People v. Hill

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 30, 2025

2025COA12

No. 24CA0347, People v. Hill — Crimes — First Degree
Criminal Trespass — Unlawful Entry by Ruse, Trickery, or
Deception

A division of the court of appeals holds that, if a person

secures permission to enter a dwelling by means of ruse, trickery,

or deception, the person enters “unlawfully” for purposes of first

degree criminal trespass, § 18-4-502(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA12

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0347
Mesa County District Court No. 22CR829
Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Kenneth Maurice Hill,

Defendant-Appellee.

RULING DISAPPROVED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur

Announced January 30, 2025

Daniel P. Rubinstein, District Attorney, Susan Manown, Deputy District
Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Andrew Sidley-MacKie, Alternate Defense Counsel, Fort Collins, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee
¶1 Defendant, Kenneth Maurice Hill, was charged with first

degree criminal trespass. The People appeal the district court’s

ruling granting Hill’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See § 16-12-

102(1), C.R.S. 2024 (“The prosecution may appeal any decision of a

court in a criminal case upon any question of law.”).

¶2 As a matter of first impression, we conclude that, if a person

secures permission to enter a dwelling by means of a ruse, trickery,

or deception, the person enters “unlawfully” for purposes of first

degree criminal trespass, § 18-4-502(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Because

the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable juror

to conclude that Hill was guilty of the trespass charge beyond a

reasonable doubt, we disapprove the district court’s ruling granting

Hill’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See Crim. P. 29 (“The

court . . . shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal . . . after

the evidence on either side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to

sustain a conviction of such offense . . . .”).

I. Background

¶3 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that would have

permitted the jury to find the following facts:

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¶4 Hill, bail bondsman employed by a bond company, was tasked

with apprehending Jose Madrid, who had a number of outstanding

warrants for his arrest. Hill tracked Madrid to an apartment leased

by Madrid’s brother. The apartment was located within an

apartment complex owned by Perry Properties.

¶5 At the complex’s leasing office, Hill spoke with a property

manager, a leasing specialist, and a maintenance technician, all of

whom were Perry Properties employees (collectively, the Perry

employees). Hill wore tactical gear, including a vest with insignias

that identified him as a “fugitive recovery agent” for an unspecified

“warrant division.” He told the Perry employees that he had

warrants for Madrid’s arrest and that he had “pinged” Madrid at the

apartment’s location. He requested permission to enter Madrid’s

brother’s apartment to take Madrid into custody.

¶6 The Perry employees didn’t ask to see Hill’s badge or

paperwork, but they all assumed that he was a member of a police

department or other law enforcement agency. Based on this

assumption, the property manager gave Hill permission to enter

and directed the maintenance technician to open the apartment for

Hill.

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¶7 Once inside the apartment, Hill confronted Madrid, and

Madrid pointed a gun out the apartment’s front door. Hill backed

out and fired his gun. The shot passed close to the maintenance

technician, but it didn’t hit anyone.

¶8 After the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Hill moved for a

judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence. The district

court granted the motion, reasoning that, because Hill had

permission to enter the apartment, a reasonable juror could not

find that Hill had unlawfully entered the apartment or that he knew

his entry was unlawful. The court further explained that Hill’s

appearance and the Perry employees’ impression that he was in law

enforcement were irrelevant because Hill “did not identify himself as

a law enforcement officer,” his clothing didn’t “identif[y] him[] as a

law enforcement officer,” and “the burden falls on the property

manager . . . to [determine] as to whether or not someone is a law

enforcement officer.”

¶9 On appeal, the People contend that the district court erred by

(1) misinterpreting the mens rea requirement for criminal trespass

and (2) concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support

the criminal trespass charge.

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II. Generally Applicable Law

¶ 10 “A person commits the crime of first degree criminal trespass if

such person . . . [k]nowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in a

dwelling of another.” § 18-4-502(1)(a). A person acts knowingly

“when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such

circumstance exists.” § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2024.

III. Mens Rea

¶ 11 The People contend that the district court improperly applied

the mental state “knowingly” to both the “entry” and “unlawful”

elements of first degree criminal trespass. They argue that, to

convict Hill under section 18-4-502(1), the jury only needed to find

that he knowingly entered into the apartment; it didn’t need to find

that Hill knew his entry was unlawful.

¶ 12 Relying on Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032 (Colo. 2011), and

People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369 (Colo. App. 2009), Hill contends

that section 18-4-502(1) imposes criminal liability only if a

defendant knows their entry is unlawful. See Oram, 255 P.3d at

1038 (noting that the second degree burglary statute requires “that

the defendant knew [their] entry was unlawful”); Walden, 224 P.3d

at 379 (“[T]he prosecution was already required to prove beyond a

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reasonable doubt that defendant had knowingly entered the victim’s

apartment without permission.”).

¶ 13 We need not resolve this dispute, however. Assuming, without

deciding, that the prosecution needed to prove that Hill knew his

entry was unlawful, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for

the case to have been submitted to the jury.

IV. Unlawful Entry

¶ 14 Before we review the sufficiency of the evidence, we first

examine the threshold legal question of whether Hill’s entry could

be considered unlawful even though he had obtained the Perry

employees’ permission to enter.

¶ 15 Hill asserts (and the People don’t dispute) that a “person

‘enters unlawfully’ or ‘remains unlawfully’ in or upon premises

when the person is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to

do so.” § 18-4-201(3), C.R.S. 2024.1 The parties further agree that

1 The first degree criminal trespass statute describes the element

“unlawfully enters,” § 18-4-502(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, but the
definitional statute describes the element “enters unlawfully,” § 18-
4-201(3), C.R.S. 2024. As best we can discern from the record and
the briefing, the parties agree that the definition of “enters
unlawfully” in section 18-4-201(3) applies to first degree criminal
trespass despite the slight wording difference.

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the evidence reflects that Hill was given permission to enter the

apartment by employees who were authorized to give it. The parties

also seem to agree, at least implicitly, that obtaining such

permission would ordinarily render the entry lawful. Nevertheless,

the People contend that Hill’s entry was unlawful to the extent that

he secured permission to enter by causing the employees to believe

(wrongly) that he was a member of law enforcement. We agree.

¶ 16 A division of this court has already concluded that unlawful

entry includes “gaining entry to . . . the premises by way of ruse,

trickery, or deception.” People v. Burke, 937 P.2d 886, 890 (Colo.

App. 1996). (While Burke analyzed unlawful entry in the context of

first degree burglary, id., we see no reason to deviate from that

analysis when determining whether an entry is unlawful in the

context of first degree criminal trespass.) And as the division noted,

courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. Id.

at 890-91; see State v. Zembreski, 138 A.3d 583, 594 (N.J. Super.

Ct. App. Div. 2016) (“To the extent it can be argued [the victim] did

allow defendant in, the invitation did not constitute a license, as it

was based upon defendant’s use of deception.”); State v. Newton,

755 S.E.2d 786, 789 (Ga. 2014) (“[C]onsent to enter that is given

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based on a fraud or deceit perpetrated by the defendant is an

unauthorized entry for the purposes of [entering or remaining in a

dwelling without authority].”); State v. Maxwell, 672 P.2d 590, 593-

94 (Kan. 1983) (“[W]here the consent to enter . . . is obtained by

fraud, deceit or pretense the entry is not an authorized entry under

the statute . . . .”); People v. Singer, 994 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App.

Div. 2014) (considering defendant’s deception used to gain access to

an apartment when determining whether the evidence was

sufficient to show that defendant wasn’t licensed to enter and knew

her entry was an unlawful trespass).

¶ 17 We are persuaded by the reasoning in these cases and

conclude that, if there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that

Hill gained entry by means of a ruse, trickery, or deception, the jury

could conclude that his entry was unlawful.

V. Sufficiency

¶ 18 We now consider whether there was sufficient evidence for a

jury to find that (1) Hill gained entry by means of a ruse, trickery, or

deception; and (2) Hill knew his entry was unlawful. We conclude

that there was.

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A. Standard of Review

¶ 19 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for a

judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence. Montes-Rodriguez v.

People, 241 P.3d 924, 927 (Colo. 2010). Whether a motion for a

judgment of acquittal should be granted is determined by the

substantial evidence test. People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 127

(Colo. 1983). “Under this test, we ask whether the evidence, ‘viewed

as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Gorostieta v. People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 16 (quoting People v.

Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 32). “[W]e must ‘give the prosecution the

benefit of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn

from the evidence.’” Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Harrison, ¶ 32).

B. Sufficiency Analysis

¶ 20 The evidence presented at trial would have permitted the jury

to find the following additional facts:

• Hill wore a tactical, bulletproof vest and carried

ammunition, several less-than-lethal devices, a firearm, and

handcuffs. A device resembling a handheld radio was hung

8
over Hill’s shoulder. One employee testified that the gear

made Hill look like a SWAT team member.

• Hill’s vest had insignias on the front and back with three

lines of yellow text that read “Fugitive Recovery / AGENT /

Warrant Division.” The insignias did not refer to the bond

company Hill worked for.

• Hill had a badge on the front of his vest. The Perry

employees didn’t get a close look at the badge and didn’t

know what wording it contained.

• Hill had a blue and white patch on his left shoulder. The

patch was in a shape commonly used by police and other

law enforcement agencies, and it contained an eagle or

similar symbol.

• Hill did not identify himself as a bail bondsman. While

holding up a file folder containing papers, he said only that

he had a warrant for Madrid’s arrest.

• Without explaining what authority he had to do so, Hill said

that he would kick in the door to the apartment if he was

not granted permission to enter. Though his tone of voice

9
was light, the Perry employees were concerned he would

kick the door down if not allowed inside.

• The Perry employees all believed that Hill was a law

enforcement officer based on his appearance, and they gave

Hill permission to enter because it was the company’s policy

to cooperate with law enforcement.

• The employees would not have let Hill into the apartment if

they had known he was a bail bondsman.

¶ 21 Viewing the evidence together and in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, see id. at ¶ 16, the jury could reasonably have

inferred that Hill used his clothing and manner as a way to deceive

the Perry employees into believing he was a law enforcement officer

to obtain their permission and assistance to enter the apartment.

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that

Hill’s entry was unlawful because he obtained his authorization to

enter by means of “ruse, trickery, or deception.” Burke, 937 P.2d at

890.

¶ 22 Still, Hill argues that a jury could not have found any

deception because (1) he never made any affirmative statement that

he was in law enforcement; (2) his clothing didn’t explicitly “claim[]

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any association with any law enforcement agency”; (3) his clothing

was also consistent with that of private security guards; and (4) the

Perry employees didn’t ask for a closer look at Hill’s credentials but

instead jumped to the “unjustified conclusion” that he was a law

enforcement officer. We reject the arguments that the Perry

employees’ conclusions were “unjustified” and that Hill needed to

make affirmative verbal or written misrepresentations for a jury to

reasonably infer that he used deception to gain entry. As described

above, the way Hill presented himself — as an armed “agent,”

seemingly carrying police gear and displaying insignias and other

symbols strongly resembling those used by governmental

organizations, while saying he was there to “arrest” somebody and

that he would kick in the door if he wasn’t allowed access — so

strongly evoked a law enforcement officer that a juror could

reasonably infer an intentional deception, particularly given Hill’s

failure to identify himself as a bail bondsman. Hill’s assertions that

private security guards may dress in a similar manner and that the

Perry employees could have been more vigilant don’t make such

inferences unreasonable, and we must give the prosecution the

11
benefit of all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn from

the evidence. See Gorostieta, ¶ 16.

¶ 23 We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence to show

that Hill knew his entry was unlawful.

¶ 24 A detective testified that, after the incident, Hill said he

“understood that he needed permission from somebody . . . that’s

authorized to enter th[e] apartment.”2 And because jurors could

have reasonably inferred that Hill used his clothing and manner to

trick the Perry employees into believing he was a law enforcement

officer, they could also have reasonably inferred that he was aware

the employees wouldn’t have granted such permission unless they

believed he was a law enforcement officer. See Oram, 255 P.3d at

1038 (holding that evidence was sufficient to show that bondsmen

knew their entry into a residence was unlawful because they used a

ruse — pretending they were in law enforcement — as part of their

efforts to gain entry); cf. People v. Ridenour, 878 P.2d 23, 26 (Colo.

App. 1994) (“[T]he defendant’s use of a pretense in order to gain [a]

2 Hill did not argue at trial — and does not argue on appeal — that

he could lawfully enter the apartment without permission.

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ticket taker’s permission to enter [an] office indicates that he was

aware that it was not open to the public.”).

¶ 25 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by

ruling that there wasn’t sufficient evidence to submit the matter to

the jury and granting the judgment of acquittal. Though Hill can’t

be retried, see People v. Galang, 2016 COA 68, ¶ 40 n.7, we

disapprove of the court’s ruling.

VI. Disposition

¶ 26 The district court’s ruling granting the judgment of acquittal is

disapproved.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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