Peo in Interest of CMW

23CA1884 Peo in Interest of CMW 02-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1884
El Paso County District Court No. 22JV53
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.M.W., a Child,

and Concerning C.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 20, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 C.B. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with C.M.W. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect based on concerns about the

parents’ substance use after drug paraphernalia was found in the

home during a parole officer visit. Mother admitted to the

allegations in the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the

child dependent and neglected.

¶3 The court then held a dispositional hearing and adopted a

treatment plan for mother. It required mother to, among other

things, (1) graduate from drug treatment court; (2) maintain a

relationship with professionals on the case; (3) obtain and maintain

sobriety; and (4) maintain regular contact with the caseworker. As

part of mother’s treatment plan, she entered the Family Treatment

Drug Court Program.

¶4 Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from the drug

treatment program after she continued to test positive for illegal

substances. Her treatment plan was modified to remove the

1
requirement that she graduate from drug treatment court, and the

case continued.

¶5 The Department moved to terminate parental rights

approximately thirteen months after filing the petition. Following a

two-day evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion and

terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed. In August

2024, we remanded the case to the juvenile court for the limited

purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Indian

Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963; see § 19-1-126,

C.R.S. 2024. The remand order directed the court to ensure the

Department “exercised due diligence” regarding father’s report of

possible Mohican heritage to assist the court in determining

whether there was “reason to know” that the child was an Indian

child. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963; § 19-1-126(3).

¶6 On remand, the Department sent appropriate notices to the

tribes with whom the child may have had affiliation. Based on the

tribes’ lack of timely responses, the juvenile court determined that

the child is not an Indian child. No party further challenges that

finding in their supplemental briefs. Based upon this additional

record, we conclude that the provisions of ICWA have now been

2
complied with and that this child is not an Indian child as defined

under ICWA.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

erred by finding the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child. We discern no error.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination based on those findings as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id. The

credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to

be drawn from it, are matters within the court’s discretion. People

in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Applicable Law

¶9 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

3
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 10 A department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate parents and reunite families before a court may

terminate parental rights pursuant to section 19-3-604(1)(c). See

§§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. Reasonable efforts

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

an out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024.

Appropriate services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208,

C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-

103(114).

¶ 11 Among those services required under section 19-3-208 are

screening, assessments, and individual case plans for the provision

of services; home-based family and crisis counseling; information

and referral services to available public and private assistance

resources; family time services; and placement services. § 19-3-

208(2)(b).

4
¶ 12 In deciding whether a department has satisfied its reasonable

efforts obligation, the juvenile court should consider whether the

provided services were appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan. People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011). The parent is ultimately responsible for using

those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the

treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

(Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether

a department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of

A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

III. Reasonable Efforts After Mother’s Relapse

¶ 13 Mother argues the Department failed to provide reasonable

efforts following her relapse and discharge from the Family

Treatment Drug Court Program. She specifically argues that the

Department’s efforts were lacking in three areas: (1) referrals for

substance abuse treatment; (2) substance abuse monitoring; and

(3) caseworker contact with mother. We disagree.

5
A. Referrals

¶ 14 Mother asserts that after she was discharged from drug

treatment court the Department failed to provide any additional

referrals despite her requests.

¶ 15 The juvenile court found the Department made reasonable

efforts and specifically found that it tried to assist mother with

community resources, made numerous referrals, and attempted to

find inpatient facilities after mother reported she wanted to attend a

second inpatient program. Because the record supports the court’s

findings, we reject mother’s arguments.

¶ 16 The record shows that the Department provided multiple

referrals to three different substance abuse treatment providers,

but mother did not successfully engage in any treatment, including

with an additional provider of her choice.

¶ 17 The caseworker testified mother was referred to Recovery

Unlimited shortly after the petition was filed. Mother did not want

to participate in an inpatient program, so she was discharged from

Recovery Unlimited. She was next referred to Rocky Mountain

Behavioral Health, where inpatient treatment was also

recommended. Mother successfully completed inpatient treatment

6
but following her discharge, she reported she did not want to

continue with services at Rocky Mountain Behavioral Health and

was released from the program. Shortly after this, mother reported

she relapsed and was discharged from drug treatment court.

¶ 18 The day after mother’s case was removed from drug treatment

court, a third referral was made for mother, again at Recovery

Unlimited, where mother was later discharged for lack of

engagement.

¶ 19 Following the second discharge from Recovery Unlimited, the

caseworker referred her to Homeward Pikes Peak; however, mother

declined to attend this program. Instead, mother found her own

provider, A Turning Point, to complete substance abuse treatment.

The caseworker testified that, while that location was not a provider

the Department contracts with, the Department was willing to allow

mother to complete treatment there and, therefore, did not put in a

referral for another provider.

¶ 20 A Turning Point recommended enhanced outpatient treatment

which included participating in two groups and individualized

therapy. Though mother engaged in some classes, she missed

twelve total classes and was taken off the individual therapist

7
calendar for lack of engagement three months before the

termination hearing.

¶ 21 The caseworker also testified that shortly before the

termination hearing, mother reported she wanted to attend

inpatient treatment. The caseworker provided a couple of resources

and requested that mother reply with her preferred provider.

Mother never replied.

¶ 22 Mother argues the caseworker failed to provide a referral for

an additional inpatient treatment and instead, only provided a

referral to a program from which mother had previously been

terminated. However, the record shows that mother’s unwillingness

to engage in treatment, not the Department’s lack of efforts,

prevented her from accessing additional substance abuse treatment

services. See A.V., ¶ 12.

B. Substance Use Monitoring

¶ 23 Mother next contends that the Department failed to provide a

referral for substance abuse monitoring and to contact the

urinalysis (UA) testing provider.

¶ 24 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to provide substance abuse monitoring and that

8
mother was never able to show consistent periods of monitored

sobriety. In particular, the court found there was no evidence of

“monitored sobriety. Though she says she’s been doing UAs. But

priority here should be to show those UAs to us.” The court

additionally found it needed “months of UAs — clean UAs to show

that [mother is] in a position to be able to have more time with [the

child]; to be able to have more of a relationship with [the child], and

we simply don’t have that. We don’t have the monitored sobriety.”

The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 25 The caseworker testified mother had a referral for UAs at

Urban Labs, but she declined to complete UAs there and instead

reported she was testing at a different facility. The caseworker did

not have a release of information to allow the Department to see the

results of those UAs. Moreover, the testing location allowed mother

to choose her test dates.

¶ 26 The caseworker also testified that mother’s UAs during her

time in drug treatment court were “around 80 percent” positive for

illegal substances. And mother admitted that she tested positive for

illicit substances as recently as two-and-a-half months prior to the

termination hearing.

9
¶ 27 Even if we assume the Department could have made

additional efforts to refer mother for additional substance abuse

monitoring, we cannot overlook the fact that mother never

demonstrated extended periods of sobriety. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at

1285.

C. Caseworker Contact

¶ 28 Mother finally argues that following the motion to terminate

the “caseworker did not even bother to meet with [m]other outside

of court and family engagement meetings.”

¶ 29 The juvenile court found the caseworker “continued to try and

contact” mother and called and texted to get her engaged and

moving forward with her treatment plan. The record supports the

court’s findings.

¶ 30 Testimony shows the caseworker reached out to mother

roughly once a month via texts and during staff meetings. The

caseworker further testified that mother would text back when she

needed something, and the caseworker would reply with a follow-up

question or text and mother would then not reply. While mother

testified about at least one instance where she was unable to get a

reply from the Department, the juvenile court ultimately found the

10
caseworker’s testimony more credible, and we will not disturb the

court’s credibility determinations upon review. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d

at 249-50.

IV. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

11