Peo in Interest of SC

23CA1133 Peo in Interest of SC 01-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1133
Weld County District Court No. 21JD399
Honorable Audrey Anne Galloway, Magistrate
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of S.C.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Gomez and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Rheiner, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 Defendant S.C., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication for second

degree assault under a theory of complicity. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 On September 3, 2021, the victim and friends were playing

basketball in a Greeley public park when another group approached

them and asked if they could play basketball together. When the

victim’s group declined, the other group started a fight. The victim

was punched in the face and then kicked in the groin by two

individuals. The victim alleged that S.C. punched him in the face,

which caused his mouth to bleed. The victim sought medical

treatment for the kick to the groin the next day.

¶3 A physician performed emergency exploratory surgery and

found that one of the victim’s testicles had “ruptured,” necessitating

the surgical removal of a portion of the testicle. The physician

testified that the rupture was the result of the attack and

characterized the injury as a “serious bodily injury” as defined by

Colorado law, given the partial loss and impairment of the victim’s

testicle. See § 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2024 (Serious bodily injuries

are those involving “a substantial risk of death; a substantial risk of

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serious permanent disfigurement; a substantial risk of protracted

loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body;

or breaks, fractures, a penetrating knife or penetrating gunshot

wound, or burns of the second or third degree.”).

¶4 S.C. was charged with second degree assault under section

18-3-203(1)(g), C.R.S. 2024, for causing serious bodily injury to the

victim with intent to cause bodily injury.

A. Plea Discussions

¶5 S.C. pleaded not guilty on June 27, 2022, and his speedy trial

deadline was set for August 26, 2022, in accordance with section

19-2.5-902(1), C.R.S. 2024 (With some exceptions, once a juvenile

enters a not guilty plea “the court shall hold the adjudicatory trial

within sixty days.”). On August 12, 2022, however, S.C. withdrew

his not guilty plea — but confusion concerning his plea agreements

resulted in the case proceeding to a magistrate bench trial on

October 20, 2022.

¶6 The plea deal confusion concerned whether the prosecution

and the defense had, in fact, reached a plea agreement on S.C.’s

assault charge. The defense later filed a motion to restore S.C.’s

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speedy trial right, arguing that on August 12, S.C. withdrew his not

guilty plea and waived his speedy trial right while detrimentally

relying on the belief that he had reached a plea deal with the

prosecution.

¶7 In support of its motion, the defense provided a screenshot of

an email the defense sent to the prosecution on August 12,

following an in-person discussion, with the subject line “RE: [S.C.]

22JD13; withdrawing contested motions.” The body of the email

read:

Just to memorialize what we settled on; let me
know if I misrepresented anything. We didn’t
talk about absolutely every single detail so let
me know if anything is off.

For all cases, 18 months DYS, non-mandatory,
credit for time served back to 4/8/22 which is
when he pled in 21JD170.

Dismissal of one of the motor vehicle theft
cases (22JD92, 22JD147, 21JD383), plea to
the felony motor vehicle theft charge in the
other two, reserving restitution for all cases.

Dismissal of 22JD13, the MIP (I’m guessing
there’s no restitution).

Plea to either charge, dismiss the other in
21JD196, reserving restitution.

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21JD399: either stip to half the restitution
amount (around 6500 or so, I believe) with a
plea (we didn’t talk about what the plea would
be to, we would request an assault 3 misdo
based on his actual conduct). If you’re unable
to stip to half, we would try this case and this
case only.

Hope I got all that right!

The last case mentioned, 21JD399, was for the assault at issue

here. The prosecution replied, “This all looks right to me. Are you

ok if I send an email to the Court to let them know we are not

proceeding to hearing today?” The defense later argued this

exchange showed that the prosecution agreed to allow S.C. to plead

guilty to a class 3 misdemeanor.

¶8 Later the same day (August 12), the defense confirmed the

parties would not be proceeding to a subsequent hearing. Defense

counsel stated, “At this time, our request would be — to just vacate

all of the trial dates — in all of [S.C.’s] cases and set for — a status

hearing. . . . I believe that there will be a resolution — in his cases

at that time.” The defense also confirmed that S.C. would be

withdrawing his not guilty pleas, and the prosecution had no

objections. The magistrate accepted the withdrawal of S.C.’s not

guilty pleas and vacated his trial dates.
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¶9 S.C.’s motion also provided another screenshot of an August

17 email exchange, in which the defense asked the prosecution,

“When you get a chance could you let me know how you’d like to

proceed on the 21JD399 case? Or in other words if we are able to

resolve with the stip to half restitution, assault 3 plea? Thanks.”

The prosecution responded on August 22, “We are not able to

stipulate to half of the restitution amount. I am happy to agree to

set the case for a restitution hearing as soon as a plea is entered,

but I can’t stipulate to less than the requested restitution.” The

defense argued that this exchange showed that the prosecution

“implicitly agreed” to proceed with an agreement allowing S.C. to

plead guilty to a misdemeanor.

¶ 10 The defense further alleged that on August 31 the prosecution

provided plea paperwork that included a felony charge for the

assault case, and when the defense corrected the charge the

prosecution “reneged on the previous agreement.” Another email

screenshot shows the prosecution stating,

I’m sorry, I missed the part where you
requested the misdemeanor assault. I will not
be agreeing to that. I don’t believe that was
discussed at our in person meeting and I don’t
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know in the email chain where I agreed to that
change. If that is a dealbreaker then we can
set that case for trial.

The defense responded and argued that the prosecution’s language

in the August 12 email reply stating “[t]his all looks right to me”

showed that the prosecution agreed to the misdemeanor plea. The

prosecution disagreed, stating,

I agree that I said everything looked correct,
but I didn’t say I was agreeing to the Assault 3.
When I said it looks right I was saying that it
matched our in person discussion. I am not in
[Victim Rights Act] for the Assault 3 charge. I
apologize for overlooking that part of your
email, but I absolutely cannot extend an
Assault 3 offer in that case.

¶ 11 In its motion, the defense argued that the prosecution

promised a misdemeanor plea offer to S.C. and then broke that

promise — a promise S.C. detrimentally relied on when he waived

his speedy trial right and withdrew his not guilty plea. So, the

defense requested that S.C.’s original August 26 speedy trial

deadline be reinstated — effectively dismissing the case.

¶ 12 The magistrate orally ruled on the matter, finding that on

August 12 “there was no finalized agreement” concerning the

assault case. This was evidenced by the fact that the defense

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reached out later on August 17 inquiring how the prosecution

would like to proceed with the assault case — indicating the defense

understood that the plea had not been finalized.

¶ 13 The magistrate acknowledged that the prosecution’s August 22

response, which only concerned restitution, could be “somewhat

misleading.” But by that time S.C. had already withdrawn his not

guilty plea — which the magistrate noted occurred when “there

wasn’t a promise by the Government to anything. No firm

agreement on the 21JD399 case. No agreement on the charge he

would plea[d] guilty to or the restitution amount.” Thus, the court

found that there was no promise that S.C. could have detrimentally

relied on. This case then proceeded to trial.

B. Evidence at Trial

¶ 14 At trial it was undisputed that S.C. did not kick the victim in

the groin. The victim identified S.C. as the individual who punched

him in the face in a police photo lineup, in a statement given to

police, and at trial. The victim’s brother also testified that he

witnessed the fight from about twenty feet away and saw S.C. hit

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the victim, though the magistrate noted that the court did not give

much weight to some of his testimony.

¶ 15 The prosecution’s theory at trial was that S.C. “aided” the

second degree assault as a complicitor under section 18-1-603,

C.R.S. 2024 (“A person is legally accountable as principal for the

behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the

intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or

she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning

or committing the offense.”). As a result, the prosecution argued

that S.C. was just as legally accountable as the principal — the

individual who kicked the victim in the groin — for the resulting

serious bodily injury.

¶ 16 The magistrate orally ruled that given the victim’s injuries and

his clear identification of S.C. as the individual who punched him —

testimony the magistrate found to be “very credible” — the

prosecution met its burden. The magistrate noted that even though

S.C. did not kick the victim in the groin, S.C.’s punch was part of a

“group assault” that caused the victim to suffer serious bodily

injury, and S.C. acted with the intent to cause a bodily injury when

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he punched him. S.C. was therefore complicit in the serious bodily

injury.

C. Procedural History

¶ 17 The magistrate sentenced S.C. to serve eighteen months in the

custody of the Division of Youth Services (the same sentence as

agreed to in the global plea agreement concerning S.C.’s other

cases), with 195 days credit for time served.

¶ 18 S.C. then filed a petition for review of the magistrate’s orders

with the district court, arguing that the magistrate erred by (1)

rejecting S.C.’s request to reinstate his speedy trial right; (2) finding

that S.C. was guilty of second degree assault under a complicity

theory; and (3) finding S.C. guilty of second degree assault because

there was insufficient identity evidence proving S.C. punched the

victim.

¶ 19 The district court rejected S.C.’s arguments and adopted the

magistrate’s findings. It concluded that (1) there was no promise

for S.C. to have detrimentally relied upon when he waived his

speedy trial right and withdrew his guilty plea; (2) S.C. aided the

group assault causing the serious bodily injury when he punched

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the victim, and the joint assault could prove complicity; and (3)

there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the second

degree assault charge, including the assailant’s identity given the

victim’s trial testimony and other identifications of S.C. as the

assailant.

II. Analysis

¶ 20 S.C. now appeals the magistrate’s findings and the district

court’s adoption of two of the findings, arguing that (1) the

magistrate lacked sufficient evidence to adjudicate S.C. for second

degree assault under a complicity theory and (2) the magistrate

erred by failing to reinstate S.C.’s speedy trial right. Both issues

were preserved. See People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 12. We

discern no error.

A. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Adjudicate S.C. for Second
Degree Assault Under a Complicity Theory

¶ 21 S.C. first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient

evidence to adjudicate S.C. for second degree assault via a

complicity theory because it failed to prove that S.C. acted with the

requisite intent to aid the individual who kicked the victim in the

groin. S.C. contends that “merely because S.C. hit the same victim

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who the other juvenile kicked does not, by itself, mean S.C.

intended to aid or encourage the other juvenile.”

¶ 22 S.C. also argues that the court was left to speculate about

issues such as (1) whether S.C. acted in anger or defended

someone; (2) the relationship between S.C. and the individual who

kicked the victim; (3) where S.C. was in relation to the victim; and

(4) if S.C. saw the kick occur. These contextual gaps, S.C. argues,

indicate a lack of intent evidence and show the adjudication was

based on mere conjecture. Consequently, S.C. argues that his

adjudication must be vacated. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 23 We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. See

McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 27; Maestas v. People, 2019 CO 45,

¶ 2. In gauging whether sufficient evidence supported a defendant’s

conviction or adjudication, we must determine “whether the

relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable

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doubt.” People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 24 (citation omitted).

Evidence is sufficient “if the quantity and quality of the relevant

evidence would support a fair-minded jury’s finding ‘that the guilt of

the accused has been established beyond a reasonable doubt with

regard to each essential element of the crime.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

¶ 24 A sufficiency of the evidence review “requires us to ‘give the

prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference which might

be fairly drawn from the evidence.’” Id. at ¶ 25 (citation omitted).

However, these inferences “must be supported by a ‘logical and

convincing connection between the facts established and the

conclusion inferred.’” Id. (quoting People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123,

128 (Colo. 1983)). Appellate courts should not serve as a

“thirteenth juror” and invade the province of the fact finder or

reweigh conflicting evidence, but “[a] verdict cannot be supported by

guessing, speculation, conjecture, or a mere modicum of relevant

evidence.” Id. If we find that a conviction was based on insufficient

evidence we must vacate the conviction, and the conviction is not

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subject to retrial. People v. McCoy, 2015 COA 76M, ¶¶ 29-30, aff’d

on other grounds, 2019 CO 44.

¶ 25 Under section 18-1-603, a defendant may be held as legally

accountable as a principal for a crime “if, with the intent to promote

or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets,

advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing

the offense.” Complicity accountability “is not a separate and

distinct crime or offense. Rather, it is ‘a theory by which a

defendant becomes accountable for a criminal offense committed by

another.’” Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Colo. 2005)

(citation omitted).

¶ 26 Complicitor accountability requires that a complicitor have a

“dual mental state.” As our supreme court explained,

section 18-1-603 . . . dictates that a person is
legally accountable as a principal for the
behavior of another constituting a criminal
offense if he aids, abets, advises, or
encourages the other person in planning or
committing that offense, and he does so with:
(1) the intent to aid, abet, advise, or encourage
the other person in his criminal act or
conduct, and (2) an awareness of
circumstances attending the act or conduct he
seeks to further, including a required mental

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state, if any, that are necessary for
commission of the offense in question.

People v. Childress, 2015 CO 65M, ¶ 34.

¶ 27 However, “[t]he requisite knowledge is minimal” and a

complicitor defendant is not required to “have advance knowledge of

the principal’s intent to commit a crime.” People v. Alvarado, 284

P.3d 99, 103 (Colo. App. 2011). Indeed, merely “roughly

contemporaneous knowledge by the complicitor of the principal’s

intent” suffices. Id. (citing People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 104

(Colo. 1989)). But “[i]t is not sufficient that the defendant

intentionally engaged in acts which ultimately assisted or

encouraged the principal. Rather, the complicitor must intend that

his conduct have the effect of assisting or encouraging the principal

in committing or planning the crime committed by the principal.”

Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo. 1997), overruled in

part on other grounds by Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 28 Furthermore, in cases where defendants act in a “common

enterprise,” such as “where both parties are acting in concert to

commit a threshold crime, but the principal ultimately commits a

more serious crime than the complicitor initially intended, the

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complicitor can be held liable for the crime committed by the

principal.” Grissom, 115 P.3d at 1284; see also People v. Theus-

Roberts, 2015 COA 32, ¶ 34; People v. Chavez, 190 P.3d 760, 768

(Colo. App. 2007) (“When two or more people are involved in the

commission of a crime, one charged as a principal may be tried and

convicted as a complicitor.”). “Complicitor liability ‘may be

established by reasonable inference from other established facts

and circumstances.’” Chavez, 190 P.3d at 769 (quoting Harris v.

People, 335 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1959)).

¶ 29 Collectively, to convict a defendant under a complicity theory,

“the prosecution must prove that (1) the principal committed the

crime; (2) the complicitor knew that the principal intended to

commit the crime; and (3) the complicitor, having the requisite

knowledge, aided, abetted, or encouraged the principal in the

commission of the crime.” Theus-Roberts, ¶ 35. And a defendant

commits second degree assault under section 18-3-203(1)(g) if,

“[w]ith intent to cause bodily injury to another person, he or she

causes serious bodily injury to that person or another.”

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2. Application

¶ 30 The victim testified that the assailants’ group approached

them and asked to play basketball, and when the victim’s group

declined the assailants attacked the victim and the group. The

prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the theory that

S.C. acted with the intent to aid or encourage the assault because

the victim identified S.C. as the assailant who punched him and

testified that S.C.’s group assaulted him.

¶ 31 The law does not require advance planning by S.C. and the

group to assault the victim to hold S.C. accountable as a

complicitor. See Alvarado, 284 P.3d at 103. Section 18-1-603 “only

requires knowledge by the complicitor that the principal is engaging

in, or about to engage in, criminal conduct.” Wheeler, 772 P.2d at

104 (emphasis added). By intentionally punching the victim during

the group assault, S.C. thus acted with the intent to cause the

victim “bodily injury.” See § 18-3-203(1)(g); see also § 18-1-

901(3)(c) (“‘Bodily injury’ means physical pain, illness, or any

impairment of physical or mental condition.”). A fact finder could

reasonably find that S.C. (1) acted with the intent to aid or

16
encourage others in the assault, and (2) acted with an awareness of

the circumstances surrounding the assault — namely that

members of the group acted with the intent to cause the victim

bodily harm. See Childress, ¶¶ 29, 34.

¶ 32 Ultimately, this case is most akin to a “common enterprise,”

where a complicitor and principal act “in concert to commit a

threshold crime,” but the complicitor may be held liable for the

principal’s actions even if the principal “ultimately commits a more

serious crime than the complicitor initially intended.” Grissom, 115

P.3d at 1284; cf. People v. Lee, 989 P.2d 777, 782 (Colo. App. 1999)

(reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty as a complicitor

to an assault when he sat on the victim in order to aid others who

were kicking the victim).

¶ 33 The evidence presented at trial — viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution — was sufficient to sustain S.C.’s

adjudication. See Perez, ¶ 24. The magistrate’s findings, and the

district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s findings, were

proper.

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B. The Magistrate Did Not Err by Declining to Reinstate S.C.’s
Speedy Trial Right

¶ 34 S.C. next argues that the magistrate erred by not reinstating

S.C.’s speedy trial right because the prosecution’s August 12 email

saying “this all looks right” constituted a binding agreement to allow

S.C. to plead guilty to a misdemeanor for the assault, or fairly

implied an agreement. S.C. adds that the lack of a finalized

agreement between the prosecution and the defense did not mean

that S.C. could not rely on the prosecution’s promise.

¶ 35 S.C. further contends that the fact that the prosecution

“missed” the reference in the emails to the misdemeanor plea

request does not undermine S.C.’s reasonable reliance on the

representation. And the prosecution’s eventual disagreement once

it discovered the issue, S.C. argues, illustrated that S.C. was

reasonably relying on a promise by the prosecution when he

withdrew his not guilty plea and waived his speedy trial right. As a

result, S.C. argues that his speedy trial right should be reinstated

(dismissing the case) or, alternatively, that the original plea

agreement should be enforced.

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1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 36 We interpret plea agreements de novo as matters of law, and

“[t]his inquiry requires us to ascertain both the existence and scope

of the promise being claimed by a defendant.” Benavidez v. People,

986 P.2d 943, 948 (Colo. 1999). In doing so, “we look to an

objective test measuring whether the interpretation being proposed

comports with the ‘meaning a reasonable person would have

attached under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Craig v. People,

986 P.2d 951, 961 (Colo. 1999)).

¶ 37 “Courts that have addressed the validity of plea agreements

frequently rely on contract law analogies. A plea agreement,

however, is more than merely a contract between two parties, and

must be attended by constitutional safeguards to ensure that a

defendant receives the performance that he is due.” People v.

McCormick, 859 P.2d 846, 856 (Colo. 1993) (citations omitted).

“Because the defendant’s due process rights are at issue, the courts

may consider extrinsic evidence as an aid to ascertaining the

existence and scope of any promises at issue, even under

circumstances where such evidence would not be properly

19
considered in the realm of ordinary civil contracts.” Craig, 986 P.2d

at 961.

The decisive factors to consider in ascertaining
the existence and extent of a defendant’s right
to enforcement of a governmental promise are:
whether a promise was made to the defendant
by a governmental official with apparent
authority to bind the government, and, if such
promise was made, the scope of the promise;
whether the defendant reasonably and
detrimentally relied on the promise by
performing his side of the bargain; and, if the
defendant reasonably and detrimentally relied
on the promise, the appropriate remedy to
which the defendant is entitled.

People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1010 (Colo. 1987).

2. Application

¶ 38 Recall that the August 12, 2022, email stated, in part,

Just to memorialize what we settled on; let me
know if I misrepresented anything. We didn’t
talk about absolutely every single detail so let
me know if anything is off. . . .

21JD399: either stip to half the restitution
amount (around 6500 or so, I believe) with a
plea (we didn’t talk about what the plea would
be to, we would request an assault 3 misdo
based on his actual conduct). If you’re unable
to stip to half, we would try this case and this
case only.

Hope I got all that right!

20
The prosecution replied minutes later with “[t]his all looks right to

me.” The question, therefore, is whether this exchange objectively

constituted a promise by the government that S.C. could have

reasonably and detrimentally relied upon. See id.; see also

Benavidez, 986 P.2d at 948.

¶ 39 We conclude that the exchange does not show that the

government made a binding promise that S.C. could have

reasonably relied on. The email exchange shows that the defense

was “memorializing” a verbal discussion and tried to nail down

terms of various agreements. But the parties had not reached a

definite agreement when the defense waived S.C.’s speedy trial right

and withdrew his not guilty plea later that same day.

¶ 40 The defense’s email shows that it was proposing an agreement

allowing S.C. to enter a guilty plea in exchange for a stipulation for

half the restitution and requesting a class three misdemeanor. If

this was not possible the defense would then go to trial on the

assault charge. But the prosecution could not have accepted this

proposal with its mere response that this “all looks right.”

21
¶ 41 To start, the very first line of the defense’s email noted that it

was “[j]ust to memorialize what we settled on” and requested that

the prosecution “let me know if I misrepresented anything.” And

the prosecution specifically responded to this request by letting the

defense know that nothing seemed amiss. Beyond this, however, if

we were to deem the prosecution’s response as an acceptance, it is

unclear concerning what exactly it is agreeing to. Is the

prosecution agreeing to the stipulated half restitution and

misdemeanor plea, agreeing that the half restitution is indeed

$6,500, confirming it is unable to stipulate to half restitution, or

agreeing to go to trial?

¶ 42 Furthermore, the defense said if the prosecution could not

agree to stipulate to half restitution the defense would proceed to

trial, indicating that the defense also understood that a plea

agreement had not been finalized. And as the magistrate aptly

pointed out, this was supported by the defense’s August 17 email —

after the not guilty plea was withdrawn — asking, “When you get a

chance could you let me know how you’d like to proceed on the

21JD399 case? Or in other words if we are able to resolve with the

22
stip[ulation] to half restitution, assault 3 plea?” See Craig, 986 P.2d

at 961 (we may look to extrinsic evidence to determine the existence

and scope of a plea deal).

¶ 43 The parties’ communications certainly would have benefited

from clarification concerning S.C.’s plea agreement. But,

ultimately, when S.C. withdrew his not guilty plea and waived his

speedy trial right on August 12, the prosecution had made no

promises that S.C. could have relied upon to his detriment. Thus,

neither the magistrate nor the district court erred by refusing to

reinstate S.C.’s speedy trial right.

III. Disposition

¶ 44 The adjudication is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE LUM concur.

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