Friends of the Earth U.S. and Justica Ambiental v. Export-Import Bank of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 2026 Decided August 18, 2026

No. 25-5387

F
RIENDS OF THE EARTH U.S. AND JUSTICA AMBIENTAL,
APPELLANTS

v.

E
XPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:25-cv-02235)

Richard L. Herz argued the cause for appellants. With him
on the briefs were Tamara A. Morgenthau, Lindsay A. Bailey,
and Michelle C. Harrison.

McKaye L. Neumeister, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for federal appellees. With her on the
brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, and
August E. Flentje, Attorney. Michael S. Raab and John
Starcher, Attorneys, and Johnny H. Walker III, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, entered appearances.

Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for intervenor-
appellee. With him on the brief were Nicholas L. Schlossman,
Andrew D. Prins, Stacey L. VanBelleghem, Rachael L.

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Westmoreland, and Jonathan L. Williams.

Before: M
ILLETT and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge C
HILDS.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
Senior Circuit Judge R
ANDOLPH.

CHILDS, Circuit Judge: As the federal government’s
official export and import credit agency, the Export-Import
Bank of the United States (Eximbank) agreed to loan up to $5
billion to fund a project to capitalize on a natural gas reserve in
Mozambique. Within two years after Eximbank reached that
agreement to loan the initial sum, the Mozambique Liquefied
Natural Gas Project (the Project) halted production following
insurgent attacks that affected the Project’s site and
surrounding communities. When Eximbank approved the
Project to restart, Friends of the Earth U.S. and Justiça
Ambiental (together, Appellants) sought a preliminary
injunction to halt the disbursement of any loan funds and void
any further obligation owed by the United States. The district
court denied Appellants’ preliminary injunction motion,
concluding that they were unlikely to establish standing for
several of their claims, and, additionally, had failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm the district court’s order.

I.

A.
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (the Bank Act),
ch. 341, § 2, 59 Stat. 526, establishes Eximbank and authorizes

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it to provide “aid in financing . . . to facilitate exports of goods
and services . . . between the United States . . . and any foreign
country . . . and in so doing to contribute to the employment of
United States workers.” 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1). Eximbank
offers a variety of financing instruments to accomplish this end,
including “loans, guarantees, insurance, and credits.” Id. A
five-member board of directors manages Eximbank. See id.
§ 635a(c). Under the Bank Act, Eximbank must comply with
notice-and-comment procedures when “making a
determination” about whether to issue a loan or guarantee—but
only “[i]f,” in its discretion, Eximbank chooses “to conduct a
detailed economic impact analysis or similar study.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 635(e)(7)(B)(i).

As a federal agency, Eximbank is subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See 42 U.S. Code
§ 4332(2)(C). However, according to the Bank Act, Eximbank
is not subject to aspects of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), including its notice-and-comment requirements. See
12 U.S.C. § 635(e)(7)(F) (“This paragraph shall not be
construed to make subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5
applicable to the Bank.”); 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (exempting
from notice-and-comment rulemaking “matter[s] relating to
. . . loans”). The Bank Act does require Eximbank to “provide
a notice and comment period” before its board meets “for the
final consideration of a long-term transaction” valued in excess
of $100 million dollars or if there is a “material change” in an
application for a loan. 12 U.S.C. § 635a(c)(10)(A), (D).

B.

We derive the following background from the factual
record the parties set forth in their preliminary injunction
filings. Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905,
912–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

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In 2012, the Project was launched in Mozambique’s Cabo
Delgado Province after the discovery of 65 trillion cubic feet
of liquefied natural gas in the region. The Project was designed
to gather, process, and export that vast supply. In April 2015,
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation applied to Eximbank for a
direct loan of $5 billion to help finance the Project.

NEPA mandates an environmental impact statement for all
“major Federal actions” that will significantly affect the quality
of the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). “This process
ensures that an agency will consider every significant aspect of
the environmental impact of a proposed action and inform the
public of its analysis.” Mayo v. Reynolds, 875 F.3d 11, 15
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation modified). However, “[n]ot every
agency action requires the preparation of a full [environmental
impact statement].” Id. (citing Duncan’s Point Lot Owners
Ass’n Inc. v. FERC, 522 F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“[F]ederal control and responsibility for an action is not
enough to trigger the EIS requirement.”)).

In response to the Project’s $5 billion loan request,
Eximbank publicized an environmental impact assessment and
solicited comments regarding the Project from both Congress
and the public. Eximbank’s board then approved the loan (the
Agreement). On May 14, 2020, Eximbank’s board approved
an amendment to the Agreement, decreasing the original loan
amount to $4.7 billion, allocating $1.8 billion of that total to
offshore production for the Project, and designating a new
operator for the Project, the French company TotalEnergies EP
Mozambique Area 1, Limitada (TEPMA1).

Since 2017, an ISIS-affiliated insurgency group known as
“Al-Shabab” has destabilized the area surrounding the Project.
In 2020, 2021, and the years since, devastating attacks have
occurred in Mozambican towns near the Project site claiming

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both the lives and livelihoods of numerous civilians.
Particularly important here, in March 2021, Al-Shabab
attacked Palma, a town near the Project site where many
TEPMA1 construction workers lived. Al-Shabab killed an
unknown number of victims and forced others to flee the area.
In addition to the insurgent attacks, reports emerged that
Mozambican government security forces committed abuses
against local civilians, some of which allegedly occurred at
TEPMA1’s facility. On April 26, 2021, due to the escalating
conflict and regional instability, TEPMA1 declared force
majeure and halted work on the Project. This declaration,
according to Appellants, effectively froze the Project’s
funding, preventing Eximbank from disbursing any additional
funds until an amendment was approved.

Several years later, based on information from audits that
the Mozambican government had improved the security
conditions in the Cabo Delgado Province, TEPMA1 wanted to
resume work on the Project and requested another amendment
(the 2025 Amendment) to the terms of the Agreement for that
purpose. The 2025 Amendment “principally extend[ed] certain
dates [out four years] to allow the already-authorized loan to
be disbursed on the Project’s adjusted schedule, and
contain[ed] no material change from the original approval.”
JA247 ¶ 55; see also JA271 ¶ 17 (describing changes to the
loan’s “Final Disbursement Date,” “First Principal Repayment
Date,” “Repayment Dates,” scheduled “Completion Date,”
“certain finance document definitions, covenants, and financial
model assumptions”). Eximbank approved the 2025
Amendment on March 13, 2025, permitting disbursement of
the loan on a revised schedule. Eximbank did not provide a
notice and comment period regarding the 2025 Amendment.

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C.

Friends of the Earth U.S. describes itself as a “champion”
for humanity through the reduction of fossil fuel consumption
and the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. JA119 ¶¶ 7,
8. A central part of Friends of the Earth’s mission is assisting
communities harmed by projects involving the U.S.
government, and it helps those groups by compiling critical
information, offering advice and support on how to convey
their concerns through the public comment apparatus, and, if
need be, by utilizing legal redress mechanisms. Id.; see also
JA120 ¶ 9. Justiça Ambiental has worked as a social activist
organization impacting the Mozambican community through
research initiatives, public comment participation, and
engagement in dispute resolution procedures. JA197 ¶ 3–199
¶ 12. Appellants have provided aid and services to
communities surrounding the Project for over a decade. JA120
¶ 10; JA198 ¶ 9.

Appellants contend that the 2025 Amendment required an
economic impact analysis and notice and comment under the
Bank Act. See JA111 ¶ 23; JA112 ¶ 28; JA209 ¶ 54; see also
12 U.S.C. §§ 635(e)(7)(B), 635a(c)(10)(A), (D). Furthermore,
Appellants state that it is an undisputed material fact that
Eximbank failed to consider the social and environmental
impact restarting the Project would have both locally in
Mozambique and globally, including in the United States.
JA112 ¶ 27. Appellants argue that the resumption of the
Project is guaranteed to intensify local conflict, displace
farmers’ homes, block fishermen’s access to the sea, and
“significantly contribute to climate change,” as Appellants
contend that the estimated emissions from the Project equal “13
million metric tons of CO
2
equivalent” each year. Appellants’
Br. 9. Appellants further assert that the Project’s resurgence
would exacerbate existing problems in the area and render

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Appellants’ services more difficult to administer and less
effective.

D.

On July 14, 2025, Appellants sued Eximbank and its board
members (collectively, Appellees), filing a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the
2025 Amendment violated the APA, NEPA, the Bank Act, and
Eximbank’s own procedures. Appellants contend that
Eximbank failed to comply with the required procedures for
considering a new loan application before approving the
requested extension dates. A week after filing the complaint,
Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction and partial
summary judgment seeking to enjoin Appellees from
disbursing loan funds or requiring further action by the United
States under the Agreement. The district court denied
Appellants’ motion.

The district court concluded that Appellants lacked
standing on their theories of (1) injury arising from the lack of
a notice and comment period for the 2025 Amendment, (2)
injury resulting from a diversion of resources to address an
increased need for their services in response to the Project, and
(3) injury to the legal rights of Mozambicans who receive
Appellants’ services. Concluding that Appellants had shown a
substantial likelihood of standing on their theory of
informational injury regarding Eximbank’s failure to provide
certain economic and/or environmental information, the
district court further held that Appellants had not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits.

Appellants challenge the district court’s decision,
requesting that this court reverse and remand with instructions

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for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction
preventing Eximbank from distributing funds pending
resolution of the merits.

II.

“We have the statutory jurisdiction to review the denial of
a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” Elec.
Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Com., 928 F.3d 95, 100 (D.C. Cir.
2019). “A preliminary injunction ‘is an extraordinary remedy
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’” Hanson v. District of
Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). To
obtain a preliminary injunction, “the movant must show:
(1) ‘he is likely to succeed on the merits,’ (2) ‘he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,’
(3) ‘the balance of equities tips in his favor,’ and (4) issuing ‘an
injunction is in the public interest.’” Id. (quoting Winter, 555
U.S. at 20). We review a district court’s ultimate decision to
deny “a preliminary injunction for [an] abuse of discretion.”
Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718, 726 (D.C. Cir.
2022).

The first factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is the
“most important factor,” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023,
1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014); a movant’s failure to show a likelihood
of success on the merits is alone sufficient to defeat their
motion for a preliminary injunction, Ark Dairy Coop. Ass’n v.
Dep’t of Agric., 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining
that “this court need not proceed to review the other three
preliminary injunction factors” if there is no likelihood of
success on the merits). “In this context, the ‘merits’ on which
[a] plaintiff must show a likelihood of success encompass
[both] substantive theories [and] establishment of jurisdiction.”

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Vilsack, 808 F.3d at 913 (quoting Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d
559, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). And a plaintiff must establish
standing to establish jurisdiction. See Vilsack, 808 F.3d at 913
(citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 563 U.S. 149, 158
(2014)).

As such, we will first analyze Appellants’ claims to
determine whether they have sufficiently established standing.
Then, for only the claims on which Appellants have met their
burden on standing, we determine whether Appellants have
met their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the
merits.

A.

We review the district court’s legal conclusions regarding
standing de novo. Id. (citing Equal Rts. Ctr. v. Post Props.,
Inc., 633 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). “At the
preliminary injunction stage, . . . the plaintiff[s] must make a
‘clear showing’ that [they are] ‘likely’ to establish each
element of standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58
(2024). This court’s precedents dictate that motions for
preliminary injunctions are evaluated “under the heightened
standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment,”
Vilsack, 808 F.3d at 912, such that plaintiffs “must set forth by
affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’” demonstrating
their standing, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 928 F.3d at 104 (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). In other
words, under our precedent, Appellants must put forth specific
facts that demonstrate a substantial likelihood that they have
suffered a cognizable injury, traceable to the challenged
actions, and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. See
Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on
Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

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On appeal, Appellants advance various theories of
organizational standing and informational standing. We
review each in turn.

1.

“[O]rganizations may [assert] standing ‘to sue on their
own behalf for injuries they have sustained.’” FDA v. All. for
Hippocratic Medicine (Alliance), 602 U.S. 367, 393 (2024)
(quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379,
n.19 (1982)). An organization asserts standing by showing
“actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the
alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable
court decision.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Dep’t of Agric. (PETA), 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (quoting Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1138).

Appellants conceptualize organizational standing based on
two injuries: (1) Eximbank denying Appellants a means of
redress by failing to provide them an opportunity to participate
in a notice and comment period regarding the 2025
Amendment, and (2) the increased burden restarting the Project
will cause Appellants in providing their services.

a.

Appellants first assert an injury from Eximbank’s denial
of their participation in a notice and comment period prior to
Eximbank’s approval of the 2025 Amendment. We hold that
this injury, in the absence of a demonstrated harm to the
particularized interests of the Appellants, is insufficient for
standing under Article III.

Perhaps the most basic requirement for an injury-in-fact is
that it “must be both concrete, meaning that it must be real and

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not abstract, and particularized, meaning it must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way and not be a
generalized grievance.” Campaign for Accountability v. Dep’t.
of Just., 155 F.4th 724, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation
modified). Under our precedent, the “mere inability to
comment effectively or fully, in and of itself, does not establish
an actual injury.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. TSA, 429 F.3d
1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. AVX
Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 119 (1st. Cir. 1992)). Instead, Appellants
“must show that the government act performed without the
procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a
particularized interest of the” Appellants. Fla. Audubon Soc’y
v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc); see
also Am. First Legal Found. v. Greer, 153 F.4th 1311, 1314
(D.C. Cir. 2025) (“[T]he ‘deprivation of a procedural right
without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient’ to
confer Article III standing.” (quoting Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009))).

Appellants have not made this required showing. By
arguing that Eximbank never provided any interested party
with the opportunity to participate in notice and comment
concerning the 2025 Amendment, Appellants effectively
conceded that their inability to engage in notice and comment
was not particularized to them. This concession is dispositive
because “general interests common to all members of the
public” are not particularized injuries. Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (citation modified). For
Eximbank’s conduct to have produced a sufficiently
particularized injury, Appellants needed to demonstrate how
their inability to engage in notice and comment created a
distinct risk to one of their particularized interests. Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 429 F.3d at 1135.

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Instead, Appellants argue that the character of their injury,
being denied a means of redress by an agency, already satisfies
the particularization element because the mechanism they were
denied would “enable parties to prevent or remedy specific
harms to specific people.” Appellants’ Br. 23. This assertion
is derived from a misplaced reliance on PETA. In PETA, an
animal rights group was forced to expend its own resources in
investigating and responding to reports of bird abuse because
the USDA had refused to act for over a decade after Congress
amended the Animal Welfare Act to include protections for
certain birds. 797 F.3d at 1090–91. We held that PETA
suffered a concrete injury in fact because had the USDA acted
as it had promised, PETA would have been able to file a
complaint and trigger the USDA to “dispatch[] an inspector to
the facility at issue to determine if any [Animal Welfare Act]
violations are occurring.” Id. at 1095 (quotation marks
omitted). Without that ability to file a complaint and trigger a
USDA inspection, PETA had to investigate and respond to
reported instances of bird abuse and “obtain appropriate and
necessary relief for” the birds using its own resources and
without the heft of the USDA’s enforcement authority. Id. at
1095–96 (quotation marks omitted).

Appellants have shown no such direct impact from their
inability to participate in notice and comment on the 2025
Amendment. While Appellants contend that their inability to
partake in notice and comment prevents them from raising
various concerns of local community members, mere denial of
an opportunity to raise local peoples’ concerns “sound[s] in
pure issue advocacy.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 892 F.3d
1249, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Appellants have established no
other direct injury from their inability to comment and voice
those concerns. PETA’s injury, meanwhile, was not merely a
denial of a means of redress, but instead an obstacle to its
ability to carry out its mission of bringing violations of the

13

Animal Welfare Act to the attention of the USDA, and to
having the USDA address the reported bird abuse. See PETA,
797 F.3d at 1094–95.

As it stands, Appellants’ inability to participate in notice
and comment is merely an “injury to its advocacy,” which
alone is insufficient to demonstrate organizational standing.
See Ctr. for L. and Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152,
1162 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (observing that it “would eviscerate
standing doctrine’s actual injury requirement” if the court held
that “a lobbyist/advocacy group had standing to challenge
government policy with no injury other than injury to its
advocacy” (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739–
40 (1972))); see, e.g., Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(explaining that standing is not conferred just because an
organization has a longstanding, abstract interest in a problem
or is qualified to evaluate it (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
739)).

Thus, we hold that Appellants’ inability to participate in
notice and comment is insufficient to meet Article III’s injury-
in-fact requirement because it is a purely procedural injury that
is shared by all members of the public rather than the
particularized injury to Appellants that precedent requires.

b.

Appellants next assert an injury based on the increased
burden to their services caused by the Project. According to
Appellants, the Project will displace individuals, who will then
seek assistance from Appellants “in greater numbers.”
Appellants’ Br. 31. Even if the court presumes that the
increased demand for Appellants’ services is a concrete and
particularized injury-in-fact, this assertion nonetheless does not

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satisfy the causation prong of standing. Specifically, it either
fails to demonstrate a causal connection between the actions of
Eximbank to the burden on Appellants’ services or requires us
to presume too many steps connecting said actions and said
burden.

In assessing the causation prong of standing, we consider
the number of “links in the chain of causation,” which may not
be “too speculative or too attenuated.” Alliance, 602 U.S. at
383 (citation modified); see also Indus. Energy Consumers of
Am. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 1156, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“A
‘highly attenuated chain of possibilities’ predicated on
‘guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will
exercise their judgment’ does not establish Article III
standing.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 410, 413 (2013))). A causal chain is too speculative
“where it is not sufficiently predictable how third parties would
react to government action or cause downstream injury to
plaintiffs.” Alliance, 602 U.S. at 383 (citing, e.g., Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757–759 (1984)). A causal chain’s links
are too attenuated, meanwhile, “where the government action
is so far removed from its distant (even if predictable) ripple
effects.” Id. Here, because there are so many steps in between
Eximbank approving the 2025 Amendment and the burden on
Appellants’ services, we hold that the causation chain is simply
too attenuated to support Article III standing.

Appellants divide their assertion of standing based on a
burden to their services into two categories: Project-related
injuries and conflict-related injuries.

Beginning with Project-related injuries, Appellants posit
that re-starting the Project’s construction in light of the 2025
Amendment will itself cause a burden on their services. The
specific harms Appellants identify are twofold, that (1)

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community members currently seeking redress from past
seizure of land are “less likely” to receive compensation now,
and (2) Appellants will have to help additional families “whose
lands will be seized because of the restart” of construction on
the Project. Appellants’ Br. 33. However, neither of these
claims can serve to satisfy the causation prong of standing
because Appellants never actually demonstrate how the alleged
harm either derives from Eximbank’s relevant actions or
affects the Appellants themselves.

As for the alleged compensation harm, it is neither self-
evident, nor do Appellants adequately explain how the
likelihood of compensation for land lost to the Project’s
construction is affected in any way by the 2025 Amendment’s
resetting of disbursement dates. The relevant inquiry regarding
causation is the existence of a “line of causation between the
illegal conduct and the injury.” Alliance, 602 U.S. at 383
(citation modified). Therefore, the conduct under review in
this case is not the Project itself or the consequences of pipeline
construction. While said construction and its effects may serve
as links in a potential chain of causation, that line must
inevitably lead back to the conduct Appellants actually seek to
challenge, the 2025 Amendment. Since Appellants have not
demonstrated how the line of causation leads back to the action
being reviewed, this alleged injury cannot satisfy standing.
Additionally, even if Appellants had properly articulated a
causal relationship, they still do not connect the disbursement
schedule to any harm to themselves as organizations or how
community members’ underpayment will harm Appellants.

Appellants fare similarly with respect to the increase in
land seizures. When it comes to predictive harm involving the
government, a plaintiff must show that the government action
being challenged would likely cause the alleged injury in fact.
See id. at 385. At present, Appellants have not shown on this

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record a substantial likelihood of that harm occurring. The
Managing Director of TEPMA1 in Mozambique attested that
“[b]y February 2025, the Project completed its resettlement,
providing all 643 displaced households with new homes.”
JA246 ¶ 49. While that past displacement is traceable to the
original Agreement for Eximbank to fund the Project’s
construction back in 2019, Appellants have not shown how the
displacement is traceable to the 2025 Amendment which merely
permitted the disbursement of Eximbank funds on a new
schedule.

Similar problems plague Appellants’ conflict-related
claims. Here, Appellants assert a chain of causation, akin to
the chain detailed above, but with the added assumption that
resuming the Project will incite greater violence in the region.
Specifically, they claim the Project’s resumption will draw the
attention of insurgent forces, who may then target surrounding
communities; which, in turn, would force the Project’s staff to
isolate themselves by creating a security enclave around the
site, which, while protecting themselves and the Project, will
leave nearby villages even more vulnerable to insurgents.
Appellants add that, even if the Project does not incite violence,
provision of their services will still be more difficult because
increased demand will require more frequent travel to an
already unsafe and unstable region. This increased risk, they
continue, would further endanger Appellants’ staff and
potentially prevent them from providing services at all in
certain areas, should the danger become too great. These
claims are far too attenuated to satisfy the causation
requirement as they rely not only on the Project’s restart, but
upon the decisions of an Islamic insurgency organization, the
Mozambican government, and the civilians affected by them.
Again, even assuming the harm is predictable, the insertion of
additional third parties between the approval of the 2025
Amendment and the harm makes the injury too attenuated.

17

In summation, neither of the theories Appellants propose
show how Eximbank’s approval of the 2025 Amendment
“directly affect[s] and interfere[s] with [Appellants’] core
business activities.” Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395. Even if the
Project’s restart is causing harm to its neighbors, as Appellants
allege, that framing, on its face, only explains how the Project
directly harms those in the causal chain, but not the burden on
Appellants’ services. Accordingly, we hold that Appellants
have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of
organizational standing to challenge the approval of the 2025
Amendment because it might cause a burden to their services.

2.

We next consider Appellants’ informational standing
arguments.

For organizations, informational standing exists to allow
them to gain access to information to which the law entitles
them; and there is an injury from the denial of access to
statutorily mandated information. See Comm. on Judiciary of
U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 766
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that
when a person seeks to obtain information the government is
required to disclose, the denial of the information is a concrete
injury for standing purposes.”). To establish informational
standing, a plaintiff must show both (1) a statutory entitlement
to the requested information and (2) that the alleged harm from
the lack of information falls within the category of interests
Congress intended to protect through the relevant disclosure
requirement. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–22 (1998).

More recent precedent crystallizes the contours of an
informational standing injury. For instance, as we have
explained, “the existence and scope of an injury for

18

informational standing purposes is defined by Congress,” such
that a plaintiff seeking to establish informational standing
generally “need not allege any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified.” Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828
F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016)). Under that framework, a plaintiff
adequately alleges a concrete and particularized informational
injury where it claims “that: (1) it has been deprived of
information that, on its interpretation, a statute requires the
government or a third party to disclose to it, and (2) it suffers,
by being denied access to that information, the type of harm
Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure.” Id.

Appellants’ theories of informational standing can be
divided based on their purported entitlement to (1) Eximbank’s
economic analyses and (2) Eximbank’s NEPA and
environmental analyses. Again, we address each theory in turn.

a.

We first review Appellants’ claim that the Bank Act
required Eximbank to prepare and disclose an updated 2025
economic analysis, but failed to do either. On this claim,
Appellants have failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood
of standing because they cannot show the first part of the
inquiry: that disclosure of the information sought is statutorily
required.

In Jewell, we held that a plaintiff failed to establish “the
first part of the inquiry, the sine qua non of informational
injury: [by] seeking to enforce a statutory deadline provision
that by its terms does not require the public disclosure of
information.” 828 F.3d at 992. Crucially, the statute there did
not impose any obligations to disclose “any information
whatsoever.” Id. at 993. Thus, although the first inquiry is

19

generally stated as requiring a plaintiff to allege that “it has
been deprived of information that, on its interpretation, a
statute requires the government or a third party to disclose to
it,” our precedent instructs us that we need not accept a
plaintiff’s interpretation if it is facially incorrect. See id. at 992
(emphasis added).

Like the statute in Jewell, the Bank Act’s text,
unambiguously creates no statutory right to economic analyses
and reports. Instead, the Bank Act only requires publication of
disclosure of the information, through publication of notice,
“[i]f . . . the Bank intends to conduct a detailed economic
impact analysis.” 12 U.S.C. § 635(e)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis
added). Moreover, the statute leaves the creation of such
information to the bank’s discretion in describing the
substantive requirements of an economic impact analysis: “[i]f
. . . the Bank conducts a detailed economic impact analysis . . .
[it] shall include consideration of . . . the views of the public.”
Id. § 635(e)(7)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). In this case, there is
no record evidence that any such analysis was done by
Eximbank. Without the requisite statutory mandate,
Appellants cannot claim harm from the lack of disclosure. Cf.
Jewell, 828 F.3d at 994 (collecting cases in which the court
found a statutory disclosure requirement).

Perhaps recognizing that there is no statutory entitlement
to the information, Appellants unavailingly point to
Eximbank’s internal guidelines. According to Appellants,
because these guidelines were promulgated under 12 U.S.C.
§ 635a-2’s requirement for Eximbank to implement regulations
and procedures to ensure full consideration of the adverse
economic effects of its financing, they require Eximbank to
conduct an economic impact analysis. But Appellants failed to
raise this argument that they had a right under the regulations
to additional economic analyses before the district court.

20

Arguments not raised in front of the district court are forfeited
on appeal absent “exceptional circumstances” not pleaded here.
Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir.
2019); see also Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th
1230, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding that a plaintiff who fails
to “make any explicit arguments . . . in the initial preliminary
injunction motion,” has forfeited those arguments on appeal).

By the terms of the Bank Act, any statutory entitlement to
the economic information that Appellants seek only vested “if”
Eximbank, in its sole discretion, opted to conduct a detailed
economic impact analysis. 12 U.S.C. § 635(e)(7)(A). But
Eximbank did not conduct a detailed economic impact analysis
for the 2025 Amendment, as it had done in 2019 for the original
loan approval. Therefore, Appellants do not have a statutory
right to the economic information for the purposes of
informational standing and fail to establish the inquiry’s “sine
qua non.” Jewell, 828 F.3d at 992; see also Elec. Priv. Info.
Ctr., 878 F.3d at 377 (“The plaintiff [alleging informational
standing] must show that . . . it has been deprived of
information that, on its interpretation, a statute requires the
government or a third party to disclose to it.” (emphasis added)
(citation modified)).

Accordingly, we hold that Appellants have failed to
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of informational standing
for its claim based on the economic analyses.

b.

We next consider whether Appellants establish
informational standing based on Eximbank’s failure to provide
environmental and NEPA-related disclosures (hereinafter
environmental information). This claim is governed by the
same two-part framework used for the economic analyses: a

21

statutory entitlement and a category of interests requirement.
The second prong is context-dependent, turning on the “nature
of the statutory disclosure provision at issue.” Jewell, 828 F.3d
at 992. The plaintiff must submit factual support showing that
the nondisclosure caused it to suffer the type of harm that
Congress intended to guard against in mandating disclosure.
Id.; see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 21–23 (applying the same
standard as in Jewell but to a motion for summary judgment,
which shares evidentiary standards with preliminary injunction
motions). As pertinent to Appellants’ environmental
information claim, we have also long held that informational
injury, in the context of NEPA, must be connected to a
“particular agency action” about which information was
deprived and from which a concrete and particularized injury
flowed. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 87 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).

The record supports the district court’s determination that
Appellants demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
informational standing here. See JA574–75. In reviewing the
standing question, we accept Appellants’ plausible
interpretation of the governing statutes and ask only whether,
under that interpretation, they have established the denial of
information to which they are entitled. See City of Waukesha
v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (observing that
courts, for purposes of standing analysis, “assume that on the
merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims”).

Appellants have made the requisite identification.
Specifically, through a declarant, Appellants demonstrate an
injury to their normal operations by comparing their
performance in response to having information about the
Project in 2016 with what they were unable to accomplish
based on Eximbank’s failure to provide information in relation
to the 2025 Amendment. See JA122 ¶ 18–JA123 ¶ 19.

22

Although their declarant did not do so, Appellants identified
statutory provisions requiring the public disclosure of
environmental information (i.e., Environmental and Social
Impact Assessments, NEPA materials, monitoring reports, and
related information) in their complaint, and they alleged that
Eximbank failed to make such materials available in
connection with the 2025 Amendment. See Compl. ¶ 56 (citing
12 U.S.C. § 635i-5(a)(1) (mandating that Eximbank “establish
procedures” that “shall provide for the public disclosure of
environmental assessments and supplemental environmental
reports required to be submitted to the Bank”)); id. ¶ 66 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring preparation of an
environmental impact statement)).

The Bank Act’s statutory scheme reinforces the
importance of disclosure in this context. See 12 U.S.C. § 635i-
5(a)(1). Congress has directed that Eximbank “shall establish
procedures to take into account the potential beneficial and
adverse environmental effects of goods and services for which
support is requested under its direct lending and guarantee
programs.” Id. Those procedures must “provide for the public
disclosure of environmental assessments and supplemental
environmental reports required to be submitted to the Bank,
including remediation or mitigation plans and procedures, and
related monitoring reports.” Id. (emphasis added).

Again, through their declarant, Appellants present
evidence that these categories of information are the very
sources they ordinarily rely upon and share with their clients
and partner communities. JA130 ¶¶ 43–46. They further show
that Eximbank’s failure to disclose forced them to undertake
independent factfinding to obtain comparable information.
JA131 ¶¶ 47–48. This factual record is sufficient to establish
the requisite deprivation.

23

Appellants have likewise submitted plausible factual
support for their claim that Eximbank’s nondisclosure caused
the type of harm Congress sought to prevent. The disclosure
requirements at issue reflect a legislative judgment that access
to environmental and related information enables interested
parties to understand, evaluate, and respond to the
consequences of agency-supported projects. See Dep’t of
Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768–70 (2004)
(describing the purposes of NEPA’s disclosure requirements).
Through their statement of undisputed facts and supporting
declaration, Appellants substantiate that the absence of such
information has impaired their ability to carry out their
organizational missions, including advising and supporting
communities in Mozambique affected by those projects. See
JA116 ¶¶ 46–51; JA130 ¶ 44–JA131 ¶ 48; see also Akins, 524
U.S. at 21 (acknowledging that the Court had “no reason to
doubt [plaintiffs’] claim that the information would help them
(and others to whom they would communicate it)”). Further,
there is no requirement that we substitute our own independent
investigation for information that Congress decided must be
publicly disclosed. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (after asking the
question about the injury, the Court conducted no further
inquiry). Based on the record before us, we have no basis to
second-guess Appellants’ assertions.

Appellants have also adequately established causation and
redressability. See, e.g., Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th
781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (explaining that because the injury
was the inability to obtain information, causation and
redressability were easily satisfied). Their alleged injury is
traceable to Eximbank’s failure to disclose the information in
question. See JA116 ¶ 49; JA130 ¶ 44. And a favorable
decision, such as vacatur of the 2025 Amendment and further
proceedings consistent with Eximbank’s disclosure
obligations, could redress that injury. See JA129 ¶ 139.

24

Appellants, therefore, have carried their burden to show a
substantial likelihood of standing on their environmental
information claims.

B.

Because Appellants have demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of standing to seek environmental information, we
next consider their likelihood of success on the merits of the
corresponding claims. See Vilsack, 808 F.3d at 913 (explaining
that likelihood of success encompasses “substantive theories”
and “jurisdiction”).

Appellants have not carried their burden of demonstrating
a likelihood of success on the merits on their NEPA claim for
one reason: NEPA excludes “extraterritorial activities or
decisions, which means agency activities or decisions with
effects located entirely outside of the jurisdiction of the United
States.” 42 U.S.C. § 4336e(10)(B)(vi) (emphasis added). And
the record reflects that the Project is located entirely overseas
in Mozambique, and it is in that foreign setting in Southeastern
Africa that its environmental consequences will be felt. See,
e.g., JA241 ¶¶ 12–13; JA286–92; JA296–99.
To be sure, Appellants contend that the Project may give
rise to indirect domestic effects, particularly through increased
carbon emissions. However, that contention alone does not
suffice to bring the Project within NEPA’s ambit. The
Supreme Court has made clear that NEPA applies only where
there exists a “reasonably close causal relationship” between
the challenged action and the alleged effects within the United
States. See Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle County,
605 U.S. 168, 188 (2025).

25

On the present record, Appellants have not shown that
such a causal nexus exists. The asserted downstream or
attenuated effects in the United States do not establish the kind
of causation NEPA requires. Cf. Seven Cnty. Infrastructure
Coal., 605 U.S. at 190 (“NEPA calls for the agency to focus on
the environmental effects of the project itself, not on the
potential environmental effects of future or geographically
separate projects.”); Sierra Club v. FERC, 145 F.4th 74, 89
(D.C. Cir. 2025) (explaining that courts should be deferential
to agencies because NEPA is concerned with “the effects of the
project at hand, but not the effects of projects separate in time
or place” (quoting Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal., 605 U.S.
at 189)); 12 C.F.R. § 408.3 (recognizing that “[h]istorically,
virtually all financing provided by Eximbank has been in aid of
U.S. exports which involve no effects on the quality of the
environment within the United States, its territories or
possessions”). Accordingly, Appellants have not demonstrated
a likelihood of success on their NEPA-based informational
claim.
Appellants fare no better with respect to their claim for
environmental information under Eximbank’s Environmental
and Social Due Diligence Procedures. Those procedures
impose a disclosure obligation on Eximbank only in defined
and limited circumstances. Specifically, they require
Eximbank to “make available Environmental and Social
Management Plans prepared for projects and supplemental
environmental reports . . . that it requires the borrower to
submit.” Environmental and Social Due Diligence Procedures
§ 9.3 (emphasis added).
*
The text thus limits the disclosure
obligation to the Environmental and Social Management Plans
and supplemental environmental reports that the borrower is

*
Environmental and Social Due Diligence Procedures and
Guidelines, https://perma.cc/98CK-QCS6 at 6.

26

required to submit to Eximbank. Here, however, Appellants do
not allege that TEPMA1, as the borrower, has submitted any
Environmental and Social Management Plans or supplemental
environmental reports to the Bank related to the 2025
Amendment. In the absence of such a submission, the
predicate condition for disclosure has not been satisfied, and
Eximbank’s obligation is not triggered.
*****
We need not address the remaining preliminary injunction
factors in this case. On the record before us, Appellants are
unable to demonstrate either Article III standing or success on
the merits of those claims for which they have standing. Ark
Dairy Coop. Ass’n, 573 F.3d at 832 (“[T]his court need not
proceed to review the other three preliminary injunction
factors” if there is “no likelihood of success on the merits.”).
*****
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction.
So ordered.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
The majority rejects on the merits plaintiffs’ claim that the
National Environmental Policy Act entitles Friends of the
Earth to the environmental information it seeks. But plaintiffs
have not carried—and cannot carry—their burden of
establishing standing to press that claim. As a result, the
complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
Informational standing under NEPA can exist only when
“the information sought relates to environmental interests that
NEPA was intended to protect.” Competitive Enter. Inst. v.
NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs’ claim
founders on that limitation because they seek information
about effects that Congress has expressly excluded from
NEPA’s reach.
In the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Congress
amended NEPA’s definition of “major Federal action” to
exclude “extraterritorial activities or decisions”—that is,
“agency activities or decisions with effects located entirely
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States.” Pub. L. No.
118-5, div. C, tit. III, § 321(b), 137 Stat. 10, 45-46 (2023)
(adding, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4336–4336e). Plaintiffs seek
to avoid that territorial limitation by observing that
“greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere” and that
“[e]missions from anywhere affect everyone.” Friends of the
Earth Br. 59. That is insufficient.
NEPA does not treat every consequence that might be
traced to an agency action, however remotely, as an “effect”
of that action. Rather, “effects” under NEPA are bounded by
“a reasonably close causal relationship”—a requirement like
the “familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law”—
between the agency action and the effect. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting

2
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,
460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)); see also Seven Cnty. Infrastructure
Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 187-88 (2025)
(reaffirming that NEPA does not encompass effects extending
down causal chains that are “too attenuated” (quoting
Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 774)).
Plaintiffs’ theory rests on precisely the kind of attenuated
causal chain that NEPA does not reach. They assert that the
Project will result in an “estimated” 13 million metric tons of
2
CO emissions and thereby “significantly contribute to climate
change.” Friends of the Earth Br. 9. That assertion is not
simply unproven—it cannot possibly be proven. Any net
effect on emissions turns on inherently unknowable market
responses affecting production and consumption, the
independent decisions of foreign purchasers, the operations of
foreign facilities, the dispersion of emissions through the
global atmosphere, and the climate’s response over time. See
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Energy, 134 F.4th 568, 574 (D.C. Cir.
2025). This is a matter of “Knightian uncertainty,” not one
that can be reduced to a reliable estimate. Id. A causal chain
dependent on so many intervening variables, independent
actors, and uncertain consequences is the paradigmatic remote
ripple beyond NEPA’s effects inquiry. See id. at 575 (“[T]he
impacts of downstream emissions in foreign countries are not
reasonably foreseeable and so any alleged failure to quantify
those impacts does not amount to a violation of NEPA.”).
Because plaintiffs identify no cognizable domestic effect
attributable to the challenged agency action, the information
they seek does not relate to an environmental interest that
NEPA protects. Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to pursue
their NEPA claim and their complaint should be dismissed in
its entirety. See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Com., 928
F.3d 95, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f, in reviewing the denial

3
of a preliminary injunction, we determine that a litigant
cannot establish standing as a matter of law, the proper course
is to remand the case for dismissal.”).