24CA1286•Peo in Interest of CK
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24CA1286 Peo in Interest of CK 02-05-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA1286 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JD676 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of C.K., Juvenile-Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 5, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee Madison R. Whitley, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile- Appellant
1 ¶ 1 C.K., a juvenile, appeals the juvenile court’s judgment adjudicating him delinquent after finding him guilty of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA), conspiracy to commit second degree burglary, two counts of second degree burglary, theft ($20,000-$100,000), and aggravated motor vehicle theft. We affirm. I. Background ¶ 2 One night, Lakewood police officers arrived at the scene of a car accident. They learned that the at-fault driver had abandoned his car after the crash and then fled on foot. Officers searched the car and found documents with the name “Easton Kochiss,” some firearm magazines and ammunition, cocaine, Adderall tablets, and marijuana products labeled “Herbs 4 You.” Herbs 4 You was a marijuana dispensary that had been broken into the day before the accident. ¶ 3 Based on the items they found in the car, officers suspected that Kochiss was involved in the “Herbs 4 You” break-in. They learned of Kochiss’s Facebook account, which was under the username “PostedPosted,” and requested and obtained a search warrant for the account. Kochiss’s messages from the
2 “PostedPosted” account showed that he was the leader of a group called the Millionaire Motion Boys (MMB) that burglarized various businesses and sold or traded the stolen items for drugs and guns. ¶ 4 The search of Kochiss’s Facebook account also revealed messages between him and another account with the username “Trapboy Kurry.” Officers identified C.K. as the owner of the “Trapboy Kurry” account. On Facebook, C.K. and Kochiss messaged about selling fentanyl pills, trading firearms, stealing cars, and other crimes. For example, C.K. told Kochiss that he had gotten a “lo” — a stolen Hyundai car. Four days earlier, an officer had received a report that a gold Hyundai Tucson had been stolen. And approximately two hours after C.K. and Kochiss messaged about the stolen Hyundai, officers responded to a burglary at Gold Casino and Pawn. The suspects had used a gold Hyundai — bearing the same license plate number as the reportedly stolen Hyundai — to smash open the front of the pawnshop. ¶ 5 Based on this information, officers requested a search warrant for C.K.’s “Trapboy Kurry” Facebook account, alleging that the messages showed probable cause that C.K. had been involved in the Gold Casino and Pawn burglary. A magistrate issued the warrant.
3 During their subsequent search, officers found a photo of cocaine with the words “Posted up” and a phone number written next to it. They also found messages between C.K. and other MMB members about obtaining crowbars and meeting up to “get on sum money.” Officers were aware that the burglary suspects used crowbars to break into the businesses. ¶ 6 Officers also found messages between C.K. and Kochiss a few months earlier about getting another “lo.” After these messages had been sent, officers had responded to a burglary at “The Joint,” a marijuana dispensary. Soon after that burglary, Kochiss had messaged C.K., “Us n chop next time” and “More profit.”1 C.K. responded, “Yep brother . . . lmk.”2 ¶ 7 Using the information obtained from C.K.’s Facebook account and information about his relationship to Kochiss, officers executed a search warrant for caller ID and GPS location information from C.K.’s cell phone. The subsequent search disclosed location data from the dates of the burglaries. Jessica Suttle, a cellular phone 1 A detective testified at trial that this meant, “it’s just going to be [Kochiss], [C.K.], and [a third MMB member] next time they do the burglary because there’ll be more profit.” 2 “Lmk” stands for “let me know.”
4 data and cell tower mapping analyst with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), used the data to create maps of C.K.’s locations around the times of the burglaries. The maps showed that C.K. was within a 600-meter radius of the Gold Casino and Pawn and The Joint on the nights of the burglaries. The data also showed that C.K.’s phone didn’t regularly connect to the cell towers near these stores, meaning he didn’t regularly spend time in those areas. ¶ 8 A grand jury indicted C.K. and the other MMB members on sixty counts, including burglary, motor vehicle theft, and violating COCCA. C.K. was charged with the offenses noted above and tried as a juvenile. Following a trial to the court, the juvenile court found C.K. guilty on all charges and adjudicated him delinquent. The court sentenced him to two years in the custody of the Division of Youth Services. II. Discussion ¶ 9 C.K. contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress the Facebook records; (2) denying his motion to suppress the cell phone records; (3) imposing inadequate sanctions for the prosecution’s failure to timely produce discovery; and (4)
5 imposing inadequate sanctions for the prosecution’s failure to provide an expert witness report. We reject each of these contentions. A. Timeliness of Appeal ¶ 10 Before we can address the merits of C.K.’s appeal, we must determine whether it was timely.3 If his appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 896 (Colo. 2005) (citing Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Colo. 1988)). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Lopez, 2020 COA 119, ¶ 21. ¶ 11 At C.K.’s sentencing hearing on May 2, 2024, the prosecutor verbally requested restitution in the amount of $74,338.35. The prosecution hadn’t yet filed any restitution request, and the court noted that, in juvenile court, the prosecution must file the request before sentencing. At the end of the hearing, the court sentenced C.K. and set a restitution hearing for two months later. C.K.’s counsel didn’t object. The prosecution submitted a motion for 3 This court issued an order to show cause requiring C.K. to explain why his appeal shouldn’t be dismissed as untimely. C.K. responded. The order was then deferred to the merits division for resolution.
6 restitution in the amount of $24,210 on June 14, 2024. The restitution hearing occurred on July 10, 2024, and the court ruled that C.K. owed restitution in the amount of $9,966.88. ¶ 12 C.K.’s counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2024, twenty-nine days after the deadline to file based on his sentencing date. ¶ 13 C.K. contends that his notice of appeal wasn’t late because the judgment only became final after the July 10 restitution hearing. He also contends that, even if his notice was untimely, we have jurisdiction over his appeal because we may exercise our discretion to extend the time to file based on good cause or other grounds. The People agree that we have the discretion to accept C.K.’s notice of appeal as timely. ¶ 14 We disagree with C.K. that his notice of appeal was timely. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a final judgment occurs when the defendant is convicted and a sentence is imposed. Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577 (Colo. 2008); see also Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 45 (“The court’s post-sentencing determination of the restitution amount, while appealable as a separate judgment, was not part of [defendant’s] sentence.”). And
7 the juvenile court implicitly found C.K. liable for restitution at the sentencing hearing because it set a date for a restitution hearing. See Tennyson, ¶ 45. Thus, the time to submit C.K.’s notice of appeal began to run when the court sentenced him on May 2, 2024, and his notice of appeal was due by June 20, 2024. See C.A.R. 4(b)(1). ¶ 15 But we have broad discretion to decide whether to accept a late-filed notice. Baker, 104 P.3d at 896. The rules of appellate procedure allow us to extend the time to file a notice of appeal if we find excusable neglect or good cause. Id. at 895-96 (first citing C.A.R. 4(b)(1); then citing C.A.R. 26(b); and then citing C.A.R. 2). ¶ 16 To establish excusable neglect, there must have been “a failure to take proper steps at the proper time . . . as the result of some unavoidable hinderance or accident.” Id. at 896 (quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973)). We determine whether good cause exists by reviewing the totality of the circumstances. Id.; People v. Ong, 2021 COA 113, ¶ 28 (“Good cause under C.A.R. 26(b) requires a showing that surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonably prudent person similarly to overlook a required act in the performance of some
8 responsibility.”). We consider a nonexclusive list of factors, such as “1) the potential prejudice the People may suffer from a late filing, 2) the interests of judicial economy, and 3) the propriety of requiring the defendant to pursue other remedies.” Baker, 104 P.3d at 896- 97 (citing Estep, 753 P.2d at 1248). ¶ 17 Based on consideration of the relevant factors and our review of the record, we conclude that there is good cause to accept C.K.’s notice of appeal as timely. The People concede that they won’t suffer any prejudice by allowing C.K. to appeal, and they also suggest that judicial economy favors accepting the appeal because otherwise C.K. “may have two Crim. P. 35(c) claims — defense counsel’s late filing of the notice of appeal and the court’s failure to advise him of his right to appeal.” Thus, we exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 2, 4(b)(1), and 26(b) and accept C.K.’s notice of appeal as timely. B. Motion to Suppress Facebook Records ¶ 18 Turning to the merits, C.K. first contends that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress the Facebook records because the search warrant lacked probable cause, lacked sufficient particularity, and was overly broad. We disagree.
9 1. Additional Background ¶ 19 Based on police reports of the burglaries and vehicle thefts, messages found on Kochiss’s Facebook account, information from law enforcement databases concerning Kochiss’s known associates, and a booking photo of C.K. obtained from another police department, officers filed a request for a warrant, supported by an investigator’s affidavit, with a magistrate seeking permission to search C.K.’s Facebook account. The officers requested six months’ worth of historical records from several areas of C.K.’s account, including activity logs, photos and videos uploaded by the account, profile information, and Facebook Marketplace usage. The six- month period began a few weeks before the burglaries occurred and ended when officers sought the warrant. The accompanying affidavit disclosed several messages between Kochiss and C.K. to support a finding of probable cause. It asserted that the messages “demonstrate[] that these individuals are closely associated, that they frequently communicate with one another.” The magistrate found that there was probable cause and signed the proposed warrant.
10 2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 20 “A trial court’s suppression ruling presents a mixed question of fact and law.” People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 11 (citing People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 14). “We accept the trial court’s findings of historic fact if those findings are supported by competent evidence, but we assess the legal significance of the facts de novo.” Id. (quoting People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 16, ¶ 9). In reviewing the validity of a warrant, we give great deference to the magistrate’s findings, “but that deference ‘is not boundless.’” People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 937 (Colo. 2009) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)). ¶ 21 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the government must ordinarily provide a valid warrant before it conducts a search. People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 16. ¶ 22 A valid warrant requires a showing of probable cause. People v. Seymour, 2023 CO 53, ¶ 44. “Probable cause means that ‘there
11 is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2001)). The determination “requires ‘less than evidence which would justify condemnation or conviction . . . [but] more than mere suspicion.’” Gutierrez, 222 P.3d at 937 (alteration in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); see also People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Colo. 2001) (The warrant “must supply a sufficient nexus between criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the place to be searched.”). ¶ 23 Determining whether there was probable cause requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances. People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo. 2003). A magistrate makes this determination “only with reference to the facts contained within the four corners” of the warrant request and its supporting documentation, such as an affidavit. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d at 937 (citing People v. Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 150 (Colo. 1994)). ¶ 24 A valid warrant must also be “sufficiently particular that it enables the executing officer to reasonably ascertain and identify
12 the things authorized to be seized.” People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2025 COA 61, ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Roccaforte, 919 P.2d 799, 803 (Colo. 1996)). A warrant is overly broad (and therefore lacks particularity) when it “describes in both specific and inclusive generic terms what is to be seized, but it authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no probable cause.” United States v. Cotto, 995 F.3d 786, 798 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty- Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2002)). To determine whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement, “courts are required to read warrants and the accompanying affidavits [together] in a practical, common sense fashion.” Roccaforte, 919 P.2d at 804. ¶ 25 A search of a Facebook account, even more than searches of other electronic data sources, potentially threatens an undue intrusion on a person’s privacy because “Facebook provides a single window through which almost every detail of a person’s life is visible.” United States v. Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d 300, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d, No. 21-1284-cr, 2022 WL 16543193 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 2022). Thus, courts should pay particular attention to whether a warrant to search such an account describes with particularity the
13 object of the search and the place in which there is probable cause to believe the object will be found. Id. at 309-10. ¶ 26 However, warrants that discuss complex and far-reaching crimes, such as organized schemes involving multiple people, “may be deemed legally sufficient even though they are less particular than warrants pertaining to more straightforward criminal matters.” Cooper, 654 F.3d at 1127. Warrants for complex crimes may also require “less temporal specificity” to be considered sufficiently particular. United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 340 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Manafort, 323 F. Supp. 3d 768, 782 (E.D. Va. 2018)). 3. Analysis a. Probable Cause ¶ 27 The affidavit submitted in support of the Facebook warrant tied C.K. to the subject Facebook account and provided background information regarding two burglaries in which C.K. allegedly participated. It recounted Facebook messages between C.K. and Kochiss, who was a suspect in the burglaries, discussing C.K. stealing a Hyundai and a Kia, both of which were the kinds of cars used by the suspects in the burglaries, and another planned
14 robbery, for which C.K. might provide a stolen Mazda. And the affidavit explained the scope of the criminal enterprise, which included selling stolen items. The messages therefore provided “sufficient facts to allow a person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located at the place to be searched.” Rodriguez-Ortiz, ¶ 21 (quoting Miller, 75 P.3d at 1112). ¶ 28 C.K. argues that the warrant didn’t go into sufficient detail about how using the Facebook data could help the police identify those who had participated in the alleged crimes. But the aforementioned information provided that detail. And the affidavit said, “If any telephone numbers are discovered, Detectives could prepare additional search warrants in attempt to obtain cellular location data, which would assist Detectives with placing the Facebook users at the crime scenes at the time the offenses were committed.” ¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the warrant and affidavit provided sufficient support for a finding of probable cause.
15 b. Particularity ¶ 30 C.K. next argues that, for three reasons, the warrant lacked sufficient particularity. We reject each argument. ¶ 31 C.K. first argues that the warrant requested access to “every piece of information within the account” even though there weren’t any supporting facts demonstrating that any evidence would be found. For example, C.K. notes, the warrant requested “[a]ll information about the user’s access to Facebook Marketplace.” C.K. argues that there are no facts demonstrating that evidence of the burglaries would be found on his Facebook Marketplace account. But the affidavit alleges that those who participated in the robberies “would then reap from the proceeds involving the various stolen marijuana products and in return would purchase other illicit narcotics and unregistered firearms though Facebook social media and Facebook open-source sale platforms.” And there was evidence that the group was selling narcotics on Facebook. It was therefore reasonable for the investigator to believe that there would be evidence of the sales of the stolen products on C.K.’s Facebook Marketplace page. And though the warrant requested a large amount of data from C.K.’s Facebook account, that alone isn’t
16 dispositive. See Rodriguez-Ortiz, ¶ 31 (“[T]he quantity of items listed in a search warrant or the quantity of items seized during the execution of a warrant does not necessarily have any bearing on the validity of the search itself.” (quoting People v. Tucci, 500 P.2d 815, 816 (Colo. 1972))). ¶ 32 The warrant was also sufficiently particular in relation to the complexity of the burglaries and related crimes by MMB. Officers learned that Kochiss had organized a multi-person criminal group engaged in car thefts, burglaries, sales of stolen goods, and purchases of narcotics and firearms. See Cooper, 654 F.3d at 1127 (“In light of the complex nature of the activities being investigated here, we conclude that the warrants were sufficiently particular when read in conjunction with their supporting affidavits.”). ¶ 33 C.K. also argues that the warrant’s time limit was overly broad. Specifically, he argues that the warrant unreasonably asked for six months’ worth of Facebook data, when the affidavit only described the two burglaries. ¶ 34 In support of his argument, C.K. relies on United States v. Irving, 347 F. Supp. 3d 615 (D. Kan. 2018); Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d 300; and United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2017). But
17 those cases are distinguishable; the courts held that the search warrants at issue for the defendants’ Facebook accounts were overly broad because they didn’t contain a time limit. Irving, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 624; Shipp, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 310, 312; Blake, 868 F.3d at 974. But the warrant in this case had a time limit of six months, and the affidavit provided factual support for the conclusion that the police would find evidence of the alleged crimes within the different areas of C.K.’s Facebook account during that timeframe: the MMB members’ activities reflected an ongoing plan to engage in certain crimes to fund illegal purchases, which they repeated. ¶ 35 Lastly, C.K. argues that the warrant lacked particularity because it contained “stock language, copied and pasted from another affidavit.” He points to the statement in the affidavit that “there is probable cause to believe that the Facebook accounts contain evidence of the shooting incidents,” even though he wasn’t being investigated in connection with a shooting. But a warrant doesn’t become invalid merely because it contains a misstatement. See Johnson v. Staab, 2025 COA 45, ¶ 28 (“[A] warrant may be supported by probable cause even if the supporting affidavit
18 contains negligent or mistaken misstatements.”); see also Kaiser v. Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he misstatements do not invalidate the warrant because they are not material, and because the affidavit included sufficient accurate statements to support the issuance of the warrant.” (citations omitted)). ¶ 36 We therefore conclude that the warrant and affidavit satisfied the particularity requirement. C. Motion to Suppress Cell Phone Records ¶ 37 C.K. argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his cell phone records because the search warrant pursuant to which those records were obtained lacked probable cause, lacked sufficient particularity, and was overly broad. Again, we disagree. 1. Additional Background ¶ 38 Based on the information found from searching C.K.’s Facebook account, officers filed a request for a search warrant, with a supporting affidavit, to obtain permission to search C.K.’s cell phone data. The warrant covered C.K.’s cell carrier’s data on C.K.’s incoming and outgoing calls and GPS location information from October 2022 to when the warrant was to be executed, in June
19 2023. The accompanying affidavit provided that the request was based on Facebook messages between C.K. and other MMB members in which C.K. discussed stealing a Dodge Charger and providing firearms for MMB members. The affidavit also said that, at the time of the request, C.K. was subject to an arrest warrant for first degree murder out of Arapahoe County, that C.K. was a danger to the community, and that his location was unknown. A magistrate signed the warrant. 2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 39 As previously noted, “[a] trial court’s suppression ruling presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Licona-Ortega, ¶ 11 (citing Davis, ¶ 14). We accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they have record support, but we review issues of law de novo. Id. ¶ 40 The protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment “apply with particular force in the case of cell phone searches. . . . [C]ell phones have ‘immense storage capacities’ and can ‘collect and store many distinct types of data in one place.’” People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Coke, 2020 CO 28, ¶ 37). Cell phones also constantly collect data, as “[m]ost modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless network several times a
20 minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 300-01. By tapping into the network, cell phones register time-stamped data of the owner’s location. Id. at 301. Location data “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). Thus, the government must obtain a valid warrant to obtain cell phone data. See id. at 304. ¶ 41 As with warrants allowing searches of social media accounts, warrants for cell phone data must show probable cause and be particular to what content will be searched. Id. at 316-17. A warrant that “broadly authoriz[es] police to search a cell phone for all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data showing ownership or possession violates the particularity” requirement. Thompson, ¶ 19.
21 3. Analysis a. Probable Cause ¶ 42 The affidavit supporting the request for the cell phone warrant asserted that detectives were “investigating a series of criminal offenses including burglaries, robberies, narcotics distribution, [and] illegal weapons.” The messages referenced in the affidavit between Kochiss and C.K. included C.K. discussing stealing a Dodge Charger and the price of 1,000 fentanyl pills, and C.K. asking if Kochiss wanted a gun for “either cash or trade.” These messages directly related to the crimes alleged and created more than a mere suspicion that C.K. was involved. ¶ 43 And, at the time the warrant was executed, C.K. had an active felony warrant for his arrest for first degree murder. The search warrant affidavit said that C.K. “is a substantial risk of serious harm to others,” and his location was unknown. Courts regularly approve warrants to collect cell phone location data to assist in apprehending fugitive suspects. See, e.g., United States v. Artis, 919 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2019) (warrant for obtaining cell phone data validly executed to apprehend fugitive); United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Police were entitled to
22 use a warrant to obtain [cell phone location] data that would help them track down [the fugitive’s] location.”). Officers thus had probable cause independent of C.K.’s involvement with MMB to obtain C.K.’s cell phone location data. b. Particularity ¶ 44 The affidavit requested that C.K.’s cellular company provide location data for C.K.’s cell phone. Different cellular carriers have different names for this data, and the affidavit listed all the names. C.K. argues that because the warrant listed all the different names for the location data, rather than only his cell carrier’s, the warrant lacked particularity.4 But the standard for particularity is “whether the description in a warrant is sufficiently particular that it enables the executing officer to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.” Roccaforte, 919 P.2d at 803. Listing the different names that cell carriers use to describe their location data ensures that the cell carrier who receives the warrant knows the 4 Specifically, the warrant said, “The wireless carrier shall provide any specialized location data referred to by different cellular carriers as Timing Advance data, Call Per Measurement Data (PCMD), Real Time Tool (RTT) data, Network Element Location Service (NELOS) data, and/or AriesoGeo data for the authorized historical date range.”
23 particular data the officer is looking to obtain. And even though the warrant listed all the different names for the data, the request was for one form of data. ¶ 45 The affidavit also requested eight months’ worth of C.K.’s location data, from October 1, 2022, through June 1, 2023. C.K. argues that this time period was much longer than needed to investigate the burglaries. However, the crimes alleged in the warrant were a series of car thefts, robberies, burglaries, narcotics distribution, and other crimes that were committed by several different people working as a criminal enterprise. The first offense in this series occurred in October 2022. And, as discussed, C.K. had an active arrest warrant for first degree murder at the time of the cell phone warrant’s execution. The officers requested C.K.’s location data up until the day the warrant was issued because they needed to apprehend him. Lastly, the warrant only requested location data; it didn’t request the content of calls, text messages, or other communications. Cf. Coke, ¶ 38 (warrant issued to search
24 the defendant’s “texts, videos, pictures, [and] contact lists” violated the particularity requirement).5 D. Sanctions Against the Prosecution ¶ 46 C.K. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by imposing insufficient sanctions against the prosecution for alleged discovery violations. We disagree. 1. Late Discovery Disclosure a. Additional Background ¶ 47 C.K.’s counsel moved for sanctions against the prosecution for Crim. P. 16 violations less than one month before trial. Defense counsel asserted that she hadn’t received the Facebook warrant and affidavit, cell phone data, or police reports about the Gold Casino and Pawn burglary. And the day before filing the motion, defense counsel had received 256 body-worn camera videos from the prosecution that she would need to review before trial. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to disclose this 5 The People argue that, even if the warrants were invalid, the evidence was admissible under the good faith exception. Because we conclude that the warrants were valid, we don’t need to address that argument. People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2025 COA 61, ¶ 35.
25 discovery before the Rule 16 deadline and requested that the court suppress the evidence from the late-disclosed discovery. ¶ 48 Following a hearing on the motion, the court issued a written order recognizing that the defense had been prejudiced by the late disclosure of discovery and that rescheduling C.K.’s trial to give the defense time to review the discovery materials would result in a trial beyond the speedy trial deadline. As a sanction, the court ordered that if C.K. consented to a continuance, and was subsequently adjudicated delinquent following a trial, he would be given credit for time served for each day between the speedy trial date and his sentencing date. The defense didn’t ask for a continuance, and the trial began as scheduled. b. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 49 We review a trial court’s discovery sanction for abuse of discretion. People v. Lee, 18 P.3d 192, 196 (Colo. 2001). “[A] discovery sanction will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Id. ¶ 50 Under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(I) and (IV), the prosecution must make available to the defense, among other things, “(I) Police, arrest and crime or offense reports . . . [and] (IV) [a]ny books, papers,
26 documents, photographs or tangible objects.” The prosecution must do so no later than twenty-one days after the charges against the defendant are filed. Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(1). If the prosecution fails to comply with its obligations, “the court may . . . enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.” Crim. P. 16(III)(g). ¶ 51 “Choosing an appropriate sanction for discovery violations lies within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” People v. Tippet, 2023 CO 61, ¶ 34. A trial court should impose “the least severe sanction that will ensure that there is full compliance with the court’s discovery orders.” Lee, 18 P.3d at 197 (quoting People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 949 (Colo. 1998)). “[T]he goal is to impose a sanction that sufficiently encourages a ‘modification of a party’s discovery practices.’” Tippet, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Daley, 97 P.3d 295, 298-99 (Colo. App. 2004)); see also People v. Dist. Ct., 808 P.2d 831, 837 (Colo. 1991) (“In fashioning a sanction to achieve the goal of eliminating the due process violation, a court must strive to restore as nearly as possible the level playing field that existed before the discovery violation.”). When imposing a discovery sanction, a trial court should consider: “(1) the reason for and degree of culpability associated with the violation; (2) the extent of
27 resulting prejudice to the other party; (3) any events after the violation that mitigate such prejudice; (4) reasonable and less drastic alternatives to exclusion; and (5) any other relevant facts.” Cobb, 962 P.2d at 949. We consider “whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” Tippet, ¶ 64 (quoting Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74). c. Analysis ¶ 52 C.K. argues that the juvenile court’s offer of a continuance and time served was an insufficient sanction because the discovery violations prejudiced his defense and forced him to choose between “his right to a speedy trial and his right to a fair one.” We conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion. ¶ 53 In its order, the court recognized that because C.K. was serving a commitment on other charges, a delay in this case wouldn’t impact his service of that commitment. And the court fashioned a remedy that would preclude the possibility of him serving additional time resulting from a continuance. This sanction also would have effectively reduced the length of C.K.’s time served on his sentence in this case. We also observe that C.K. doesn’t point to anything in the record showing that his ability to defend
28 against the charges was actually compromised by proceeding to trial on the scheduled date. Therefore, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion. 2. Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony a. Additional Background ¶ 54 On December 13, 2023, fifty-four days before C.K.’s trial was set to begin, the prosecution provided a list of witnesses it intended to call at trial. The list included Jessica Suttle, the ATF cellular data and cell tower data analyst. The list didn’t identify Suttle as an expert, and the prosecution didn’t provide any reports made by Suttle in connection with the case. ¶ 55 On January 11, 2024, twenty-five days before trial, the prosecution identified Suttle as an expert witness. That same day, defense counsel filed a motion to exclude Suttle’s testimony. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to endorse Suttle and provide her expert report thirty-five days before trial, as required by Rule 16. At a hearing on January 22, C.K.’s counsel also argued that, without the report, counsel couldn’t effectively cross-examine Suttle.
29 ¶ 56 The court issued an order agreeing with C.K.’s counsel that the prosecution had failed to meet its obligation to disclose Suttle’s report. To cure the deficiency, the court required the prosecution to submit the report by January 26, 2024. Instead of excluding Suttle’s testimony, the court said that it would grant a continuance of the entire trial or for Suttle’s testimony if defense counsel wanted one. Defense counsel didn’t request a continuance. b. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶ 57 Under Crim. P. 16, the prosecution must disclose to the defense “(III) [a]ny reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons . . . [and] (VII) [a] written list of the names and addresses of the witnesses then known to the district attorney whom he or she intends to call at trial.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(III), (VII). The prosecution must make these disclosures no later than thirty-five days before trial. Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3). ¶ 58 “[E]xclusion [of a witness’s testimony] is a drastic remedy and therefore is strongly disfavored.” Cobb, 962 P.2d at 949. When lesser sanctions, such as a continuance or a recess, will cure the
30 prejudice to the defendant, “the trial court should go no further in crafting a sanction to address a due process violation.” Dist. Ct., 808 P.2d at 837 (citing People v. Dist. Ct., 793 P.2d 163, 168-69 (Colo. 1990)). ¶ 59 We review a trial court’s discovery sanction for an abuse of discretion. People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 10. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. c. Analysis ¶ 60 C.K. contends that the trial court’s offer of a total or partial continuance was insufficient because “C.K.’s agreement with a continuance would have meant waiving his right to a speedy trial.” We conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion. ¶ 61 C.K. first argues that the prosecution failed to endorse Suttle as an expert prior to the deadline. But Rule 16 doesn’t require the prosecution to endorse a witness as an expert. People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 930 (Colo. App. 2011). And, as C.K. concedes, the defense was aware before the deadline that Suttle would testify about the cell phone data.
31 ¶ 62 C.K. also argues that the prosecution failed to provide Suttle’s written report until eleven days before trial and that excluding Suttle’s testimony was the proper remedy for that violation. As noted, Rule 16 did require disclosure of any such report at least thirty-five days before trial. But while the prosecution disclosed Suttle’s report late, the disclosure wasn’t so egregiously late that it prejudiced C.K.’s defense. See Lee, 18 P.3d at 198. And the burden on C.K.’s counsel wasn’t such that exclusion of Suttle’s testimony was the least drastic alternative. A continuance would have provided C.K.’s counsel with additional time to prepare for a cross-examination and ensured that the court could continue its truth-finding purpose. See id. (“[T]here was no indication that a further continuance would have been inadequate to compensate for any violation or would have unfairly prejudiced the defendant.”). Thus, the court didn’t abuse its discretion. III. Disposition ¶ 63 We affirm the judgment. JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.
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