstrate how to support the youth and meet his developmental

and emotional needs. The treatment plan was subsequently

amended to remove the anger management assessment and instead

have father address this issue in individual therapy.

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¶4 The Division later moved to terminate father’s parental rights.

After a hearing, held nearly four years after the filing of the petition,

the court terminated father’s parent-child legal relationship with

the youth.

II. Additional Time

¶5 Father argues that the juvenile court erroneously found that

he could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time. We are

not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 “Once a treatment plan has been devised for a parent, a court

may only terminate parental rights when, among other things, the

court finds that parent unfit and unable to become fit in a

reasonable time.” People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 27.

An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders them

“unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care to

include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health

needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 When determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider

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whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶8 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child. Id. at ¶ 25. A “reasonable time”

is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a parent has made

recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is not required to

give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25

(citing People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo.

App. 1998) (even “increased compliance” over the course of a case

may not justify additional time)).

¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

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¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. See

id.; People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

¶ 10 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that father could not become fit to

parent the youth in a reasonable time. In doing so, the court found

that the case had been open for nearly four years and yet father had

not addressed his mental health or anger and he lacked an ability

to regulate his emotions. The court also found that father engaged

in only four therapeutic family time sessions in four years, that

there was significant inconsistency in his engagement with

therapeutic family time, and that attempts to engage him in family

time were unsuccessful. The court further found that the youth’s

“needs are extraordinarily high and, frankly, complicated.” The

court acknowledged father’s recent progress but found that father

had not demonstrated an understanding of the youth’s specific

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physical, mental health, and emotional needs. The record supports

the court’s findings.

¶ 12 During the four years that the case was open, father did not

successfully address the issues that would render him fit. The

caseworker testified that father had not completed a mental health

assessment nor engaged in individual therapy. And because father

did not start individual therapy, he never addressed his anger

management issues. Father regularly became dysregulated and

angry with both caseworkers assigned to this case, causing concern

for the caseworkers’ safety. The caseworker reported that

throughout the case, father’s demeanor became escalated, and he

did not show an ability to de-escalate or control his frustration.

¶ 13 Because father had no pre-existing relationship with the youth

when the case opened, the parent-child relationship began with

therapeutic visits. The therapist testified that father inconsistently

attended family time, that father behaved inappropriately toward

the therapist, and that the therapist could not redirect father

during family time. The last therapeutic family time session, which

occurred a month prior to the termination hearing, lasted only ten

minutes. The youth ended the session early because the therapist

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was unable to redirect father when he spoke of inappropriate topics.

Thereafter, the youth requested additional time and space before

re-engaging with father, and there were no more family time visits.

In total, father participated in only four sessions with the youth

over a period of four years.

¶ 14 The record also shows that the youth had extraordinarily high

needs. The caseworker testified that the youth’s emotional and

behavioral needs were more demanding than a typical youth his

age, and he suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,

post-traumatic stress disorder, and a mild intellectual disability.

The youth’s therapist testified that the youth’s needs are “incredibly

high in terms of his therapeutic needs” and that he presents at a

much lower developmental age. She stated that in engaging with

the youth, it was “important to be incredibly trauma-informed,

incredibly important to have proper psychoeducation on the

impacts of trauma and his attachment and how he conceptualizes

and processes things.” However, Father minimally engaged in

family intervention services, which were designed to teach him how

to be trauma informed and to appropriately handle the youth’s

needs.

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¶ 15 The caseworker, who was qualified as an expert in child

protection casework, testified that she did not believe there was a

substantial probability that anything in father’s condition would

change within a reasonable time.

¶ 16 Based on the evidence in the record, and considering the

youth’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs, the juvenile

court did not err when it found father could not become fit within a

reasonable time.

III. Disposition

¶ 17 We affirm the judgment.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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