Peo in Interest of GDD

24CA1105 Peo in Interest of GDD 02-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1105
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30189
Honorable Lisa M. Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of G.D.D., a Child,

and Concerning D.C.P and J.D.D.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Dunn and Graham*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 13, 2025

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant D.C.P.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant J.D.D.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, D.C.P. (mother)

and J.D.D. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment terminating

their parent-child legal relationships with G.D.D. (the child). We

affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services filed a petition in

dependency or neglect regarding the newborn child. The petition

alleged that mother appeared under the influence at the hospital

and admitted using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. The

petition further alleged that the child tested positive for

amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl and was diagnosed

with congenital syphilis, hydrocephalus, and several other medical

conditions requiring intensive care. Father also admitted substance

abuse.

¶3 The juvenile court accepted the parents’ admissions to the

allegations of the petition and adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court adopted treatment plans for each parent

requiring that they, among other things, (1) complete substance

abuse evaluations and engage in recommended treatment;

(2) attend mental health counseling; (3) maintain stable

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employment and housing; (4) engage in regular family time; and

(5) learn to provide for the child’s extensive medical needs.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate the parents’ parental

rights. After a hearing, the court terminated mother’s and father’s

parent-child legal relationships with the child.

II. Additional Time

¶5 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erroneously found

that they could not become fit parents within a reasonable time.

We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 “Once a treatment plan has been devised for a parent, a court

may only terminate parental rights when, among other things, the

court finds that parent unfit and unable to become fit in a

reasonable time.” People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 27.

An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders them

“unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care to

include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health

needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2). When determining whether

a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a

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reasonable time, “the court may consider whether any change has

occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the

chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.”

People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶7 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at ¶ 25. A

“reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a

parent has made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is

not required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at

¶¶ 24-25. When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time

the petition is filed, the action is subject to the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) provisions, and the court must consider

the child’s need to be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously

as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

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underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. See

id.; People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

¶9 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 10 The juvenile court determined that neither mother nor father

could become fit to parent the child in a reasonable time. It found

that the case had been open more than a year, and the parents

were still struggling with substance abuse, untreated mental health

problems, and instability. And the court noted that the child had

very high needs. The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 11 Mother admitted to relapsing in January 2024, and, although

she provided one negative urine sample in February 2024, she did

not consistently submit to drug testing thereafter and was not

engaged in substance use treatment at the time of the termination

hearing. The caseworker testified that she could not verify any kind

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of steady employment for mother, although mother had found

housing and was scheduled to move in shortly after the termination

hearing. The caseworker also testified that mother had not engaged

in mental health treatment.

¶ 12 The caseworker testified that father’s substance use was the

Department’s primary concern. Father’s substance abuse

treatment provider testified that father participated in medically

assisted treatment, but did not regularly engage in individual or

group therapy and failed to submit regular sobriety tests.

¶ 13 The caseworker also testified that father had been incarcerated

for several months during the proceeding but acknowledged that he

had reached out to his substance abuse treatment provider the day

of his release to start treatment again. However, that day he also

provided a urine sample that tested positive for amphetamine and

methamphetamine. Moreover, father told the caseworker he did not

need to submit to further sobriety testing through the substance

abuse treatment provider because he was already required to do so

through probation. But father’s probation officer testified that

father was non-compliant with sobriety testing and was facing

sanctions.

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¶ 14 With respect to the child’s needs, his pediatrician testified

about his various medical conditions and ongoing treatment. The

child’s placement provider testified that the child had extensive

medical needs including a shunt placed after he had a stroke at

around two weeks old. The child required around the clock

monitoring for signs that the shunt was malfunctioning. If the child

exhibited symptoms such as fever and vomiting, he had to be

immediately transported to the hospital or risk another stroke,

grave brain injury, or death. The child’s placement provider

testified that the child had been admitted to the hospital around

seven times since he had been placed with them after leaving the

hospital after birth and that those stays lasted from three days to

about a week.

¶ 15 The child also regularly saw a host of doctors and specialists

to manage his conditions. He attended a center specializing in the

care of children with sight problems. He required special thickened

formula both for additional calorie intake and because he had

trouble with ingesting different textures. And he regularly attended

occupational, physical, and speech therapies.

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¶ 16 The child’s doctor testified that she was “encouraged by . . . all

the progress he has made” but that his future outlook was “very

challenging.” She testified that the child needed continued diligent

therapy and follow up with subspecialists and general pediatric

doctors as well as “doing the homework” in between therapy

sessions and medical appointments. She testified that the child

was “high risk” and needed “extra diligence and care.” She further

testified that a “stable, nurturing home environment . . . ranks in

importance” along with his continuation of medical care and

therapies.

¶ 17 Although father’s testimony expressed an understanding of

some of the child’s medical needs, he admitted that he and mother

had “a lot . . . to get together” before being able to fully care for the

child. And he admitted that while he tried to attend visits with the

child regularly, there had been “quite a few times” that he was not

able to.

¶ 18 Father testified that he and mother needed “two or three

months” to be in a place to care for the child and that his biggest

obstacle was getting identification and securing employment. But

he failed to address the Department’s main concern — his

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substance abuse. Father’s substance abuse treatment provider

testified that “it takes a good amount of time and energy and

support” for an individual to be able to stop abusing substances.

¶ 19 The caseworker, who testified as an expert in social

caseworker with an emphasis in child protection, opined that she

did not believe that mother or father could become fit in a

reasonable time for the child. She testified that both parents’

substance use problems “had gone back for several years,” and that

she did not know how long it would take for parents to become fit.

She testified that they continued to struggle with instability,

substance abuse, and mental health problems despite significant

resources and time. She also testified that the child’s needs were

extensive and that she did not believe either parent was aware of all

of the child’s medical needs and symptoms or would be able to

consistently respond appropriately and immediately in an

emergency situation. And she opined that “[the child,] given his age

and given his needs, deserves the permanency that adoption will

provide for him following a termination of . . . parental rights.”

¶ 20 On appeal, both parents assert that they had achieved some

stability because mother had obtained housing, father had plans to

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get himself added to the lease, and that they were cooperative and

“very respectful” with the caseworker. But nothing suggests that

either parent would be able to fully address their substance abuse

or mental health issues within a reasonable time for the child,

particularly given his extensive medical needs. See S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24-25

(the court is not required to give additional time even when a parent

has made recent progress).

¶ 21 Based on this evidence in the record, and considering the EPP

provisions requiring permanency as expeditiously as possible, the

juvenile court did not err when it found the parents’ conditions

unlikely to improve within a reasonable time for the child.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.

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