Peo v. Gonsalez

22CA1900 Peo v Gonsalez 02-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1900
Jefferson County District Court No. 21CR2914
Honorable Robert Lochary, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

John Raymond Gonsalez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
J. Jones and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 20, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, John Raymond Gonsalez, appeals the judgment of

conviction on one count of felony driving while ability impaired

(DWAI) – fourth or subsequent (FDWAI), a class 4 felony. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At around 10:30 a.m., employees at the Jefferson County

Action Center1 called police to report a possible drunk driver whom

employees had seen “driving erratically” and cutting in line.

According to Action Center employees, the driver was stumbling,

mumbling, and “very animated,” and after an employee opened the

car door to give him food, an empty alcohol bottle — a shooter of

Fireball — fell out. The driver was later identified as Gonsalez.

¶3 Although the first call was made at around 10:30 a.m., due to

a clerical error, officers weren’t dispatched until about 11 a.m.,

after receiving a second call from an Action Center employee.

Officers began arriving on scene about twenty minutes after being

dispatched. Agent Timothy Hazel was the first officer to arrive,

followed shortly by Agent Clay Guidry and then Agent Paul

1 The Action Center acts as a resource center for individuals in need

by providing them with access to necessities such as food, clothing,
and rental assistance.

1
Ciarvella. When Agent Hazel first approached Gonsalez’s vehicle, he

saw an empty shooter of Fireball on the ground near the driver’s

side of the vehicle.

¶4 At some point while speaking with Agent Hazel, Gonsalez

“demanded to speak to a sergeant,” so Agent Hazel contacted one.

Agent Ciarvella, however, was unaware that Gonsalez had

requested to speak with a sergeant. According to Agent Ciarvella,

when he arrived, Gonsalez asked him if he was a sergeant. Agent

Ciarvella responded that he wasn’t and Gonsalez approached him

with an “aggressive” posture. Because of his aggressive posturing,

Agent Ciarvella handcuffed Gonsalez for “safety purposes.”

¶5 After placing Gonsalez in handcuffs, Agent Ciarvella began

questioning him. Agent Ciarvella asked Gonsalez “if he took a

breath test what he thought it’d show.” Gonsalez replied that he

thought it would be a “.34.” When Agent Ciarvella said the

estimated number sounded high, Gonsalez said that “he was an

alcoholic, and that’s . . . where he thought he was at then.” At

some point, after that exchange with Gonsalez, Agent Ciarvella

noticed the Fireball shooter on the ground and Gonsalez “blurted”

2
out that “the shooter probably came from him.” According to Agent

Ciarvella, his conversation with Gonsalez lasted only a few minutes.

¶6 After speaking with witnesses, Agent Ciarvella placed Gonsalez

in his patrol car, told him he was under arrest, and advised him of

the law regarding express consent at around 12:15 p.m. After being

advised, Gonsalez refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath

or blood.

¶7 The People charged Gonsalez with one count of driving under

the influence (DUI) (fourth or subsequent offense) and one count of

violation of a protection order prohibiting Gonsalez from consuming

alcohol. A jury found Gonsalez guilty of the lesser included offense

of FDWAI, and the People voluntarily dismissed the count for

violation of a protection order.

II. Analysis

¶8 Gonsalez raises three arguments on appeal, two of which

relate to the trial court’s rulings on suppression motions and the

third of which relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. First,

Gonsalez contends that his seizure by police — specifically, placing

him in handcuffs — constituted an arrest unsupported by probable

cause and necessitating the suppression of any evidence obtained

3
thereafter. Second, he contends that inculpatory statements he

made after he was handcuffed were the product of a custodial

interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966), and, therefore, should have been suppressed. Third, he

contends that the People failed to introduce sufficient evidence that

he had been convicted of at least three prior qualifying convictions,

which was necessary to secure a conviction for FDWAI. Below, we

address Gonsalez’s two suppression contentions together, followed

by an analysis of his sufficiency contention.

A. The Trial Court Didn’t Err by Denying Gonsalez’s Motions to
Suppress Evidence

¶9 Both of Gonsalez’s suppression arguments involve his status

when he was placed in handcuffs. Gonsalez contends that upon

being placed in handcuffs, he was (1) formally arrested without

probable cause and (2) in custody for purposes of Miranda and then

interrogated in the absence of proper advisements. The trial court

rejected both of these arguments because it concluded that

Gonsalez was handcuffed during, and as part of, a proper

investigatory stop and that he was neither arrested nor in custody

when he was handcuffed and questioned.

4
¶ 10 We approach Gonsalez’s challenges by considering (1) whether

the investigatory stop was reasonable in scope and duration

considering Gonsalez was placed in handcuffs during the course of

that investigatory stop; and (2) whether handcuffing Gonsalez

placed him in custody for Miranda purposes. Because we conclude

that officers conducted a proper and reasonable investigatory stop

and that Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes, we

reject Gonsalez’s constitutional contentions and don’t reach the

issue of whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonsalez.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 11 Before trial, Gonsalez filed a motion to suppress evidence for

lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to detain and

arrest him and a motion to suppress illegally obtained statements.

The court held a two-day hearing on Gonsalez’s suppression

motions, at which the court heard from Agent Ciarvella, Agent

Guidry, and Agent Hazel. We recount relevant portions of the

officers’ testimony below.

¶ 12 Agent Hazel testified that upon arriving at the scene, he got

out of his car and Gonsalez approached him, appearing “highly

agitated” and “animated.” Agent Hazel also testified that Gonsalez’s

5
eyes were watery, and that, although he couldn’t smell any alcohol

on Gonsalez because he had lost his sense of smell due to COVID-

19, dispatch aired that someone had smelled alcohol on Gonsalez.

According to Agent Hazel, Gonsalez was “wondering what was going

on” and Agent Hazel told him that there were concerns about his

ability to drive. Gonsalez gave Agent Hazel his identifying

information, and using that information, Agent Hazel learned that

Gonsalez was subject to a protection order prohibiting him from

consuming or possessing alcohol.

¶ 13 Agent Hazel also testified that, when Agent Ciarvella arrived,

Gonsalez “was very agitated, and he walked up and asked him if he

was a sergeant, [and] got really close to him with his arms up by his

side.” On cross-examination, Agent Hazel testified that he believed

Gonsalez got within approximately two to three feet of Agent

Ciarvella and that Gonsalez’s body language was “aggressive.”

Agent Ciarvella similarly testified that, when he arrived, Gonsalez

approached him with an “aggressive posture.” Specifically, Agent

Ciarvella testified that Gonsalez leaned forward until he was about

eight inches from Agent Ciarvella’s face and put his arms out.

According to Agent Ciarvella, this prompted him to place Gonsalez

6
in handcuffs for safety purposes because of “how quickly [Gonsalez]

came up to [him], . . . pushing his face and chest forwards toward

[him]” in a manner that he deemed “aggressive.” Agent Ciarvella

testified that he told Gonsalez that he detained him “because of the

way he was acting.”

¶ 14 Agent Ciarvella also testified that before he detained Gonsalez,

he noticed indicia of alcohol intoxication, including a “moderate-to-

strong odor of a[n] unknown alcoholic beverage on [Gonsalez’s]

breath” and watery eyes. Once Gonsalez was handcuffed, Agent

Ciarvella began questioning him about whether he had been

drinking. According to Agent Ciarvella, Agent Hazel was near him

while he was questioning Gonsalez, but he “didn’t remember Agent

Guidry being within [the] immediate area.” Agent Ciarvella and

Agent Hazel both testified that they knew that Action Center staff

had taken Gonsalez’s keys.

¶ 15 Because the Action Center didn’t want Gonsalez’s car left on

their property, Agent Guidry began the impoundment process. As

part of the impoundment process, Agent Guidry conducted an

inventory search of Gonsalez’s car and empty Fireball shooters were

7
found in the car.2 Although Agent Guidry began impounding

Gonsalez’s car, the officers were able to find a family member of

Gonsalez’s who came and picked up the car, which obviated the

need for the officers to have the car towed.

¶ 16 After the hearing, the court denied both of Gonsalez’s

suppression motions. Regarding Gonsalez’s motion to suppress

evidence for lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, the

court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct

an investigatory stop. With regard to Gonsalez’s motion to suppress

illegally obtained statements, the court found that the statements

didn’t need to be suppressed because Gonsalez wasn’t in custody

for Fifth Amendment purposes when they were obtained.

2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 17 Individuals are protected from unreasonable searches and

seizures by the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution and Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution.

U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. Under the umbrella

2 Agent Ciarvella also testified that Gonsalez asked him to get a

cigarette lighter from his car and that, when he entered the car, he
saw empty Fireball shooters in the car.

8
of the Fourth Amendment, there are “three types of police-citizen

contacts: consensual encounters, investigatory stops, and arrests.”

People v Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Colo. 2009). Arrests and

investigatory stops are “seizures implicating the protections of the

Fourth Amendment and Article II, section 7.” Outlaw v. People, 17

P.3d 150, 154 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 18 An investigatory stop is less intrusive than an arrest and is

“justified upon reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the

detainee is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a

crime, and is limited in scope to a brief detention to confirm or

dispel that suspicion.” People v. Fields, 2018 CO 2, ¶ 12. When

assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, courts

consider “(1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the officer

diligently pursued the basis for the initial stop; (3) whether the

suspect was required to move from one location to another; and (4)

whether there were alternative, less intrusive means available.”

People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶ 22. This list of factors

isn’t exhaustive; indeed, in other cases, courts have considered the

degree of force used by officers during an encounter. Id. at ¶ 23.

9
¶ 19 An investigatory stop can become an arrest when it “involves

more than a brief detention and questioning.” Martinez, 200 P.3d at

1057. An arrest is more intrusive than an investigatory stop and “is

justified only upon the acquisition of probable cause to believe a

crime has been committed by the detainee.” Fields, ¶ 12. “Whether

a formal arrest has been announced or not, an infringement on the

liberty of a detainee exceeding that permitted as an investigatory

stop, in the absence of probable cause to arrest, amounts to an

unlawful seizure.” Id.

¶ 20 A suspect must be advised of his rights under the Fifth

Amendment before being subjected to a custodial interrogation.

People v. Sampson, 2017 CO 100, ¶ 17. The prosecution can’t

introduce in its case-in-chief any statement “procured by custodial

interrogation” that wasn’t preceded by “certain warnings.” Effland

v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 873 (Colo. 2010) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 444). A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda protections

if “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have

believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree

associated with a formal arrest.” Sampson, ¶ 18. In assessing

whether a suspect is in custody, courts evaluate the totality of the

10
circumstances surrounding questioning and should consider the

following non-exhaustive list of factors:

(1) the time, place, and purpose of the
encounter; (2) the persons present during the
interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the
officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of
voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and
mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any
limitation of movement or other form of
restraint was placed on the defendant during
the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to
any questions asked by the defendant; (8)
whether directions were given to the defendant
during the interrogation; and (9) the
defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to
such directions.

Id. (quoting People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo. 2002)).

¶ 21 Review of a “trial court’s suppression order presents a mixed

question of law and fact.” People v. Moreno, 2022 CO 19, ¶ 12

(quoting People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 13). We defer to the trial

court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the record, but “we

review the legal effects of those facts de novo.” Id. Determining

whether a suspect was in custody for the purposes of Miranda “is a

mixed question of law and fact.” Sampson, ¶ 16. We defer to the

trial court’s findings of fact and credibility if they are supported by

the record, but “we review de novo the legal determination of

11
whether an individual is in custody for” the purposes of Miranda.

Id.

3. Analysis of the Suppression Issues

a. The Investigatory Stop Was Reasonable in Scope and Duration
and Handcuffing Gonsalez Didn’t Convert the Investigatory
Stop Into an Arrest

¶ 22 We first address Gonsalez’s assertion that the trial court

erroneously found that he was subjected to a reasonable

investigatory stop when Agent Ciarvella handcuffed him. Gonsalez

contends that rather than subject him to a proper investigatory

stop, the officers arrested him without probable cause. This,

Gonsalez argues, warrants suppression of the fruits of his illegal

arrest, including any incriminating statements, the empty shooters

found in his car, and his express consent refusal. We discern no

error.

¶ 23 When considering the reasonableness of the officers’

investigatory stop, the court found that (1) “the length of the

intrusion was very brief”; (2) the agents did “diligently pursue the

investigation during the detention”; (3) while Gonsalez “was

required to move from one location to another,” it was reasonable

because the intrusion was relatively brief and for the safety of the

12
officers and others; and (4) “there weren’t any less intrusive means

that were appropriate given the totality of the circumstances here.”

¶ 24 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion as to the

reasonableness of the investigatory stop. Gonsalez was handcuffed

almost immediately upon Agent Ciarvella’s arrival approximately

twenty minutes after the first officers responded. While the entire

encounter took over an hour, that doesn’t affect our analysis of the

status of the stop from the time Gonsalez was handcuffed to the

time that he was formally arrested. Further, during the stop, the

officers limited their focus to an investigation of whether Gonsalez

had been drinking and driving. We acknowledge that Gonsalez was

moved and handcuffed during the stop. But Agent Ciarvella

testified that these actions were taken due to actions that he

perceived as aggressive, and the trial court credited that testimony.

Indeed, the record supports the conclusion that Gonsalez

approached Agent Ciarvella, got within approximately eight inches

of his face, and took on a potentially threatening posture. These

circumstances support the court’s finding that Agent Ciarvella took

the least intrusive means available to ensure his safety and the

safety of others by handcuffing Gonsalez and directing his

13
movements. This interaction, therefore, remained a reasonable

investigatory stop in both scope and duration.

¶ 25 Agent Ciarvella’s handcuffing Gonsalez, by itself, doesn’t

necessitate a finding that Gonsalez had been placed under arrest.

See People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 305 (Colo. 2000) (Officers may

take actions to ensure their safety during an investigatory stop,

“[e]ven the use of handcuffs does not automatically transform a

detention into an arrest.”). The trial court noted as much when it

said that Agent Ciarvella’s use of handcuffs during the stop was

reasonable because Agent Ciarvella testified that Gonsalez acted

aggressively. Accordingly, the court didn’t err by rejecting

Gonsalez’s contention that he was arrested when he was placed in

handcuffs and properly concluded that the officers conducted a

constitutional investigatory stop.

b. Gonsalez Wasn’t in Custody for Miranda Purposes

¶ 26 Gonsalez separately contends that the trial court erred by

finding that he wasn’t subjected to a custodial interrogation after

Agent Ciarvella handcuffed him. According to Gonsalez, his

incriminating statements, namely that his BAC would be a “.34”

and that he is an “alcoholic,” were the product of a custodial

14
interrogation in which he wasn’t given warnings required by

Miranda.

¶ 27 In its ruling on Gonsalez’s motion to suppress his statements

due to Miranda violations, the trial court found that the officers

subjected Gonsalez to an interrogation. The People don’t challenge

this finding, and we agree that it was correct. Thus, we need only

address the court’s conclusion that Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for

Miranda purposes.

¶ 28 In its ruling, the trial court considered the factors set forth in

Sampson. In particular, the court found that (1) when Gonsalez

was handcuffed and questioned, it was daylight, in a public parking

lot, with numerous members of the public around; (2) the officers

who communicated with Gonsalez did so in a conversational tone

and were not overbearing; (3) the duration of the interrogation was

very brief; (4) while Gonsalez was restrained, this was done for

officer safety and the safety of others; and (5) minimal directions

were given to Gonsalez.

¶ 29 The record supports the trial court’s factual findings and,

applying these factual findings to the law, we conclude that, based

15
on the totality of the circumstances, Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for

Miranda purposes.

¶ 30 After considering the factors set forth in Sampson, we

conclude that a couple of factors weigh in favor of a custody finding,

namely the following:

• At least two officers, Agent Ciarvella and Agent Hazel, were

present during the interrogation.

• Officers physically restrained Gonsalez by placing him in

handcuffs.3

¶ 31 But the balance of the Sampson factors weigh against a

custody finding, including the following:

• The interrogation occurred during the day, and in a public

place.

• The officers’ tone was conversational, and they didn’t use

threatening language when addressing Gonsalez.

• None of the officers ever drew or otherwise brandished a

weapon.

3 Although Gonsalez argues that he was further restrained because

his keys were taken, his keys weren’t taken by the officers and,
therefore, that fact doesn’t weigh in favor of a custody
determination.

16
• Although the total encounter took over an hour, Agent

Ciarvella indicated that he began interrogating Gonsalez

almost immediately after he was handcuffed and that his

questioning only lasted a few minutes.4

• Gonsalez asked the officers questions, primarily about when

a sergeant would be present, and they responded to his

questions in a conversational tone.

• Although the officers told Gonsalez to stay in one place, that

was primarily because he was fidgety, and they had

concerns for their safety and the safety of those around

them. While it appears that Gonsalez remained fidgety

throughout the encounter, the officers’ tone remained

conversational, weighing against a custody determination.

¶ 32 Based on the totality of circumstances, and applying the

Sampson factors, we conclude that Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for

Miranda purposes when he was interrogated. Therefore, the trial

court properly declined to suppress Gonsalez’s statements.

4 Even if, at some point, the detention of Gonsalez became custodial

because of the duration that he remained in handcuffs, he wasn’t in
custody at the time he made the incriminating statements, which
was almost immediately after he was handcuffed.

17
B. Whether the People Presented Sufficient Evidence that
Gonsalez had Prior Qualifying Convictions

¶ 33 We next address Gonsalez’s assertion that the People

introduced insufficient evidence to prove that he had three prior

qualifying convictions. According to Gonsalez, the People only

provided sufficient evidence to prove that he had two prior

qualifying convictions and, therefore, his FDWAI conviction must be

vacated. We disagree.

1. Legal Framework and Evidence Admitted at Trial

¶ 34 To convict Gonsalez of FDWAI, the People had to prove that

Gonsalez “dr[ove] a motor vehicle or vehicle while impaired by

alcohol or by one or more drugs, or by a combination of alcohol and

one or more drugs” and that “the violation occurred after three or

more prior convictions, arising out of separate and distinct criminal

episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI; vehicular homicide . . .

vehicular assault . . . or any combination thereof.” § 42-4-

1301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. These prior convictions must be proven to

a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Linnebur v. People, 2020 CO

79M, ¶ 8, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Crabtree, 2024

CO 40M, ¶¶ 2-3.

18
¶ 35 The jury found that Gonsalez had four prior qualifying

convictions: a DWAI in Adams County in 2003; a DWAI in Adams

County in 2005; a DUI in Jefferson County in 2008; and a DWAI in

Clear Creek County in 2015. On appeal, Gonsalez challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 2003 and 2015

convictions but concedes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the 2005 and 2008 convictions.

¶ 36 To prove the 2003 and 2015 convictions, the People admitted

Gonsalez’s certified Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) record,

including his Colorado driving history. Gonsalez’s certified DMV

record included the following: his driver’s license photo, his driver’s

license number, his fingerprint, his full name, his date of birth, his

height, his sex, his weight, his hair color, his eye color, and the last

four digits of his social security number. His official driving history

also included the last four digits of his social security number, his

driver’s license number, his full name, his date of birth, his height,

his weight, his eye color, and his hair color. It also stated in his

official driving history that he had two prior convictions for DWAI.

The first was a 2015 conviction for a violation that occurred in 2014

19
in Clear Creek County. The second was a 2003 conviction for a

violation that occurred in 2003 in Adams County.

¶ 37 As corroborating evidence of these convictions, the People

introduced a sentencing order5 for each conviction. Both

sentencing orders included the county where Gonsalez was

convicted, his name, his date of birth, the case number, that a plea

of guilty was entered for DWAI, and a conviction date. In the

sentencing order for the 2003 conviction, Gonsalez’s date of birth,

the date of conviction, the charge he pleaded to, and the county of

conviction matched Gonsalez’s certified DMV record and his official

driving history. Despite these consistencies in the record, the

sentencing order didn’t include his middle name, and it spelled his

last name incorrectly (Gonzalez instead of Gonsalez).

¶ 38 In the sentencing order for the 2015 conviction, Gonsalez’s

date of birth, his first and last name, the charge he pleaded to, and

the county of conviction matched Gonsalez’s certified DMV record

5 The People refer to this document interchangeably as “certified

record of conviction,” “certified conviction,” or “certified copy of
conviction,” whereas Gonsalez refers to it as a “sentence order.”
These are all the same thing. For clarity, we opted to consistently
use the term “sentencing order.”

20
and his official driving history. Like the 2003 conviction, the

sentencing order didn’t include his middle name. Even more

concerning, however, is that the conviction date didn’t match, and

in fact the sentencing order stated that Gonsalez was convicted in

2018, three years after the date of conviction on the certified DMV

record.

¶ 39 For the 2005 and 2008 convictions, the People introduced

evidence that Gonsalez committed these underlying offenses with

documents that included Gonsalez’s full name, his date of birth, his

height, his weight, his eye color, his hair color, his sex, the

conviction he pleaded to, the date of the plea, and the county where

the plea was entered. The biographical information in these

documents matches the certified DMV record. But the conviction

and the conviction date aren’t included in Gonsalez’s official driving

history. Both documents showing the 2005 and 2008 convictions

show that Gonsalez’s alias is “Gonzalez, John Raymond.”

2. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 40 When proof of a prior conviction is a necessary element for an

offense, the evidence of identity must be legally sufficient. See

Gorostieta v. People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 35. Regardless of preservation,

21
we review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. McCoy v.

People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 19.

¶ 41 We apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether

the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the

conviction. Gorostieta, ¶ 16. “Under this test, we ask whether the

evidence, ‘viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion

by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting People v. Harrison, 2020

CO 57, ¶ 32). When applying the substantial evidence test, we

must “give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference

which might be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Harrison, ¶ 32

(quoting People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25). But we can’t serve as a

thirteenth juror, even if we would have reached a different

conclusion faced with the same evidence. Id. at ¶ 33.

¶ 42 If the only evidence of identity offered to match the defendant

to the prior conviction are matching names and dates of birth, the

evidence is generally legally insufficient. See People v. Cooper, 104

P.3d 307, 312 (Colo. App. 2004). Rather, legally sufficient evidence

requires that the prosecution “establish an essential link between

22
the prior conviction and the defendant” through “documentary

evidence combined with specific corroborating evidence of

identification.” Gorostieta, ¶¶ 25-26.

¶ 43 Documentary evidence is tangible evidence contained in a

document or other writing that must be authenticated before it can

be admitted into evidence. See Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary

697 (12th ed. 2024). Corroborating evidence can include

(1) evidence specifically identifying the
defendant; (2) unique identifiers such as a
driver license, prison identification number, or
social security number; (3) photographs or
fingerprints from the prior case that link that
case to the current defendant; (4) a physical
description from the prior case that can be
compared to the defendant in the present case;
(5) distinguishable features of the defendant
such as tattoos; or (6) testimony of probation
officers or others with personal knowledge
positively identifying the defendant as being
the same person who had previously been
convicted.

Gorostieta, ¶ 27. This list of sufficient corroborating evidence isn’t

exhaustive, and additional evidence, such as matching counties of

conviction, can be used to tie the defendant to the prior convictions.

Id. at ¶¶ 27, 33.

23
3. The People Proved with Sufficient Evidence that Gonsalez had
been Previously Convicted of at least Three Qualifying Offenses

¶ 44 Because the People only needed to sufficiently prove that

Gonsalez had previously been convicted of three qualifying

convictions, only one of the challenged convictions must be proved

by sufficient evidence for us to affirm his FDWAI conviction. We

conclude that the People sufficiently proved that Gonsalez

committed the offense underlying the 2003 conviction. (Thus, we

don’t analyze whether the People sufficiently proved the 2015

conviction.)

¶ 45 The certified DMV record and official driving history (which

includes a photograph that was identified as Gonsalez by the

arresting officer at trial) contains abundant specific biographical

information about Gonsalez to sufficiently establish that it is his

DMV record and official driving history. Thus, the evidence will be

sufficient to sustain a felony conviction if these documents can be

linked with the sentencing order from the 2003 conviction. Under

Gorostieta, we therefore must determine whether the People

sufficiently proved an essential link between Gonsalez and his 2003

conviction. Gorostieta, ¶ 35.

24
¶ 46 The following information in the 2003 sentencing order exactly

matches the information in Gonsalez’s certified DMV record and

official driving history: Gonsalez’s birthdate, the date of conviction,

the charge pleaded to, and the county of conviction. But, critically,

Gonsalez’s name in the 2003 sentencing order is “John R Gonzalez”

(with a “z” in place of the “s”), and the 2003 sentencing order

doesn’t contain any aliases for Gonsalez. This is certainly not a

trivial discrepancy. But in determining the sufficiency of the

evidence, we look to all of the evidence that was before the jury. In

doing so, we observe that both the 2005 and 2008 sentencing

orders show “John R Gonzalez” as a known alias. All of this taken

together establishes the requisite “essential link between the prior

conviction and the defendant” through “some documentary evidence

combined with specific corroborating evidence of identification.” Id.

at ¶¶ 25-26, 30-32 (concluding that, although “thin,” the evidence

presented by the prosecution that the defendant “had the same

name and date of birth as the prior defendant, as well as self-

authenticating court records of the prior conviction” and that “the

prior felony occurred in the same county as the instant case” was

sufficient).

25
¶ 47 Accordingly, we conclude that the People presented sufficient

evidence that Gonsalez had previously been convicted of three

qualifying offenses and that his FDWAI conviction must stand.

III. Disposition

¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

26