Audrey Dagmar Tomerlin v. DUSTIN LLOYD, Officer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUDREY DAGMAR TOMERLIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DUSTIN LLOYD, Officer,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 23-55095
D.C. No.
5:21-cv-00096-JGB-SHK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 12, 2024**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Audrey Tomerlin appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations during the course
of her arrest. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount
them here, except as necessary to provide context to this decision. We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 12 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tomerlin’s false
arrest claim because she did not raise a triable dispute as to whether, at the time of
her arrest, Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Dustin Lloyd lacked probable cause
to believe that Tomerlin had violated certain laws. Lloyd reasonably could have
concluded that Tomerlin had violated at least one or more of the following statutes:
California Penal Code § 626.8 (regarding unlawful presence on school grounds);
California Penal Code § 278 (regarding interfering with child custody rights); and
California Penal Code § 148 (regarding willfully resisting any officer in carrying
out duties). See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“The validity of
the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime[.]”);
Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)
(probable cause to arrest exists if officers have “reasonably trustworthy
information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tomerlin’s
excessive force claim because Tomerlin did not raise a triable dispute as to whether
Lloyd’s actions were objectively unreasonable. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989) (an officer is allowed to use reasonable force during an arrest).
The body camera and dash camera recordings contradict Tomerlin’s allegations

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that Lloyd “body slammed” her to the pavement causing serious injuries. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). ([W]hen opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
Tomerlin’s contentions of judicial bias and incompetence are unpersuasive.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone
almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”).
AFFIRMED.

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