Marriage of Danks

23CA1962 Marriage of Danks 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1962
Weld County District Court No. 17DR30496
Honorable Shannon D. Lyons, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Megan Jo Dell,

Appellant,

and

Raymond B. Danks,

Appellee.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Harris and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Sherman & Howard L.L.C., Jordan M. Fox, Hannah R. Taylor, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellant

Antommaria & Rodionov, LLC, Amy M. Antommaria, Greeley, Colorado, for
Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Megan Jo Dell

(mother) and Raymond B. Danks (father), mother appeals the

district court’s order granting father’s emergency motion to restrict

parenting time and ordering shared decision-making responsibility.

Mother also appeals the order denying her motion for post-trial

relief under C.R.C.P. 59 and C.R.C.P. 60. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This matter arose amidst ongoing, contentious

post-dissolution litigation. The parties divorced in September 2018

and have two young children.

¶3 The court’s initial orders designated mother the sole

decision-maker and established equal parenting time for each

party. At the time of dissolution, mother lived in New Mexico while

father lived in Colorado. However, mother moved to Oregon during

the course of this case — without the district court’s consent —

where she currently resides. Father remains in Colorado. The

parties’ parenting time schedule proved to be impractical, and the

parties agreed to change father’s parenting time to ten consecutive

overnights per month in Colorado. Despite this change, the parties

continued to struggle with parenting time transitions. As a result,

1
the court again modified the parenting time schedule to align with

the children’s school calendar in Oregon, giving mother the majority

of the year and father the summer, with occasional school year

visits.

¶4 The latest dispute arose after father exercised parenting time

with the children in late February through March of 2023. Upon

their return to Oregon, one of the children told a teacher that he

was confined while at his father’s house. The teacher made a

mandatory report of child abuse. After receiving the report, the

Oregon Department of Human Services began an investigation and

referred the matter to Juliette’s House, a child advocacy center in

Oregon. Juliette’s House separately interviewed each of the

children and issued preliminary evaluation reports: a two-page

recommendation for each child, dated May 3 and 10, as well as a

ten-page medical exam and forensic interview report for each child,

dated May 10 and 15. The reports recommended that the children

have no unsupervised contact with father until the investigation

concluded.

¶5 The day after the last report was issued, mother filed a status

report that included the two-page recommendations and a request

2
for the court to relieve her from the obligation of confirming the

children’s travel to Colorado for their scheduled June 17 parenting

time with father. The district court denied this request.

¶6 Then on June 14, the district court held a status conference

during which mother asked the court to permit her Oregon counsel

to appear. However, the Oregon counsel had not been admitted pro

hac vice, so the court denied the request and reiterated that the

current parenting time order — that included a scheduled visit on

June 17 — remained in effect.

¶7 During this status conference, mother did not inform the court

that she intended to file an emergency motion to restrict parenting

time in the Oregon circuit court. But the next day, she did exactly

that. The Oregon court issued an order — the same day —

restricting father’s parenting time. Due to these events, the

children did not visit their father at the start of his scheduled

parenting time on June 17.

¶8 Subsequent to the Oregon court order, the parties filed

cross-motions to restrict parenting time in the Colorado district

court. Mother claimed that father physically abused the children,

while father claimed that mother coached the children to make the

3
abuse allegations, placing them in emotional danger. The district

court held another hearing on June 27. Two days later, it issued a

thirty-four-page order granting father’s motion to restrict mother’s

parenting time and withdrawing sole decision-making authority

from mother. Mother filed a post-hearing motion to reconsider.

The district court denied the motion, and mother appealed.

II. Analysis

¶9 Mother contends that the district court erred by (1) changing

the children’s residential parent from mother in Oregon to father in

Colorado; (2) changing the decision-making authority from being

solely mother’s to shared; and (3) failing to properly apply section

14-10-127.5, C.R.S. 2023, known as “Kayden’s Law.”1 We address

the first two issues together due to their related facts and law before

turning to the application of Kayden’s Law.

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the version of Kayden’s Law

that was in effect when the district court issued its order. The
General Assembly has since amended section 14-10-127.5, C.R.S.
2023. Ch. 344, sec. 6, § 14-10-127.5, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws
2342-45.

4
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 “We review [the district court’s] findings of fact for clear error,

‘meaning that we won’t disturb such findings if there is any

evidence in the record supporting them.’” Bartenders & More v.

Colo. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp., 2023 COA 123, ¶ 13 (quoting

Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34,

¶ 24).

¶ 11 “The determination of parenting time is a matter within the

sound discretion of the trial court, taking into consideration the

child’s best interests and the policy of encouraging the parent-child

relationship.” In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo.

App. 2007) (citing In re Marriage of England, 997 P.2d 1288, 1290

(Colo. App. 1999)). Indeed, “every presumption that supports

upholding the court’s decision will be exercised.” Id. Further, on a

motion to restrict parenting time, “[c]redibility determinations and

the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well

as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are

matters within the sole discretion of the [district] court.” In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (second alteration in

original) (quoting In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo.

5
App. 2003)). A “court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on a

misapplication of the law.” Adams Cnty. Hous. Auth. v. Panzlau,

2022 COA 148, ¶ 17 (quoting Black v. Black, 2020 COA 64M,

¶ 118).

¶ 12 However, “we review the legal conclusions the trial court drew

from [its factual] findings de novo.” In re Marriage of de Koning,

2016 CO 2, ¶ 17. And we review a district court’s interpretation of

a statute de novo. Bodelson v. City of Littleton, 36 P.3d 214, 216

(Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 13 The party asserting an error has the burden of showing that

the error wasn’t harmless. Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355,

1375 (Colo. 1993). An error is harmless if it “does not affect the

substantial rights of the parties.” C.R.C.P. 61. An error affects a

party’s substantial rights “only if it can be said with fair assurance

that [it] substantially influenced the outcome of the case or

impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself.” Stockdale v.

Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109, ¶ 32 (quoting Laura A. Newman, LLC v.

Roberts, 2016 CO 9, ¶ 24).

6
¶ 14 Section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2024, governs the modification of

parenting time. “[T]he court may make or modify an order granting

or denying parenting time rights whenever such order or

modification would serve the best interests of the child.”

§ 14-10-129(1)(a)(I). However, “[t]he court shall not restrict a

parent’s parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting

time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly

impair the child’s emotional development.” § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I).

B. Relocation and Decision-Making

¶ 15 Mother contends that the district court erred by changing the

children’s primary residence to Colorado and altering the decision-

making responsibility from her sole authority to a shared

arrangement. To support these contentions, mother argues that

the court (1) incorrectly applied the modification of parenting time

statute, section 14-10-129, by not considering the harm of

relocation to the children; (2) incorrectly relied on a parental

evaluation report and lacked sufficient evidence to make a finding of

coaching; (3) made improper credibility findings; and (4) applied its

personal knowledge to the matter. We address each argument in

turn.

7
1. Application of the Modification of
Parenting Time and Decision-Making Statutes

¶ 16 Mother argues that the district court failed to consider the

harm caused by the children’s relocation from Oregon, where they

lived with her, to Colorado, where they would live with father. But

because the district court did consider the harm of the change in

environment, we disagree.

¶ 17 In its order granting father’s motion to restrict mother’s

parenting time, the district court primarily relied on section

14-10-129(1)(b)(I), which governs the restriction of a parent’s

parenting time rights. In applying the statute, the court made

findings of endangerment, ordered supervised visits for mother,

substantially changed the parties’ allocated parenting time, and

ordered joint decision-making.

¶ 18 Mother does not argue that the court incorrectly applied

section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). However, she contends that the district

court failed to apply two other controlling statutory provisions:

section 14-10-129(2)(d), which addresses modification of parenting

time, and section 14-10-131(2)(c), C.R.S. 2024, which addresses

modification of decision-making responsibility.

8
¶ 19 Father argues, in response, that the court’s determination is

only governed by section 14-10-129(1)(b)(1) and that no other

statutory provisions apply. We disagree. Father cites no case law

in support of this argument, and the plain language of section

14-10-129(2)(d) indicates it clearly applies in this matter along with

the requirements of section 14-10-129(1)(b)(1).

¶ 20 Section 14-10-129(2)(d) provides that

[t]he court shall not modify a prior order
concerning parenting time that substantially
changes the parenting time as well as changes
the party with whom the child resides a
majority of the time unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior
decree or that were unknown to the court at
the time of the prior decree, that a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or
the party with whom the child resides the
majority of the time and that the modification
is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child. In applying these standards, the court
shall retain the parenting time schedule
established in the prior decree unless:

....

(d) The child’s present environment endangers
the child’s physical health or significantly
impairs the child’s emotional development and
the harm likely to be caused by a change of
environment is outweighed by the advantage of
a change to the child.

9
(Emphasis added.)

¶ 21 In addition, section 14-10-131(2)(c) contains a near identical

requirement. Under that paragraph, one basis for a court to modify

decision-making responsibility is when it finds that “[t]he retention

of the allocation of decision-making responsibility would endanger

the child’s physical health or significantly impairs the child’s

emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a

change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change

to the child.” § 14-10-131(2)(c).

¶ 22 Mother argues that the district court erred by failing to make

“any findings regarding the harm likely to be caused from removing

the children from their primary caregiver.” However, her argument

overlooks a key section of the district court’s order that specifically

addressed these required findings: “In addition, [the court] makes

the further finding that retaining allocation of decision-making

authority in mother would significantly impair the children’s

emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a

10
change of environment is currently outweighed by the advantage of

a change in the children’s current environment.”2

¶ 23 The district court made the findings required by sections

14-10-129(2)(d) and 14-10-131(2)(c).3 We thus discern no error,

and mother’s argument fails.

2. The Parental Evaluation Report
and Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 24 Mother next argues that the district court improperly took

judicial notice of a report created by Dr. Mark Kilmer, and that

without that report there was no evidence to support the district

2 While it appears that the district court accidentally collapsed its

statutory citations to section 14-10-129(2)(d), C.R.S. 2024, and
section 14-10-131(2)(c), C.R.S. 2024, into “C.R.S.
§ 14-10-129(2)(c),” this typographical error does not undercut the
substance of its finding.

3 Further, mother’s argument regarding the court’s determination of

decision-making responsibility is foreclosed by section
14-10-131(2)(b.5), which provides that a court may modify
decision-making responsibility when “[t]here has been a
modification in the parenting time order pursuant to section
14-10-129, that warrants a modification of the allocation of
decision-making responsibilities.” The district court’s rationale for
the modification of the parenting time schedule from being
primarily with mother to primarily with father also warrants the
change in decision-making responsibility from being solely mother’s
to joint. This alternative rationale also supports the district court’s
order.

11
court’s finding that mother had coached the children to make false

reports about father.

¶ 25 We first address the court’s use of the report. Dr. Kilmer was

appointed as the parental responsibility evaluator (PRE) in this case

and issued his PRE report in December 2022. The PRE report

contained statements the children had made during their interview

with Dr. Kilmer, along with his analysis and evaluation. Although

he was later removed from the statewide PRE list, his report was

already part of the district court’s record at the time of the June 27

hearing. During that hearing, the district court took judicial notice

of the contents of its court file, which included the PRE report.

Neither party objected.

¶ 26 But when the court later indicated that it had reviewed and

would consider the PRE report, mother’s counsel made the following

record:

Your Honor, if I could just -- for the record, the
PRE Report obviously was filed with [the
court]. There has never been a hearing in
which the PRE Report or the PRE himself was
available to be cross-examined, and [the court]
is aware of the issues related to Dr. [Kilmer]
and his report, and his removal from the PRE
list. Thank you, Your Honor.

12
¶ 27 Mother argues that she “objected to the court taking judicial

notice of the contents of the PRE Report in this manner.” She also

contends that she preserved her two-pronged argument that (1) the

PRE report, and hearsay within it, is not something that can be

judicially noticed; and (2) she was not provided the opportunity to

cross-examine Dr. Kilmer about what he reviewed and his

conclusions.

¶ 28 The record mother made was not sufficient to preserve her

entire argument for review. “To properly preserve an argument for

appeal, the party asserting the argument must present ‘the sum

and substance of the argument’ to the district court.” Gebert v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2023 COA 107, ¶ 25 (quoting Madalena v.

Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32, ¶ 50). The only argument

mother presented to the district court was that she did not have the

opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Kilmer and that he was removed

from the PRE list. Her statement was sufficient to preserve an

objection to Dr. Kilmer’s findings and conclusions. But, as the

court noted in its order, it “[did] not rely on Dr. Kilmer’s opinions as

an expert since he did not testify and was not subject to

cross-examination.”

13
¶ 29 Instead, the district court relied on “the statements [in the

report] attributed to [the children].” But mother didn’t object to the

court taking judicial notice of the report or considering the

statements in it (or indeed argue that they were hearsay). Thus, her

argument that the court couldn’t have considered the contents of

the PRE report under judicial notice is unpreserved. See People v.

Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 11 (“[A]n appellate court has an

independent, affirmative duty to determine whether a claim is

preserved . . . .”). When a party fails to advance an argument in the

district court, that argument is generally waived. Melat, Pressman

& Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18.

¶ 30 But regardless of the extent of the district court’s reliance on

the statements in the PRE report, there was ample evidence in the

record to support the court’s ultimate findings and conclusion.4

4 Mother also argues that “[the PRE report] would never be admitted

as evidence in a proceeding without the PRE appearing and being
admitted as an expert and the proper foundation being laid.” We
note that C.R.C.P. 16.2(g)(2)(c) provides that “[t]he court shall
receive the expert reports into evidence without further foundation,
unless a party notes an objection in the Trial Management
Certificate.” Mother does not argue that she made such an
objection, thus contradicting her argument.

14
¶ 31 Mother argues that apart from “the [c]ourt’s pure conjecture”

and the PRE report, there was no evidence that she coached the

children to make claims of abuse. It’s true that the children’s

statements within the PRE report constitute a portion of the basis

for the coaching finding. But the district court also relied on other

evidence to determine that the children’s abuse allegations were not

credible and that, as a result, mother likely influenced their report.

¶ 32 After “[v]iewing all the evidence together,” the court found that

“Mother coached the boys to make false allegations against Father.”

It concluded that “the coaching may have been direct or indirect or

a combination of both.” But it didn’t rely on the opinions from the

PRE report to get there.

¶ 33 Instead, in reaching this conclusion the district court found

that mother was “trashing Father,” focusing her litigation on

disrupting father’s parenting time, and using the children’s reports

of abuse in strategic instead of protective ways. Further, it found

that “Mother simply shares her feelings (most of them negative)

about Father far too frequently, including with the children, and the

boys have received the message that Father is the bad guy.” Based

on mother’s actions, intentional or not, the court found that “[t]he

15
boys . . . have learned how to please their primary caretaker. The

boys knew their allegations against Father would please Mother.”

¶ 34 Mother also argues that there was no evidence that she

previously engaged in coaching the children. But the district

court’s order belies this claim. Setting aside the statements from

the PRE report and the reasons discussed above, the court found

historical coaching because of the incredible nature of the

children’s allegations, mother’s strategic rather than protective

litigation tactics, its finding that her denial of coaching was not

credible, and its findings that mother was exposing the children to

an environment “where trashing Father and calling him ‘Ray’ have

been commonplace.” Further, mother doesn’t explain why these

findings are wrong or how they affected the outcome of this case.

¶ 35 Regardless, the coaching finding was only one small part of

the court’s larger conclusion that mother was “stunting [the

children’s] emotional development.” This ultimate conclusion was

what the court relied on when it issued its “orders . . . intended to

ameliorate the emotional harm Mother has caused.” Even

completely disregarding the coaching finding, there was still

sufficient evidence supporting the district court’s findings of

16
emotional harm to the children. The court made the following

findings relevant to emotional harm:

• “Mother has been sharing inappropriate adult

information and opinions with the boys.”

• “Specifically, . . . Mother has shared with the boys, either

directly or in their presence, the flaws she [found] in

Father and his parenting style.”

• “Mother has conveyed to the boys that it [was]

outrageous that [father] want[ed] them to call him ‘Dad’

instead of ‘Ray.’”

• “Mother demonstrated with the method and timing of her

pleadings that she was attempting to maximize the

amount of time Father would be restricted from seeing

the children.”

• “Mother exhibit[ed] a pattern of attempting to seriously

diminish Father’s standing.”

• “Based on the complete lack of any evidence of physical

injuries to the children, . . . impossibility of confinement

in the manner reported by the children, . . . [and] stories

containing other wild exaggerations, . . . the [children’s]

17
reports [were] false and . . . Mother encouraged [them] to

invent false stories about their Father.”

• “Mother [was] blinded by her dislike of Father.”

• “The Court has lost all trust in Mother’s ability to

facilitate the relationship between Father and the

children.”

¶ 36 These factual findings are reviewable for clear error, “meaning

that we won’t disturb such findings if there is any evidence in the

record supporting them.” Bartenders & More, ¶ 13 (quoting

Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, ¶ 24). They have support in the record,

and mother does not argue otherwise. Thus, we have no basis to

disturb them. So even if all of mother’s arguments about the PRE

report and the coaching finding were correct, they would not have

substantially influenced the outcome of the proceeding, see

Stockdale, ¶ 32, and any error is therefore harmless.

3. The District Court’s Credibility
Findings and Denial of Reconsideration

¶ 37 Mother contends that the district court erred in its credibility

findings and refused to acknowledge or reconsider its findings and

18
conclusions when presented with evidence that father perjured

himself during his testimony.

¶ 38 “The very ‘sanctity of trial court findings is derived from the

recognition that the trial judge’s presence during the presentation of

testimonial evidence provides an unparalleled opportunity to

determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

afforded the evidence which is before the court.’” In re Marriage of

Wollert, 2020 CO 47, ¶ 23 (quoting Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 796

(Colo. 1979)). Given this unique position of the district court, “we

will not disturb the . . . determination of matters involving weight

and credibility of the evidence,” In re Marriage of Foottit, 903 P.2d

1209, 1213 (Colo. App. 1995), “unless the findings of the trial court

are manifestly erroneous,” In re Marriage of Hoyt, 742 P.2d 963, 964

(Colo. App. 1987).

¶ 39 The district court made numerous credibility findings based

on testimony adduced at the hearing. Generally, the court found

that mother’s testimony was not credible, the children’s allegations

regarding abuse and confinement were facially unbelievable or not

credible, and father’s testimony regarding the children was credible.

19
As an example, the court made the following finding about mother’s

testimony:

The Court does not find Mother’s testimony at
the hearing on June 27, 2023, to be credible.
Her excuses for delayed filing in Oregon
instead of prompt filing in Colorado were not
credible. Her testimony about when she made
the decision to file is not credible. Mother’s
denial of coaching the boys prior to meeting
with the PRE is not credible.

¶ 40 We understand mother’s argument that she presented other

evidence contradicting father’s testimony at the hearing. But that

doesn’t change our analysis. We are limited by the record before us

and “[a] cold record is a poor substitute for live testimony.” Wollert,

¶ 23 (quoting People v. Scott, 600 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1979)). The

additional evidence pointed to by mother does not demonstrate that

the district court’s credibility findings about father are manifestly

erroneous. And even if it did, that evidence would not call into

question the court’s credibility findings about mother or the

children. We simply have no basis on this record to disturb the

district court’s credibility findings.

¶ 41 In addition to the credibility findings made at the hearing on

father’s motion to restrict parenting time, mother argues that the

20
district court erred by not reconsidering those credibility findings in

light of newly discovered evidence demonstrating that father

committed perjury.

¶ 42 At the hearing, father and two other witnesses testified that

his basement was unfinished and did not have rooms or drywall.

After the district court issued its order — which credited father’s

testimony about his home as credible — mother filed a motion for

post-trial relief under C.R.C.P. 59 and 60. In that motion, she

sought relief under C.R.C.P. 59(d)(4), arguing that she had newly

discovered evidence showing that father lied to the court about the

condition of his basement. That evidence consisted of social media

posts showing father constructing a mushroom growing operation

in his basement.

¶ 43 The district court denied her request to reconsider, finding

that mother’s newly provided evidence was in fact posted on social

media in January 2023 and, therefore, was discoverable before the

hearing in June. It determined that the newly provided evidence

was not “material for the party making the application which that

party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and

produced at the trial.” C.R.C.P. 59(d)(4).

21
¶ 44 Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, Unicure, Inc. v. Thurman,

599 P.2d 925, 928 (Colo. App. 1979), we perceive no error in the

district court’s denial of the motion. A party must show that “the

evidence could not have been discovered in the exercise of

reasonable diligence” in order to receive relief under the rule. Id.

And as the district court noted, these social media posts and

publications are materials that could have been discovered and

produced at the hearing.

4. Knowledge Outside of the Record

¶ 45 Mother next argues that the district court improperly

considered evidence outside of the record by relying on its own

knowledge about the location in Mexico where mother traveled with

the children.

¶ 46 In the challenged June 2023 order, the court noted that in

early 2022, mother took the children to Chihuahua, Mexico, where

she ran an ultramarathon. Mother and the children flew to Texas

and then drove eleven hours to get to the race site. The district

court stated that they traveled through “one of the most dangerous

regions in Mexico” and referenced a U.S. State Department’s

advisory, which recommended that individuals “reconsider travel to”

22
Chihuahua. The court criticized mother for opting to take the

children through a dangerous area while she “withheld information

about her journey” from father, instead of leaving them with father,

who was available to care for them.

¶ 47 Mother contests the district court’s reference to a travel

advisory, arguing that it was not in place at the time of the trip and

that no one admitted evidence on the topic. She says that “the

Court [took] it upon itself to look it up” and that “[t]he Court’s

efforts to find ‘evidence’ that was not presented by Father is clearly

error.”

¶ 48 We disagree. As mother admits in her briefing, the district

court, without objection, took judicial notice of its case file at the

June 2023 hearing. The case file contained all of the matters

previously litigated by the parties, including this very issue, which

was the subject of evidentiary hearings that concluded in August

2022. In its order addressing the parenting disputes at that time,

and the Mexico trip in particular, the court noted that it was

entering “detailed factual findings . . . to place the parties on notice

of the [c]ourt’s degree of alarm initiated by mother’s entire manner

of handling the Mexico trip.” The court noted in its August 2022

23
order that, at that time, the State Department had categorized

Chihuahua as being “classified as a Level 3 state, meaning that

U.S. citizens should ‘reconsider travel to’ that region ‘due to crime

and kidnapping.’”

¶ 49 Contrary to mother’s argument, “a court may take judicial

notice of its own records and adopt factual findings . . . involv[ing]

the same parties and the same issue.” In Interest of C.A.B.L., 221

P.3d 433, 442 (Colo. App. 2009). In its August 2022 order, the

court found that (1) “mother does not have the authority to

jeopardize the safety of the children by requiring them to travel to

the race with her, and that it was a mistake to do so in 2022”;

(2) “U.S. citizens should ‘reconsider travel to’ [Chihuahua]”; and

(3) “mother failed to consider the best interests of the children with

respect to her trip to Mexico.”

¶ 50 In its June 2023 order, the court noted that

[t]hough this episode occurred more than a
year ago, it fits a pattern of Mother withholding
important information about the children from
Father. More importantly, it demonstrates
that Mother is willing to place the children’s
physical safety in jeopardy to keep them close
to her. Mother’s default position is to always
avoid including Father in the children’s lives,
no matter the risk to their lives.

24
¶ 51 The court incorporated its earlier factual findings to

demonstrate what it found to be a concerning pattern, not as an

independent basis upon which it decided the pending motion to

restrict parenting time. It was not error for the court to adopt its

findings from its August 2022 order as support for its June 2023

conclusions. And to the extent that mother seeks to challenge the

district court’s August 2022 findings, any such challenge is

untimely. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1).5 Thus, we discern no error in the

district court’s reliance on findings from earlier in the case.

C. The Application of Kayden’s Law

¶ 52 Lastly, mother contends that the district court erred by

concluding that section 14-10-127.5 (known as “Kayden’s Law”) is

inapplicable here.

¶ 53 As an initial matter, the parties dispute preservation. Father

says mother failed to raise this issue at the June hearing and that

she could not properly raise this issue for the first time in her

5 Additionally, to the extent that mother argues the court cannot

consider its previous findings, she is incorrect. See In Interest of
C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433, 442 (Colo. App. 2009). And to the extent
mother argues that there are no new facts or evidence arising since
its prior orders, this argument is patently refuted by the record,
which includes the June 2023 event prompting the court’s action.

25
motion for reconsideration. Mother counters that she didn’t have

an opportunity to raise the issue earlier because she didn’t know

how the district court was going to rule. We decline to resolve this

dispute because, even if preserved, mother’s claim fails on the

merits.

¶ 54 Mother argues that the district court’s order violates

subsection (3) of Kayden’s Law, which, she says, applies to these

proceedings. See § 14-10-127.5(3). Because mother misreads the

district court’s order, we disagree.

¶ 55 The relevant provision of Kayden’s Law states that when “a

party has committed domestic violence . . . , a court shall not:

(I) [r]emove a child from a protective party solely to improve a

deficient relationship with an accused party; [or] (II) [r]estrict

contact between a child and a protective party solely to improve a

deficient relationship with an accused party.”

§ 14-10-127.5(3)(b)(I)-(II).

¶ 56 In its June 2023 order, the court explained that it restricted

mother’s parenting time to “ameliorate the emotional harm mother

has caused thus far and to prevent future harm.” Later, in its order

denying mother’s motion for reconsideration, the court confirmed

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that “[n]owhere in the [June 2023 order]” did it state that it

“restrict[ed] Mother’s parenting time to improve a deficient

relationship with Father.” Nonetheless, mother characterizes the

order as an attempt to rebuild the children’s relationship with

father and says that the district court “effectively states that Mother

must get over being a domestic violence victim before she can have

unrestricted parenting time again.” This reading grossly

mischaracterizes the district court’s order.

¶ 57 We agree with the district court that its order does not say

that it is restricting mother’s parenting time to improve the

children’s relationship with father. To the contrary, its findings are

focused on mother’s actions and the emotional harm she has

caused the children. And nowhere within the order does the court

state that mother “must get over” the domestic violence. In fact, the

court’s order states the opposite: “Mother’s dislike of Father may be

justified, and she is entitled to hold on to that sentiment for the rest

of her life. The Court does not require Mother to change her

feelings about Father to resume unrestricted parenting time.”

¶ 58 Because there is no indication that the court was attempting

to improve a deficient relationship with an accused party — much

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less acting solely for that reason — the provision of Kayden’s Law

cited by mother does not apply. See § 14-10-127.5(3)(b)(I)-(II).

Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial

of mother’s motion to reconsider. See, e.g., Gold Hill Dev. Co., L.P. v.

TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 2015 COA 177, ¶ 52 (“An order denying a

motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 is reviewed for abuse

of discretion.”).

D. Attorney Fees

¶ 59 Father requests attorney fees and costs “pursuant to C.A.R.

39(2).” As the prevailing party, father is entitled to his costs.

C.A.R. 39(a)(2). However, “the party claiming attorney fees must

include a specific request, . . . and must explain the legal and

factual basis for an award of attorney fees.” C.A.R. 39.1. Father’s

request constitutes a single sentence with no explanation as to any

entitlement to fees. He provides no facts or legal argument to

support his request. Because he merely cites an appellate rule

“without stating the specific grounds that justify an award of fees,”

we deny his request. In re Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 32.

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III. Disposition

¶ 60 The order restricting parenting time and modifying

decision-making responsibility and the order denying post-trial

relief are affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE YUN concur.

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