Peo in Interest of ST

24CA1188 Peo in Interest of ST 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1188
Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30070
Honorable Lindsay Van Gilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.T., a Child,

and Concerning J.P.T. and J.M.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Welling and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Claire M. Czajkowski, Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant J.P.T.

Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant J.M.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.P.T. (father) and

J.M. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with S.T. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In March 2023, the Jefferson County Division of Children,

Youth, and Families filed a petition in dependency and neglect

regarding the then-three-month-old child. The Division alleged

concerns about the parents’ substance use. The juvenile court

granted temporary legal custody to the Division, and the child was

placed with kin.

¶3 The parents admitted the allegations in the petition, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The

court adopted treatment plans that required both parents to

address substance abuse issues. The court later amended the

treatment plans to additionally require that mother engage in

domestic violence victim treatment and father complete anger

management classes.

¶4 In December, the Division moved to terminate the parents’

legal relationships with the child. After a three-day evidentiary

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hearing in April and May 2024, the juvenile court granted the

Division’s termination motion.

II. Analysis

¶5 On appeal, mother contends that the juvenile court erred

when it determined that she could not become a fit parent within a

reasonable amount of time. Father contends that the termination

judgment cannot stand because (1) the Division made no

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify him with the child

and (2) there was a less drastic alternative to termination of his

parental rights. We address each of these contentions in turn.

A. Statutory Criteria and Standard of Review

¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of

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S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10; People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8. Thus, we review the court’s factual findings for clear

error and accept them if they have record support. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10.

But we review de novo the court’s legal conclusions based on those

facts. Id.

B. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶8 Mother’s sole contention is that the juvenile court erred by

finding that she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We

disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶9 A parent is unfit if they are unable or unwilling to give a child

reasonable parental care. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 23. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that

the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” S.R.N.J-S.,

¶ 9. A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs

and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

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¶ 10 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on

the issues addressed in a treatment plan before the juvenile court

terminates their parental rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d

874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007). The determination of a reasonable

period is necessarily fact specific, and thus, what constitutes a

reasonable time to comply with a treatment plan may vary from

case to case. Id. But a reasonable time is not an indefinite time,

and it must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of the child. S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

¶ 11 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change and whether the parent can become fit in a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider several factors,

including whether any change occurred during the dependency and

neglect proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic or

long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. K.D. v.

People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). And when, as here, a child

is under six years old when the petition is filed, the juvenile court

must also consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP)

provisions, which require that the child be placed in a permanent

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home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

2. The Record Supports the Juvenile Court’s Determination that
Mother Could Not Become Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 12 The juvenile court considered whether mother could become fit

within a reasonable amount of time but ultimately concluded she

could not. Specifically, the court found that mother had not

demonstrated the kind of progress that was necessary to show that

she would be a safe caregiver. The court found that although

mother had “demonstrated some effort,” she had not complied with

her treatment plan “in any significant respect” and exhibited the

same problems addressed in her treatment plan “without adequate

improvement.” The court also found that even if mother “engaged

in treatment tomorrow,” she would still need “a long period of time”

to show that the child could be returned to her, which would not be

in the child’s best interests. The court noted that there was another

dependency and neglect case, related to a different child, that also

involved concerns about mother’s substance abuse. And in

determining whether mother had been given a reasonable amount

of time to complete her treatment plan, the court considered the

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EPP provisions, noting that the child had been out of the home for

“almost the entirety of her life” and that the case had been open for

more than a year.

¶ 13 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. It shows

that although treatment and services were available to mother

throughout the case, by the time of the termination hearing, she

had not successfully resolved the concerns that initially brought her

family to the Division’s attention. The caseworker’s testimony and

report, which was admitted as evidence, established that mother

did not complete a substance abuse intake, engage in substance

abuse treatment, or provide any urinalysis (UA) tests. During the

pendency of the case, she was charged with several different crimes,

at least one of which involved illegal drugs. And mother never

responded to the domestic violence treatment provider’s attempts to

contact her nor did she utilize any of the domestic violence

resources provided by the Division.

¶ 14 The record also shows that mother’s issues with substance

use were long standing. Approximately a year before this case

opened, the referenced dependency and neglect case was opened in

Weld County for the child’s older sibling after she was found “alone

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sleeping in bed with drug paraphernalia . . . in the home.”

Although mother completed inpatient treatment as part of that

case, she relapsed just before this case opened. At that time, she

was not in compliance with her treatment plan in the Weld County

case. The record also shows that different county departments had

received referrals concerning mother’s drug use dating back to 2021

and that mother had been charged with criminal drug offenses as

early as 2014.

¶ 15 Last, at the time of termination, the child was eighteen months

old and had been out of the home for fourteen of those months.

The caseworker — who was qualified as an expert in the field of

child protection — testified that even if mother started engaging in

treatment right away, it would take “a significant amount of time”

for her to demonstrate the ability to remain sober and safely parent

the child. The caseworker opined that it would not be in the child’s

best interests to wait for mother to improve because the child was

very young and needed permanency, and mother had not engaged

in services for over a year.

¶ 16 To the extent mother argues that the juvenile court misapplied

the EPP provisions by stating that it was required to ensure

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permanency “within a certain period of time,” we are not persuaded

that the court misapplied the statute. True, the EPP provisions do

not provide a specific deadline for placing children in a permanent

home, but rather, they state that children under the age of six must

be placed in a permanent home “as expeditiously as possible.”

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-3-702(5)(c). Here, the record does not indicate,

as mother argues, that the court erroneously believed it was

required to close the case because it had been open for more than

twelve months. Indeed, after noting that the EPP provisions

applied, the court stated that “there [was] no definite period of time

that [it was] obligated to keep the case open.” It then analyzed

whether allowing mother more time to work on her treatment plan

was in the child’s best interests and determined that it was not.

Considering this context, we perceive no misapplication of the

statute.

¶ 17 We also reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court failed

to consider the impact of termination on the child. The court

acknowledged the evidence showing that mother’s parenting time

went well, that she loved the child, and that the child was bonded

to her. But the court still found that allowing mother more time

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was not in the child’s best interests based on her lack of

engagement and the child’s needs. See In re Marriage of Kann,

2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed

unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).

¶ 18 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

properly analyzed whether mother could become fit within a

reasonable time. And because the court’s determination is

supported by the record, we discern no basis for disturbing its

termination judgment as to mother. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10.

C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 19 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that the Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and

reunify him with the child. We are not persuaded.

1. Preservation

¶ 20 As an initial matter, the Division and the guardian ad litem

assert that father’s reasonable efforts argument is unpreserved.

Divisions of this court are split on whether a parent must challenge

a department’s reasonable efforts prior to the termination hearing

to preserve the issue for appellate review. Compare People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 916 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that

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a parent’s failure to object to services does not bar appellate review

of a reasonable efforts findings), with People in Interest of D.P., 160

P.3d 351, 355-56 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to review a

reasonable efforts finding because the parent failed to object to

services provided before the termination hearing). However, we

need not determine whether father preserved his reasonable efforts

argument because even if we assume he did, we discern no basis

for reversal.

2. Applicable Law

¶ 21 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 911. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services provided in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 22 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

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provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). And if funding is available, section 19-3-208(2)(d)

requires a department to provide transportation assistance; drug

and alcohol services; and financial services. However, these

services must be provided only if necessary and appropriate based

on the individual case plan. § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d).

¶ 23 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

obtain the assistance needed to comply with their treatment plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

In determining whether a department made reasonable efforts, a

juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances and

account for all services and resources provided to a parent,

measuring them holistically rather than in isolation with respect to

specific treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of My.K.M.

v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

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3. The Record Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding That the
Division Made Reasonable Efforts

¶ 24 The juvenile court found, with record support, that the

Division made reasonable efforts to provide rehabilitative services to

father but that “this task was especially difficult . . . in light of the

extended periods without communication” from father as well as his

incarceration. Specifically, the caseworker testified that although

she had repeatedly reached out to father, he did not meet with her

outside of court until approximately nine months into the case.

And although the caseworker had set up sobriety monitoring and

had made multiple referrals for substance abuse treatment, father

never provided any UAs or responded to the treatment provider’s

attempts to contact him. The caseworker also referred father for an

anger management evaluation, but father never completed the

intake paperwork despite many reminders from the caseworker.

Moreover, the caseworker arranged supervised and therapeutic

family time, both while father was out of custody and while he was

incarcerated. The caseworker also referred father to get a free

tablet from the Division when he told her he was struggling to

obtain a cell phone, but father never picked up the tablet.

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¶ 25 We reject father’s argument that the Division was required to

provide him with financial assistance under section 19-3-208(2)(d)

and core services under the Division’s administrative regulations to

help him obtain stable housing. Although some testimony at the

hearing indicated that father was homeless at times, his counsel

presented no evidence, testimony, or argument about the financial

assistance the Division could or should have provided. Moreover,

the caseworker testified that father’s homelessness, on its own, did

not prevent the Division from placing the child with him. Rather, it

was father’s ongoing substance use, domestic violence, and

involvement with the criminal justice system that prevented the

Division from recommending that the child be returned to him.

¶ 26 We are also not persuaded by father’s argument that the

Division failed to meet its reasonable efforts burden because it did

not provide housing information or resources as required under

section 19-3-208(2)(b)(III). We acknowledge that the Division did

not present evidence or testimony about its efforts to assist father

with housing. But the record shows that father was generally

unresponsive to the caseworker’s attempts to contact him between

March and December 2023 — the timeframe in which he was

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homeless and may have benefitted from housing assistance. And

the caseworker’s apparent failure to provide housing resources to

father during the time period he was not communicating with her

did not constitute a lack of reasonable efforts. See People in Interest

of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (A department need not persist with

futile efforts when a parent voluntarily absents himself or cannot be

located.).

¶ 27 Moreover, by the time father began to consistently engage with

the caseworker, housing assistance was unnecessary because he

was arrested and remained incarcerated at the time of the

termination hearing. Thus, the caseworker’s decision to prioritize

services related to substance abuse and anger management was

reasonable. See § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d) (Services must only be

provided if they are determined to be “necessary and appropriate.”);

see also My.K.M., ¶ 33 (The department “retain[s] discretion to

prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most

pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall

completion of the treatment plan.”).

¶ 28 Last, we reject father’s argument that the Division failed to

provide transportation assistance as required by section

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19-3-208(2)(d)(I) because the argument is undeveloped. Father

does not point to anything in the record that shows he needed

transportation assistance, nor does he articulate how it would have

helped him accomplish his treatment plan objectives. See

§ 19-3-208(2)(b), (d) (Services must only be provided if they are

determined to be “necessary and appropriate.”). Thus, we decline to

address this argument. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B); People in Interest of

D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an

appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific

argument, or specific supporting authorities).

¶ 29 In sum, the juvenile court did not err by determining that the

Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father, particularly

when considering the record showing that the Division provided

numerous services related to father’s treatment plan objectives

despite his lack of engagement and communication with the

caseworker. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (noting that the court must look at

the totality of the circumstances to analyze reasonable efforts); A.V.,

¶ 12 (A juvenile court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment as a factor in determining whether a

department made reasonable efforts.).

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D. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 30 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. He argues

that, based on the Division’s failure to make reasonable efforts to

provide appropriate services, the court should have found that

giving him more time to work on his treatment plan was a less

drastic alternative to termination. But this claim is derivative of the

argument that the Division failed to make reasonable efforts, which

we have already rejected above. Thus, there is no need to

separately address this issue.

III. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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