United States of America v. Juvenile Male

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
J UVENILE M ALE,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10257
D.C. No.
4:12-cr-01126-
CJK-JR-1
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2018
San Francisco, California
Filed August 14, 2018
Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit
Judges, and Ivan L.R. Lemelle,* Senior District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Lemelle
* The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, Senior United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 18 --

2 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
SUMMARY**
Criminal Law
The panel vacated a 34-month term of official detention
imposed following revocation of a juvenile delinquent
supervision, and remanded for the district court to order the
defendant’s immediate release.
Construing 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5), the panel held that
the duration of previously ordered terms of official detention
is subtracted from the maximum term of official detention
that can be imposed upon revocation of juvenile delinquent
supervision, including when the juvenile is more than 21
years old at the time of the revocation proceedings.
COUNSEL
David W. Basham (argued), Tucson, Arizona, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Robert L. Miskell (argued), Appellate Chief; Raquel
Arellano, Assistant United States Attorney; Elizabeth A.
Strange, First Assistant United States Attorney; United
States Attorney’s Office, Tucson, Arizona; for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

-- 2 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 3
OPINION
LEMELLE, Senior District Judge:
Juvenile Defendant-Appellant D.A.T. appeals the
district court’s imposition of a 34-month term of official
detention following revocation of Appellant’s juvenile
delinquent supervision. Appellant argues that his term of
official detention exceeded the statutory maximum
established in 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5). Because we agree,
we vacate the sentence and remand with instructions that the
district court order Appellant’s immediate release.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
In August 2009, when Appellant was 15 years old, he
and two other individuals killed R.O. on the Tohono
O’odham Nation. Appellant was arrested by tribal
authorities and remained in tribal custody until he was
transferred to federal custody in June 2012, shortly after the
government charged Appellant with first degree murder in a
one count information. In January 2013, Appellant reached
a plea agreement with the government and pled guilty to
second-degree murder, as charged in an amended
information. The statutory maximum sentence was five
years of official detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2)(A).
On April 2, 2013, the district court sentenced Appellant to
28 months of official detention, followed by juvenile
delinquent supervision until Appellant’s 21st birthday.
Appellant was released from detention on June 25, 2014,
at the age of 20. But in November 2014, a warrant was
issued for Appellant’s arrest because he violated the
conditions of his juvenile delinquent supervision. As part of
a Juvenile Revocation Disposition Agreement with the

-- 3 of 18 --

4 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
government, Appellant admitted to two violations of his
juvenile delinquent supervision conditions—commission of
various crimes and use of controlled substances. In October
2015, the district court revoked Appellant’s juvenile
delinquent supervision and sentenced him to nine months of
official detention for each violation, to be served
consecutively, followed by 42 months of juvenile delinquent
supervision.
Appellant was released from detention on July 29, 2016,
at the age of 22. In September 2016, a second warrant was
issued for Appellant’s arrest, again because Appellant
violated the conditions of his juvenile delinquent
supervision. In April 2017, Appellant admitted to two
violations (failure to notify probation of contact with law
enforcement and consumption of alcoholic beverages)
without a plea agreement. In May 2017, the district court
revoked Appellant’s juvenile delinquent supervision and
sentenced him to 34 months of official detention for each
violation, to be served concurrently, with no term of juvenile
delinquent supervision to follow. Appellant did not object
at the hearing, but timely appealed his sentence.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s
revocation proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and
5031–5037. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
The parties disagree about whether we should review de
novo or for plain error. Regardless of which standard

-- 4 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 5
applies, the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum
permitted by law.1
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents a question of statutory
interpretation. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(FJDA) governs the adjudication of juvenile delinquency in
federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–5042. When a
district court finds a juvenile to be a juvenile delinquent, the
FJDA empowers the district court to impose a term of
official detention, followed by a term of juvenile delinquent
supervision. See id. § 5037(a), (c), (d). The FJDA also
empowers the district court to revoke juvenile delinquent
supervision if a juvenile violates a condition of supervision,
and to impose a new term of official detention. See id.
§ 5037(d)(5). In this appeal, the parties dispute the
maximum term of official detention that can be imposed
upon revocation of juvenile delinquent supervision when the
juvenile is more than 21 years old at the time of the
revocation proceeding. To resolve this dispute, we must
examine § 5037(d)(5) of the FJDA.
Section 5037(d)(5) states:
1 See United States v. Goodbear, 676 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that it is plain error to impose a “sentence [that] exceeds the
statutory maximum”); United States v. Juvenile Male, 470 F.3d 939,
940-41 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing juvenile’s sentence under plain error
review because district court used incorrect statute to sentence juvenile,
even though there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on the
issue); United States v. Echavarria-Escobar, 270 F.3d 1265, 1267–68
(9th Cir. 2001) (applying de novo review to “a district court’s
construction and interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines,” even
though no objection was raised in district court (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

-- 5 of 18 --

6 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
If the juvenile violates a condition of
juvenile delinquent supervision at any time
prior to the expiration or termination of the
term of supervision, the court may, after a
dispositional hearing and after considering
any pertinent policy statements promulgated
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994 of title 18, revoke the term of
supervision and order a term of official
detention. The term of official detention
which is authorized upon revocation of
juvenile delinquent supervision shall not
exceed the term authorized in section
5037(c)(2)(A) and (B), less any term of
official detention previously ordered. The
application of sections 5037(c)(2)(A) and (B)
shall be determined based upon the age of the
juvenile at the time of the disposition of the
revocation proceeding. If a juvenile is over
the age of 21 years old at the time of the
revocation proceeding, the mandatory
revocation provisions of section 3565(b) are
applicable. A disposition of a juvenile who is
over the age of 21 years old shall be in
accordance with the provisions of section
5037(c)(2), except that in the case of a
juvenile who if convicted as an adult would
be convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony, no
term of official detention may continue
beyond the juvenile’s 26th birthday, and in
any other case, no term of official detention
may continue beyond the juvenile’s 24th
birthday.

-- 6 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 7
Section 5037(d)(5) references § 5037(c)(2), which provides
the maximum term of official detention that may be imposed
when “a juvenile [is] found to be a juvenile delinquent.” Id.
§ 5037(c). As relevant here, § 5037(c)(2) initially
authorized a five-year term of official detention for
Appellant.2
Section 5037(d)(5) is not a model of clarity with respect
to calculating the maximum term of official detention that
can be imposed when supervision is revoked. Relying on the
unqualified wording of § 5037(d)(5)’s second sentence,
Appellant argues that the duration of previously ordered
terms of official detention is always subtracted from the
maximum term prescribed by § 5037(c)(2). The government
argues that § 5037(d)(5) contains two independent methods
for calculating the maximum term of official detention
following revocation. Pointing to the last two sentences of
the section, the government maintains that juveniles older
than 21 do not receive credit for previously ordered terms of
official detention. Both interpretations are plausible.3
Therefore, § 5037(d)(5) is ambiguous. See United States v.
2 Appellant’s offense would have been a Class A felony if he had
been charged as an adult, and the sentencing guidelines range for a
similarly situated adult exceeded five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2).
3 The United States Probation office relied on each interpretation at
various times during Appellant’s case. Also, the magistrate judge who
conducted the admit/deny hearing and the district judge who conducted
the revocation proceeding described the maximum term of official
detention differently. Whereas the magistrate judge stated that the
maximum term of official detention would be reduced by previously
ordered terms of official detention, the district judge explained that the
maximum term of official detention could extend to Appellant’s 26th
birthday, without any mention of subtracting previously ordered
detention.

-- 7 of 18 --

8 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)
(providing definition).
“If [a] statute’s terms are ambiguous, we may use canons
of construction, legislative history, and the statute’s overall
purpose to illuminate Congress’s intent.” Jonah R. v.
Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2006). We
conclude that Appellant’s construction of § 5037(d)(5) best
reflects the structure of the statute and congressional intent,
while remaining faithful to the purpose of the FJDA.
I. Text and Structure
The structure of § 5037(d)(5) suggests that all juveniles
receive credit for previously ordered terms of official
detention when supervision is revoked. Section 5037(d)(5)
is a single paragraph with no subparts or other internal
divisions. The paragraph begins with the unqualified
statement that a district court “may . . . revoke [a juvenile’s]
term of supervision and order a term of official detention”
when a “juvenile violates a condition of . . . supervision.”
18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5). The next sentence states, again
without qualification, that the term of official detention
imposed “shall not exceed the term authorized in section
5037(c)(2)(A) and (B), less any term of official detention
previously ordered.” Id.
But, by its own terms, § 5037(c)(2) applies only “in the
case of a juvenile who is between eighteen and twenty-one
years old.” And the third sentence of § 5037(d)(5) states that
the district court must use “the age of the juvenile at the time
of the disposition of the revocation proceeding” when
applying § 5037(c)(2). Therefore, § 5037(c)(2) and the first
two sentences of § 5037(d)(5) leave a crucial question
unanswered: how does a district court revoke supervision
when a juvenile is more than 21 years old at the time of the

-- 8 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 9
revocation proceeding? The last two sentences of
§ 5037(d)(5) answer that question. Per the penultimate
sentence, revocation of supervision is mandatory when
juveniles older than 21 commit certain serious violations. Id.
(referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)). The last sentence
instructs the district court to use § 5037(c)(2) to calculate the
maximum term of official detention after revocation, even
when a juvenile is older than 21 at the revocation
proceeding. Id.
As previously discussed, the parties dispute the
significance of the last sentence of § 5037(d)(5). Whereas
Appellant argues that the last sentence supplements, but does
not displace, the section’s first three sentences, the
government argues that the last sentence creates an
independent method of calculating the maximum term of
official detention for juveniles who are over the age of 21 at
their revocation proceedings. The government’s argument
primarily relies on the definition of the term “juvenile.” The
government points to the definitional section of the FJDA,
which states that, “for the purpose of proceedings and
disposition under th[e] [FJDA] for an alleged act of juvenile
delinquency,” “a ‘juvenile’ . . . is a person who has not
attained his twenty-first birthday.” Id. § 5031. Based on this
definition, the government argues that Appellant was not a
“juvenile” at the time of the revocation proceeding and was,
therefore, not entitled credit for previously ordered terms of
official detention.
But the government’s attempt to separate § 5037(d)(5)
into its constituent parts runs counter to the natural reading
of the statute. Section 5037 repeatedly uses the phrase, “a
juvenile who is over the age of 21 years old.” Id. § 5037(b),
(d)(5), (d)(6). This phrase suggests that, at least for purposes
of § 5037, a defendant can be a “juvenile” and over the age

-- 9 of 18 --

10 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
of 21 at the same time. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014) (“[A] statutory term—even one
defined in the statute—may take on distinct characters from
association with distinct statutory objects calling for
different implementation strategies.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); cf. United States v. Olsen, 856 F.3d 1216,
1223 (9th Cir. 2017) (presumption that statutory definition
controls use of term “may yield to context” “[i]f interpreting
a term consistently with its statutory definition would, for
instance, lead to ‘obvious incongruities’ or would ‘destroy
one of the major congressional purposes’” of the statute
(alteration omitted)) (quoting Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit &
S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949)).
Considering Appellant a juvenile for purposes of § 5037
is also consistent with our analysis in United States v. LKAV,
712 F.3d 436, 444 (9th Cir. 2013), where we concluded that
juveniles over the age of 21 remain “subject to” the FJDA as
long as the district court had jurisdiction when the
information was filed.
Moreover, the government’s proposed construction fails
to account for the fact that only the first sentence of
§ 5037(d)(5) authorizes revocation of supervision and
imposition of official detention. If, as the government
suggests, the first sentence of § 5037(d)(5) applies only to
juveniles who are under the age of 21 at their revocation
proceedings, then there would be no statutory authorization
to revoke Appellant’s supervision. That is certainly not the
government’s position, and the resulting inability to revoke
Appellant’s supervision would be an “obvious
incongruit[y]” that “destroy[s] one of the major
congressional purposes” of the 2002 amendments to the
FJDA. See Lawson, 336 U.S. at 201; see also H.R. Rep. No.
107-685, at 218 (2002) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that the

-- 10 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 11
FJDA was amended to “provide[] authority to sanction a
violation of probation when a person adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent is over 21 at the time of the violation”). The
government offers no persuasive rationale for considering
appellant a “juvenile” for purposes of the first sentence of
§ 5037(d)(5), but not the second.
Appellant’s proposed construction is more faithful to the
text and structure of § 5037(d)(5) because it explains that the
last two sentences of the section supplement the general
framework established by the first three sentences of the
section. The general framework is that: (1) supervision can
be revoked for violating conditions of supervision, and
official detention can be imposed upon revocation; (2) the
maximum term of official detention is provided by
§ 5037(c)(2), subject to reduction for previously ordered
terms of official detention; and (3) application of
§ 5037(c)(2) depends on the juvenile’s age at the time of the
revocation proceeding. The modifications that apply when a
juvenile is older than 21 at the revocation proceeding are:
(1) certain serious violations of supervision conditions
trigger mandatory revocation; and (2) the maximum term of
official detention is provided by § 5037(c)(2), subject to
certain age limits.
But simply reading § 5037(d)(5) as a whole, instead of
as two independent pieces, does not fully resolve the parties’
dispute. The question remains whether the last sentence of
§ 5037(d)(5) alters the operation of the section’s second
sentence by implicitly eliminating credit for previously
ordered terms of official detention when a juvenile is older
than 21 at the revocation proceeding. The last clause of
§ 5037(d)(5) reads:
except that in the case of a juvenile who if
convicted as an adult would be convicted of

-- 11 of 18 --

12 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
a Class A, B, or C felony, no term of official
detention may continue beyond the juvenile’s
26th birthday, and in any other case, no term
of official detention may continue beyond the
juvenile’s 24th birthday.
This clause appears two other times in § 5037.
In § 5037(b), which governs the revocation of probation,
and in § 5037(d)(6), which governs the imposition of
juvenile delinquent supervision after revocation of a
previous term of supervision, the clause serves to limit the
district court’s authority to detain or supervise a juvenile.
See id. § 5037(b), (d)(6). Moreover, in neither instance does
the clause create an independent sentencing framework for
juveniles over the age of 21. For example, consider a
juvenile who was sentenced to three years of probation for a
Class A felony at the age of 20. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 5037(b)(2)(A). If that juvenile’s probation is later
revoked, § 5037(c)(2) allows a period of official detention of
five years. See id. § 5037(b). But if the revocation
proceeding occurs after the juvenile’s 21st birthday, the last
clause of § 5037(b) limits the term of official detention to
end on the juvenile’s 26th birthday. The result would be less
than five years of official detention. Because the clause
limits a juvenile’s exposure to detention when used in other
parts of § 5037, it should similarly limit a juvenile’s
exposure to official detention upon revocation of
supervision. See United States v. Maciel-Alcala, 612 F.3d
1092, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We interpret identical
phrases used in the same statute to bear the same meaning,”
especially when the phrases are in “close proximity.”).
Understanding the clause to limit a district court’s
authority to detain a juvenile is also consistent with the

-- 12 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 13
implicit age limits on detention that exist throughout § 5037.
Section 5037 consistently rejects control over juveniles after
their 24th or 26th birthday, depending on the severity of the
underlying conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b), (c)(2),
(d)(2)(B), (d)(6). For example, when a juvenile who
committed a class A felony is initially sentenced, he can
neither be detained nor supervised after his 26th birthday
because the maximum sentence of five years will start no
later than his 21st birthday. See id. § 5037(c)(2)(A),
(d)(2)(B). In fact, under no circumstances does § 5037 allow
detention or supervision of a juvenile past his 24th or 26th
birthday. See id. § 5037(b)–(d). Accordingly, it is not
remarkable that § 5037(d)(5) contains a similar limiting
provision to ensure that juveniles are not indefinitely
detained or supervised under the FJDA.
II. Legislative History
The authority to order juvenile delinquent supervision,
as well as the power to impose a term of official detention
upon revocation of that supervision, was added to the FJDA
in 2002. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 12301, 116 Stat. 1869,
1896–99. The legislative history offers little insight into the
specific question presented in this appeal: whether juveniles
over the age of 21 receive credit for previous terms of official
detention when their supervision is revoked. Admittedly, the
legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned
about the level of violent juvenile crime when it enacted
§ 5037(d)(5). See H.R. Rep. No. 107-685, at 113–14 (2002)
(Conf. Rep.). This concern could support the government’s
construction of § 5037(d)(5), because the government’s
construction allows for the imposition of longer terms of
official detention for older juveniles. But the conference
report only briefly acknowledges § 5037(d)(5), stating that

-- 13 of 18 --

14 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
it “(1) provides authority to impose a term of juvenile
delinquency supervision to follow a term of official
detention, [and] (2) provides authority to sanction a violation
of probation when a person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent
is over 21 at the time of the violation.” Id. at 218. Neither
provision of authority noted in the conference report
suggests a strong intent in favor of the government’s
construction.
The interpretation of an analogous statute that was in
effect when § 5037(d)(5) was enacted may shed more light
on Congress’s intent. See Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1007 (“It is
a rudimentary principle of construction that statutes dealing
with similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously.”
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). In the
adult criminal justice system, the closest analog to a term of
juvenile delinquent supervision is a term of supervised
release. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 5037(d)(1). When juvenile delinquent supervision was
introduced in 2002, “the circuit courts were in agreement
that, when calculating the maximum term of imprisonment
to impose upon revocation of a[n] [adult] defendant’s
supervised release, the district court was required to subtract
the aggregate of length of any and all terms of revocation
imprisonment from the statutory maximum.” United States
v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2009).
The text of § 5037(d)(5) appears more generous than the
consensus described in Knight because § 5037(d)(5) reduces
the potential term of official detention upon revocation by
“any term of official detention previously ordered,” not just
those ordered during previous revocation proceedings. See
18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5) (emphasis added). But the
government’s proposed construction would mean that
juveniles older than 21 at their revocation proceedings would

-- 14 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 15
get no credit at all, neither for official detention ordered
during the initial disposition hearing, nor for official
detention ordered at previous revocations.
“[I]t [is] highly unlikely that Congress meant to treat
juveniles more harshly than adult offenders” when it enacted
§ 5037(d)(5). See Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1010. Congress
later amended § 3583 so that adult offenders no longer
receive credit for imprisonment related to a prior revocation.
See Knight, 580 F.3d at 937–38 (citing Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 101, 117
Stat. 650, 651). But Congress made no such change to
§ 5037(d)(5). See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5).
III. Motivating Policies
Finally, the FJDA’s purpose cautions against adopting
the government’s construction. “The FJDA creates a
separate system of criminal justice for juveniles to shield
them from the ordinary criminal justice system and to
provide them with protective treatment not available to
adults accused of the same crimes.” Jonah R., 446 F.3d at
1010 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
“The primary goal of the FJDA is rehabilitative, not
punitive; we have thus declared that a least restrictive
standard for confinement is implicit in the structure and
purposes of the FJDA sentencing provisions.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In keeping with its rehabilitative
goals, the FJDA disfavors institutionalization and in
particular the warehousing of young people away from their
communities.” United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778, 785
(9th Cir. 2003). Whereas the government’s construction
would expose juveniles to longer terms of detention,
Appellant’s construction would help prevent excessive
detention of juveniles, furthering the FJDA’s purpose.

-- 15 of 18 --

16 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
Also weighing in favor of Appellant’s construction is the
risk that the government’s construction would create
constitutional concerns. The government’s construction
could subject similarly situated juveniles to different
maximum terms of official detention based on how promptly
each juvenile’s revocation proceeding is held. Because the
maximum term of official detention is driven by a juvenile’s
age at the time of his revocation proceeding, a juvenile who
violates a condition of supervision before he turns 21 would
have a different maximum sentence depending on whether
his revocation proceeding occurred before or after his 21st
birthday. Disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants triggers equal protection concerns when there is
no rational basis for the distinction. See Jonah R., 446 F.3d
at 1008; see also cf. United States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 964,
968–69 (9th Cir. 2002). “We must interpret statutes to avoid
such constitutional difficulties whenever possible.” Jonah
R., 446 F.3d at 1008.
The FJDA does provide for different maximum terms of
detention depending on whether a juvenile was originally
sentenced before or after his 18th birthday. See United
States v. Leon H., 365 F.3d 750, 753–54 (9th Cir. 2004). But
differentiating between juveniles based on when they were
originally sentenced is consistent with the language and
structure of the FJDA. See id. at 752–53. It also “makes
sense from a policy perspective,” because it avoids a
“nonsensical” juvenile sentencing scheme “in which the
potential penalty that can be applied decreases as the
defendant ages.” Id. at 753. Here, however, there is no
apparent rational basis for granting credit for previous terms
of official detention to juveniles who have revocation
hearings before their 21st birthdays, but refusing credit to
juveniles whose revocation hearings happen after they turn
21. In this context, the period of possible detention is

-- 16 of 18 --

UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE 17
already limited by the juvenile’s age because § 5037(d)(5)
prohibits extending detention beyond a juvenile’s 24th or
26th birthday. Therefore, our holding in Leon H. does not
assuage our concerns about the constitutional implications
of the government’s construction of § 5037(d)(5).
CONCLUSION
The text and structure of § 5037(d)(5), its legislative
history, and the FJDA’s motivating purpose support
Appellant’s construction of § 5037(d)(5). Because
Appellant was entitled to credit for “any term of official
detention previously ordered,” the maximum term of official
detention that could have been imposed upon revocation of
his juvenile delinquent supervision was 14 months.4 See
18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5). Appellant was sentenced to 34
months of official detention. Therefore, Appellant’s
sentence exceeded the maximum permitted by law. At the
end of May 2018, Appellant had been detained for
14 months for the instant supervision violations. We
therefore vacate Appellant’s sentence and remand with
instructions that the district court order Appellant’s
immediate release. We also order that the mandate issue
immediately upon filing of this disposition. See Fed. R. App.
P. 41.
4 The maximum statutory term of official detention is 60 months.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2). At the time of his second revocation
hearing, Appellant had been previously ordered to serve 46 months of
official detention (28 months at the original dispositional hearing and
18 months at the first revocation hearing). 60 months less 46 months is
14 months.

-- 17 of 18 --

18 UNITED S TATES V. J UVENILE M ALE
VACATED and REMANDED. The mandate shall
issue immediately upon filing of this decision. The
district court shall order Appellant’s immediate release.

-- 18 of 18 --