Gunderson v. Gunderson

24CA0334 Gunderson v Gunderson 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0334
Mesa County District Court No. 22CV30428
Honorable Dinsmore Tuttle, Judge

Kimberly Gunderson,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Jerry Gunderson,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Wegener Lane & Evans, P.C., Benjamin M. Wegener, Dalen B. Porter, Grand
Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Starritt Legal, LLC, Sam D. Starritt, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee
¶1 Plaintiff, Kimberly Gunderson (Kimberly), appeals the district

court’s order declining to take judicial notice of certain rulings in

earlier civil litigation between her and defendant, Jerry Gunderson

(Jerry) (jointly, the parties or the Gundersons).1 Kimberly also

appeals the judgment entered on the jury’s award of zero damages

to her. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Gundersons have been married for over twenty-five years

but have been embroiled in divorce proceedings since 2015. They

have also been embroiled in civil litigation spanning multiple states

since at least 2017. The prior proceedings relevant to this appeal

include (1) a civil case in Colorado that Jerry initiated against

Kimberly and others (the prior Colorado case); and (2) a civil case in

Nevada that Jerry initiated against Kimberly, The Kimberly

Gunderson Trust (Kimberly’s trust), and others (the Nevada case).

Based on these prior proceedings, Kimberly filed a lawsuit against

Jerry in which she alleged abuse of process and malicious

prosecution (the current Colorado case). In her complaint filed in

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by

their first names. No disrespect is intended.

1
the current Colorado case, she requested a jury trial and an award

of economic and noneconomic damages.

¶3 Relevant to this appeal are the following facts about the

parties’ practice of purchasing real estate with funds from

Kimberly’s trust and the parties’ litigation history after Kimberly

filed for dissolution of marriage.

A. Kimberly’s Trust

¶4 In 2003, Kimberly’s father set up an irrevocable trust under

Nevada law. In 2005, the trustees of that trust formed a spendthrift

trust for Kimberly’s benefit — Kimberly’s trust. During their

marriage, the Gundersons purchased multiple homes using funds

borrowed from Kimberly’s trust. The trustees of Kimberly’s trust

conditioned the loans on Kimberly’s and Jerry’s execution of loan

documents, such as promissory notes, that required them to repay

the funds with interest and transfer title to the properties to

Kimberly’s trust. A Nevada limited liability company that

Kimberly’s trust owned (the LLC) generally held the titles to the

Gundersons’ various residential properties. The trustees didn’t

require the Gundersons to make payments on the principal or

interest on the loans when their marriage was intact; instead, the

2
parties were simply required to maintain the properties in good

condition.

¶5 Between 2005 and 2015, the parties followed this practice of

using funds borrowed from Kimberly’s trust to purchase various

properties in Nevada, Colorado, and Montana. In 2015, Kimberly

filed for dissolution of marriage in Montana, where the parties then

resided. In 2017, the LLC — which held notes secured by the

parcel of Colorado real property on which the Gundersons lived —

called the notes due. The notes expressly provided that the LLC

could demand full payment from Kimberly and Jerry individually or

jointly, and the LLC demanded that Jerry individually pay the notes

in full by April 2017. Thereafter, the parties began their yearslong

civil litigation battle.

B. The Prior Colorado Case

¶6 Jerry didn’t pay the notes as the LLC demanded. Rather, in

May 2017, he initiated the prior Colorado case against Kimberly,

Kimberly’s father, the LLC, and others seeking declaratory relief

related to the notes. Jerry also asserted claims of affirmative fraud,

negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment or

nondisclosure against Kimberly, Kimberly’s father, and the LLC. He

3
further pleaded contribution, promissory estoppel, and unjust

enrichment claims against Kimberly individually.

¶7 In December 2021, the court entered an order granting

Kimberly’s motion to dismiss four of Jerry’s seven claims against

her (the prior Colorado order). A month later, the court entered

judgment in favor of the LLC and concluded that the LLC was

entitled to collect the entire amount due under the notes from

either Kimberly or Jerry (the prior Colorado judgment). The court

also found in favor of Jerry on his contribution claim against

Kimberly and concluded that, after Jerry had satisfied his

obligations under the notes, he could seek contribution from

Kimberly.

C. The Nevada Case

¶8 Jerry filed the Nevada case in April 2018, while the prior

Colorado case was pending. In the Nevada case, he asserted similar

claims to those he brought in the prior Colorado case but included

as defendants Kimberly’s father’s trust, Kimberly’s trust, and their

respective trustees (collectively, the trust defendants). Jerry also

asserted that he had a marital property interest in Kimberly’s trust.

4
¶9 In December 2018, the Nevada court entered an order granting

the trust defendants’ motion to dismiss Jerry’s complaint with

prejudice and concluding that Jerry had no interest in Kimberly’s

trust (the Nevada order).

¶ 10 Although the trust defendants were dismissed under the

Nevada order, the claims against Kimberly individually and the LLC

remained pending in the Nevada case. In March 2019, the Nevada

court entered a judgment in favor of the LLC and denied Jerry’s

request for judgment.

¶ 11 In September 2020, Kimberly, Kimberly’s trust, the LLC, and

Jerry stipulated to the dismissal, with prejudice, of Jerry’s

remaining claims against the various defendants (the stipulation).

The Nevada case ended once the Nevada court approved the

stipulation.2

D. The Current Colorado Case

¶ 12 In November 2022, Kimberly filed the current Colorado case,

in which she asserted that Jerry abused the legal process and

2 Jerry appealed the Nevada order dismissing his complaint against

the trust defendants to the Nevada Supreme Court; the court
affirmed the Nevada order in December 2021.

5
maliciously prosecuted her based on the litigation in the prior

Colorado case and the Nevada case. The court scheduled the

current Colorado case for a four-day jury trial and ordered the

parties to file trial briefs at least fourteen days before trial.

¶ 13 Two months before trial, Kimberly filed her “Plaintiff’s

Unopposed Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

Pursuant to C.R.E. 201” (the motion) and requested that the court

take judicial notice of the prior Colorado order, the prior Colorado

judgment, and the Nevada order (collectively, the prior rulings). The

court granted the motion.

¶ 14 In his trial brief, filed two weeks before trial, Jerry objected to

Kimberly’s request to admit the prior rulings into evidence, arguing

that their admission was improper under CRE 201 because they

included adverse rulings and findings about Jerry’s credibility.

Alternatively, he argued that, if the court admitted the prior rulings

into evidence, it should redact “factual findings [the] jury must

reach, credibility findings[,] and the judge[s’] identities.” He further

argued that the prior rulings should not be referenced at trial until

the court determined whether and to what extent the prior rulings

were admissible.

6
¶ 15 A week before the trial, the parties participated in a pretrial

readiness conference during which the court addressed the issue of

judicial notice of the prior rulings. Coincidentally, the judge who

had presided over the prior Colorado case also presided over the

current Colorado case, which was why Jerry requested that the

judge’s identity be redacted from any documents from the prior

Colorado case provided to the jury.

¶ 16 During the pretrial readiness conference, the judge agreed that

her name should be redacted from any of the prior Colorado case

documents provided to the jury. Initially, the judge likewise agreed

that findings about Jerry’s credibility should also be redacted.

Kimberly’s counsel agreed to the redaction of the judge’s name but

objected to redacting the court’s prior credibility findings. Instead,

her counsel suggested that the court provide the jury with a limiting

instruction clarifying the jury’s duty to determine credibility in the

current Colorado case, regardless of any prior credibility findings.

¶ 17 At the conclusion of the pretrial conference, the court

permitted the parties to file motions and responses detailing their

arguments for or against the court taking judicial notice of the prior

rulings. In his motion, Jerry reasserted his argument in his trial

7
brief that “[a] court may take judicial notice of its own record and

adopt factual findings from a previous case as long as the previous

case involved the same parties and issues,” but the court “may

not . . . take judicial notice of findings of fact on the very issue the

parties are litigating.” In her response, Kimberly asserted that “the

jury may consider the [prior rulings] and the determinations

contained therein with regard to the fact that civil lawsuits were

brought against [Kimberly] by [Jerry], that the civil lawsuit ended in

favor of [Kimberly], and as evidence that the lawsuit was brought

without probable cause.”

¶ 18 The court issued an order a few days before trial ruling that it

would take judicial notice of the prior rulings as evidence of “the

fact that civil lawsuits were brought against [Kimberly] by [Jerry]”

and that “at least one of those lawsuits . . . ended in favor of

[Kimberly],” but it declined Kimberly’s request that it judicially

notice the prior rulings as evidence that the prior Colorado case was

brought without probable cause.

¶ 19 The court specifically denied Kimberly’s request that it take

judicial notice of the courts’ credibility determinations underlying

the prior rulings, noting that, while it may be inclined to judicially

8
notice certain information contained in related proceedings’ records,

“it [was] unwilling, without more, to commit to invading the

province of the jury by taking judicial notice of underlying

credibility determinations related to [the current Colorado case] that

were raised in the prior proceedings.”

¶ 20 The court also declined Kimberly’s request that it take judicial

notice of “the contents of other files” because it didn’t know exactly

which records counsel might seek judicial notice of; thus, the court

deemed the matter unripe for ruling. However, the court provided

Kimberly with the opportunity to raise this issue again at the

pretrial hearing set the day before trial, so long as Kimberly

identified the records she would be requesting that the court

judicially notice and her purpose for offering those records into

evidence.

¶ 21 At the pretrial hearing, Kimberly’s counsel reminded the court

that the prior rulings Kimberly was requesting be judicially noticed

were attached to the motion, filed in September 2023. Jerry’s

counsel argued that the only fact from the prior proceedings of

which the court could take judicial notice was that he didn’t prevail

on certain claims. He again objected to the court taking judicial

9
notice of the credibility findings or the substantive content of any

prior rulings. Kimberly’s counsel argued that the substance of the

prior rulings went “to the basis of [her] claims” — abuse of process

and malicious prosecution — and would minimize the relitigation of

those issues. However, Kimberly’s counsel ultimately agreed to

redact the court’s credibility findings from the prior rulings.

¶ 22 At the conclusion of the pretrial hearing, the court ordered

counsel for both parties to submit their proposed redactions to the

prior rulings. The following day, before trial began, the court

adopted the entirety of Jerry’s proposed redactions to the Nevada

order, which redacted large portions of the court’s conclusions of

law. After the first day of trial, the court ruled on the parties’

proposed redactions of the filings in the prior Colorado case. The

court ordered the redaction of much of the court’s findings and the

judge’s identity from both the prior Colorado order and the prior

Colorado judgment.

¶ 23 During closing argument, Kimberly’s counsel requested that

the jury award Kimberly damages against Jerry, including

$119,870.95 in economic damages for attorney fees and costs she

incurred in her defense against Jerry’s claims in the Nevada case

10
and the prior Colorado case, and noneconomic damages for “stress,

anxiety, [and] the issues that she’s [had] to deal with over all these

years because of what [Jerry] [has] been doing with regard to these

lawsuits.”

¶ 24 The jury came back with a split verdict: It concluded that

Jerry didn’t engage in malicious prosecution in either of the prior

proceedings and that he did not abuse process in the prior Colorado

case, but it concluded that Jerry abused process in the Nevada

case. The jury didn’t award Kimberly any damages for Jerry’s

abuse of process in the Nevada case, however.

¶ 25 After the court entered judgment, Kimberly filed this appeal, in

which she asserted that the court abused its discretion by redacting

the prior rulings rather than taking judicial notice of them in their

entirety. She also appeals the jury’s verdict declining to award her

damages despite its finding in her favor on her claim of abuse of

process in the Nevada case.

¶ 26 We first discuss the legal principles underlying judicial

notice — CRE 201 — and our standard for reviewing a court’s

ruling on a party’s request for judicial notice. We then consider the

court’s application of CRE 201 in this case and conclude that the

11
court didn’t abuse its discretion when it redacted certain portions of

the prior rulings. Next, we discuss the legal principles underlying a

jury’s determination of damages and the applicable standard of

review. We conclude that the jury’s verdict awarding no damages to

Kimberly was not inconsistent or irreconcilable with the evidence

presented at trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

II. The Court Did Not Err by Declining to Take Judicial Notice of
the Unredacted Prior Rulings

A. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 27 CRE 201 governs a court’s ability to take judicial notice of an

adjudicative fact, which means the fact is either “(1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Larsen v.

Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. App. 1981)

(quoting CRE 201(b)).

¶ 28 Under Rule 201, a court may “adopt factual findings from a

previous case as long as the previous case involved the same parties

and the same issue.” Mun. Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy

Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 711 (Colo. 1999). It is

12
improper, however, for a court to take judicial notice of the “very

issue the parties are litigating.” Id. Rule 201 has “traditionally

been used cautiously in keeping with its purpose to bypass the

usual fact finding process only when the facts are of such common

knowledge that they cannot reasonably be disputed.” Prestige

Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850, 853 (Colo. 1983).

¶ 29 Facts that have been considered common knowledge include,

but aren’t limited to, unquestioned laws of mathematics, calendar

days and dates, and matters of public record. See id.; see also

Winterberg v. Thomas, 246 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Colo. 1952); Sierra

Mining Co. v. Lucero, 194 P.2d 302, 303 (Colo. 1948); In re

Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on House Bill

91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875, 880 (Colo. 1991). It’s commonplace for a

court to take judicial notice of its own court records or another

court’s judgments or opinions, but a court commits error if it takes

judicial notice of court records for the truth of the matters asserted

in other litigation. Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, ¶ 11; see Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d

Cir. 1992).

13
B. Standard of Review

¶ 30 We review a court’s evidentiary rulings, such as a ruling on

taking judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201, for an abuse of

discretion. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193, 1198-99

(Colo. App. 2002). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling

is “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair” or when it

misapplies the law. Rains v. Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8 (citation

omitted).

C. Analysis

¶ 31 Kimberly asserts that the court erred by (1) reversing its

pretrial order granting her request to admit unredacted copies of

the prior rulings into evidence; (2) allowing Jerry to object to the

admissibility of the prior rulings; and (3) accepting Jerry’s proposed

redactions to the prior Colorado order and judgment. We discern

no error for three reasons.

¶ 32 First, we note that, even though the court initially granted the

motion, the court wasn’t required to follow that prior ruling because

it wasn’t a final ruling in the case. See Giampapa v. Am. Fam. Mut.

Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 243 (Colo. 2003) (“When a court issues final

rulings in a case, the ‘law of the case’ doctrine generally requires

14
the court to follow its prior relevant rulings.”). A ruling is “final”

when it “end[s] the particular action in which it is entered and

leave[s] nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order

to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the

proceeding.” Luster v. Brinkman, 250 P.3d 664, 666 (Colo. App.

2010).

¶ 33 Furthermore, a court has discretion to “reconsider and reverse

a prior ruling if it determines that . . . ‘it needs to correct its

previous ruling because of a legal or factual error.’” People v.

Warren, 55 P.3d 809, 813 (Colo. App. 2002) (citation omitted).

While the court previously granted the motion, upon briefing and

the parties’ oral argument, the court concluded that it would be

error to allow the prior rulings into evidence without redaction

because they contained findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

credibility findings that would invade the province of the jury.

Thus, the court acted within its discretion to reverse its prior ruling

to correct a legal error.

¶ 34 Second, C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(4), provides that “[t]he

court has discretion to order briefing or set a hearing on [a]

motion,” which is what the court did here. Because Jerry opposed

15
the court taking judicial notice of credibility findings and other

substantive content in the prior rulings, it was wholly within the

court’s discretion to order briefing and a hearing on the matter

before it issued a ruling. See C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(4); BFN-Greeley,

LLC v. Adair Grp., Inc., 141 P.3d 937, 942 (Colo. App. 2006) (If an

evidentiary hearing isn’t required, “it is within the district court’s

discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing or rule on the

submitted motions.”).

¶ 35 Moreover, Kimberly asserts that she was “unfairly prejudiced”

because the court’s redaction order “occurred in the middle of

[Kimberly] putting her case on at trial.” But, as the record

demonstrates, this argument ignores the fact that Kimberly had

ample opportunity before trial to present written and oral argument

on the judicial notice issues, and the court entered its order on the

redactions at the conclusion of the first day of trial, before Kimberly

put on any evidence. See Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d

301, 318 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[W]here the party against whom the

motion is directed had ample opportunity to present written

argument, the due process requirements of notice and a reasonable

opportunity to be heard have been satisfied.”), aff’d, 252 P.3d 1071

16
(Colo. 2011). Thus, we reject Kimberly’s assertion that the court

erred by allowing Jerry to object and file a motion in opposition to

her request for judicial notice.

¶ 36 Third, we reject Kimberly’s argument that the court erred by

admitting redacted versions of the prior rulings because Kimberly

sought to admit them for purposes contrary to those underlying

Rule 201. As previously noted, Kimberly asserted claims of abuse

of process and malicious prosecution against Jerry. “The essential

element of an abuse of process claim is the use of a legal proceeding

in an improper manner; therefore, an improper use of the process

must be established.” Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428, 439 (Colo.

App. 2011). To prove malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must satisfy

five elements, including that the defendant lacked probable cause to

bring the action against them. Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408, 411

(Colo. 2007).

¶ 37 Kimberly argued that “the jury [could] consider the [prior

rulings] and the determinations contained therein with regard to

the fact that civil lawsuits were brought against [Kimberly] by

[Jerry], that the civil lawsuit ended in favor of [Kimberly], and as

evidence that the lawsuit was brought without probable cause.”

17
Furthermore, Kimberly’s counsel argued that, to prove abuse of

process and malicious prosecution, Kimberly “[had] to show that

there [were] improper reasons or lack of probable cause for the

other cases to have . . . been filed” and that “those issues were

determined, not only in the Nevada case . . . [b]ut also [in the prior

Colorado case].”

¶ 38 Thus, Kimberly admitted that she was asking the court to take

judicial notice of the prior rulings to establish certain elements of

her claims against Jerry, which is not the purpose of judicial notice.

See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 969 F.2d at 1388 (“A court may take

judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth

of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to

establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.’”) (citation

omitted). And the court recognized that it would invade the

province of the jury’s duty as the fact finder if it took judicial notice

of the substance of the prior rulings.

¶ 39 Indeed, admission of the prior rulings without redactions

would have invaded the province of the jury in two ways. First, the

court properly declined to take judicial notice that “the [prior

Colorado case] was brought without probable cause” because such

18
a finding would establish an essential element of malicious

prosecution — probable cause — which was a determination

reserved for the jury. See Larsen, 631 P.2d at 1164 (affirming the

court’s ruling in a negligence case that declined to take judicial

notice that “a slippery surface presents more than an ordinary risk

of harm” because “[w]hether certain conditions . . . present more

than an ordinary risk of harm depends upon the circumstances of

each case, and thus, is not an adjudicative fact” but rather a fact

for the jury to decide); see also Prestige Homes, Inc., 658 P.2d at

853-54 (Judicial notice should be used “to bypass the usual fact

finding process only when the facts are of such common knowledge

that they cannot reasonably be disputed,” and therefore, a court’s

use of judicial notice to substitute its own factual findings “for those

of the [jury] . . . expand[s] the judicial notice rule far beyond its

intended scope.”).

¶ 40 Second, it is for the jury, as the fact finder, to weigh the

evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and determine the

credibility of the witnesses. See Karg v. Mitchek, 983 P.2d 21, 25

(Colo. App. 1998) (“It is the sole province of the jury to resolve

disputed issues of fact and to determine the credibility of witnesses,

19
the weight to be accorded testimony, and the inferences to be drawn

from evidence.”); see also Vigil v. Pine, 490 P.2d 934, 936 (Colo.

1971). Without redactions, the jury may make its credibility

determinations based on the prior rulings instead of focusing on the

evidence and witness testimony presented during trial.

¶ 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion by redacting substantive portions of the prior rulings.

III. The Jury’s Verdict Awarding No Damages Was Neither
Inconsistent Nor Irreconcilable

A. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 42 A general verdict requires the jury to announce the “ultimate

legal result of each claim” and “permits the jury to decide who

wins,” whereas a special verdict “presents the jury with specific

questions of fact” and then “the court applies the law to the facts

found by the jury and enters judgment accordingly.” Morales v.

Golston, 141 P.3d 901, 906 (Colo. App. 2005) (citation omitted).

¶ 43 A jury verdict that awards zero damages, even when evidence

of damages was presented, may be upheld if there was ample

evidence to support the award. Gonzales v. Windlan, 2014 COA

176, ¶¶ 39-40; see Lee’s Mobile Wash v. Campbell, 853 P.2d 1140,

20
1143 (Colo. 1993) (When “evidence is conflicting, a reviewing court

should not disregard the jury’s verdict, which has support in the

evidence, in favor of its own view of the evidence” but should

“reconcile the verdict with the evidence if at all possible” and affirm

it “[i]f there is any basis for [it].”).

B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 44 Whether a party has preserved their objection to a jury’s

verdict for inconsistency depends on whether the verdict was a

special verdict or a general verdict with answers to special

interrogatories. Morales, 141 P.3d at 905; see C.R.C.P. 49(a)-(b).

“Rule 49(a) does not require a party to object to the inconsistencies

in a jury’s answers to a special verdict before the jury is discharged

in order to preserve its right to challenge the inconsistencies . . . on

appeal.” Morales, 141 P.3d at 905.

¶ 45 On appeal, we must “examine the instructions, the verdict

forms, and the evidence . . . to determine from the record whether

there was competent evidence from which the jury logically could

have reached its verdict.” Id. at 906. And in considering a party’s

challenge to the amount of damages the jury awarded, we “will not

disturb an award of damages unless it is completely unsupported

21
by the record.” Averyt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 265 P.3d 456, 462

(Colo. 2011). The standard for reversing a jury verdict on damages

is “only upon a showing that the jury’s action was arbitrary and

capricious or that the jury was swayed by passion or prejudice.”

Gonzales, ¶ 38 (quoting Peterson v. Tadolini, 97 P.3d 359, 361

(Colo. App. 2004)).

C. Analysis

¶ 46 As a preliminary matter, Jerry asserts that Kimberly’s

objection to the jury’s verdict is unpreserved because the verdict

was a general verdict, and she didn’t object or allege any

inconsistency before the jury was discharged. Conversely, Kimberly

asserts that the verdict was a special verdict; thus, she wasn’t

required to object to any inconsistencies to preserve the issue for

our review.

¶ 47 We conclude the verdict was a special verdict because the

verdict form required the jury to answer specific questions of fact,

and the court entered judgment based on the facts that the jury

found. See Morales, 141 P.3d at 906. Accordingly, Kimberly wasn’t

required to object to any inconsistencies before the jury was

22
discharged to preserve this issue for appeal, so we will consider the

merits of her argument.

¶ 48 Kimberly asserts that the verdict is inconsistent because it

found Jerry liable for abuse of process in the Nevada case but didn’t

award her any damages “where the undisputed evidence proved

otherwise.” Referring to exhibits admitted at trial, she contends

that she presented “undisputed evidence” of the attorney and court

filing fees she incurred in the Nevada case. She argues that,

because the evidence admitted at trial also showed that she

received money from her trust to pay for her legal fees and other

expenses, the jury was “swayed by their emotions, personal biases,

and prejudice” and “evidently biased towards her” when it awarded

her zero damages despite finding in her favor on the abuse of

process claim concerning the Nevada case. We are unpersuaded.

¶ 49 Kimberly’s opening brief only addresses the jury’s decision not

to award her damages for attorney fees and filing costs related to

the Nevada case. However, her argument fails to acknowledge that

she agreed to bear her own attorney fees and costs in a stipulation

signed by her counsel in that case. Kimberly’s counsel didn’t object

when Jerry’s counsel offered the stipulation into evidence, and

23
Kimberly didn’t deny that her lawyer entered into the stipulation

when asked about it at trial. Kimberly fails to identify anything in

the record that otherwise supports her contention that the jury was

biased against her. See Mauldin v. Lowery, 255 P.2d 976, 977

(Colo. 1953) (“It is the task of counsel to inform us . . . both as to

the specific errors relied on and the grounds and supporting facts

and authorities therefor.”).

¶ 50 Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s award of zero

damages to Kimberly is supported by the record, and thus, we will

not disturb the award. See Averyt, 265 P.3d at 462; see also Higgs

v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 840, 860-61 (Colo. 1985) (“[A]bsent an award

so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and

to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption

or other improper cause invaded the trial, the jury’s determination

of the fact is considered inviolate.”) (citation omitted).

IV. Disposition

¶ 51 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

24