Peo in Interest of JDC

24CA1389 Peo in Interest of JDC 02-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1389
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30377
Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.D.C., Jr., a Child,

and Concerning J.D.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Dunn and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 20, 2025

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 J.D.C. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating his parent-child legal relationship with J.D.C., Jr. (the

child). Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in

determining that there were no viable less drastic alternatives to

termination of his parental rights. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2023, father brought the three-month-old child to an

emergency room. Hospital staff determined that the child was

substance-exposed and had a skull fracture and other injuries

consistent with abuse. The hospital notified the Denver County

Department of Human Services, which already had an open case

involving the family. The Department sought, and was granted,

temporary protective custody and filed a petition in dependency and

neglect. The child was placed in a foster home for medically fragile

children (medical foster home).

¶3 Father admitted the petition. The court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and entered a dispositional order. Later,

the Department moved to terminate father’s parental rights. In

July 2024, nine months after adopting the treatment plan, the

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court terminated father’s parent-child legal relationship

with J.D.C., Jr.

II. Father’s Contention

¶4 Father contends that the juvenile court should have ordered

an allocation of parental responsibilities to either paternal or

maternal grandmother. We perceive no error.

A. Applicable Law

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent did not comply

with or was not successfully rehabilitated by an appropriate, court-

approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA

79, ¶ 10. Father does not contest that these statutory criteria were

met.

¶6 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives to termination. People in Interest of M.M., 726

P.2d 1108, 1122 (Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic

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alternatives, the court must base its decision on the best interests

of the child, giving primary consideration to the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶7 When deciding whether permanent placement with a relative is

a viable less drastic alternative to termination, the court may

consider various factors, including whether an ongoing relationship

with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child.

People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38. “[L]ong-term or

permanent placement with a family member or foster family, short

of termination, may not be a viable less drastic alternative if it does

not provide adequate permanence that adoption would provide or

otherwise meet a child’s needs.” Id. at¶ 41.

¶8 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be in the child’s best interest. People in Interest of

A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a

less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.

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¶9 When the juvenile court considers the availability of a less

drastic alternative and determines that termination of a parent’s

rights would be in the child’s best interests, we are bound to affirm

the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the record.

People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 Explicitly giving primary consideration to the physical, mental,

and emotional needs of the child, the juvenile court found no less

drastic alternatives to termination. The juvenile court noted that

maternal grandmother had withdrawn her request to be considered

for permanent placement. And the court found that paternal

grandmother’s issues with sobriety and emotional regulation, as

well as her inability to care for the child’s special needs, eliminated

her as a placement option.

¶ 11 The record supports the court’s findings. The initial

caseworker testified that paternal grandmother’s history of

substance use disqualified her from being a placement for the child.

But a placement’s disqualification may be overcome with a

mediation plan and a court order. Thus, the caseworker asked

paternal grandmother to submit to urinalysis and hair follicle tests.

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The test results suggested that paternal grandmother was still

using drugs. The caseworker also had concerns about paternal

grandmother’s mental health. Paternal grandmother’s emotional

presentation was “heightened, and at times explosive.” Ultimately,

the caseworker ruled her out as a placement for the child.

¶ 12 Maternal grandmother, who initially requested placement of

the child, already had five children in her care and also resided with

adult children. And maternal grandmother had “serious medical

complications going on at the time.” The caseworker also ruled her

out as a placement.

¶ 13 After five months, the child’s medical foster home informed the

Department that it was not a permanent placement option. The

parents had identified no other potential placements. The

Department also contacted a cousin, who “was not able to take [the

child].” The Department identified another foster family, but “they

backed out” without explanation.

¶ 14 At that time, the Department again considered maternal

grandmother and paternal grandmother as placement options.

According to the caseworker, maternal grandmother was still not an

available placement option because “one of the boys living in the

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home was having . . . significant behavioral issues,” and “there

[were] a lot of stability issues” for the family. At the time of the

termination hearing, the caseworker understood maternal

grandmother no longer wanted to be considered as a placement

option. Meanwhile, the Department never received confirmation

that paternal grandmother’s mental health had improved. And the

second caseworker opined that that paternal grandmother was not

an appropriate placement for the child at the time of termination.

¶ 15 To the extent that father argues that his ex-partner was a

viable less drastic alternative, we are not convinced. The parents

did not suggest the placement to the Department before the

termination hearing. And a department need not independently

identify and evaluate other placements. See People in Interest of

D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 16 The second caseworker opined that there were no viable less

drastic alternatives to termination for the child. She testified that

the child, who had been in foster care for more than a year, had no

bond with either parent. He had ongoing, complicated medical

needs. Moreover, citing similar reasons, the first caseworker

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explained that the child needed the consistency of adoption and

termination was in his best interest.

¶ 17 The court properly considered the child’s physical, mental and

emotional needs and determined that the proposed less drastic

alternatives of either maternal or paternal grandmother did not

provide the stability and permanence that the child needed.

Because these findings are supported by competent evidence in the

record, we will not disturb them.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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