Surinder Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SURINDER SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 23-143
Agency No.
A097-586-573
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 29, 2024**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, WALLACH,*** and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Surinder Singh (“Singh”), a 58-year-old native and citizen of India, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Senior Circuit Judge
for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 2 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
“A denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Aguilar
Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bonilla v. Lynch, 840
F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016)). “A decision is an abuse of discretion if it is
‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’” Id. at 892 (quoting Bonilla, 840 F.3d at
581).
To prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, a
petitioner must “(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country
of removal, (2) show that the evidence is material, (3) show that the evidence was
unavailable and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous
hearings, and (4) establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Singh v.
Garland, 46 F.4th 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2022); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
During his underlying proceedings, Singh sought asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture relief on the basis of three instances of
police harassment he suffered in India, due to a perceived affiliation with the
Mann—also called the SADA—party. In 2007, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found
Singh “not worthy of credence” as to “anything . . . in his case,” based on
discrepancies in his testimony regarding his whereabouts and the alleged

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mistreatment. In his motion to reopen, Singh alleges changed country conditions
on the basis of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s recent targeting of Mann party
supporters. The BIA denied his motion to reopen, because Singh “has not
submitted additional evidence to establish either his party membership or that
individuals in his hometown have imputed political views to him,” citing the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination. Singh argues the BIA erred in relying on this
determination to deny his motion.1
On a motion to reopen, the BIA may not make credibility determinations and
must credit evidence unless it is “inherently unbelievable.” Shouchen Yang v.
Lynch, 822 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d
1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, however, the IJ found Singh not credible as to
“anything . . . in his case.” IJs are permitted to “find that a witness who testified
falsely about one thing is also not credible about other things.” Id. (citing Enying
Li v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1160, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2013)). Because Singh’s additional
evidence is not “independent of the facts that formed the prior credibility finding,”
1 We need not address the two other issues Singh raises on appeal: (1) whether the
BIA abused its discretion in finding no changed circumstances; and (2) whether the
BIA abused its discretion in finding Singh did not show that he is prima facie
eligible for relief. The BIA did not make a separate finding as to these issues, and
instead rested its finding on Singh’s failure to “establish that he is a SADA party
worker or that individuals in his hometown impute this status to him,” Navas v.
I.N.S., 217 F.3d 646, 658 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court cannot affirm the BIA
on a ground upon which it did not rely.”).

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the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion. See Singh, 46
F.4th at 1122 (finding the BIA erred in denying a motion to reopen based on a
prior adverse credibility determination where the new, “independent,” evidence
included, inter alia, “a letter from the Mann leader attesting to his membership in
the party, and a letter from his mother stating that the police were looking for
Singh”).
PETITION DENIED.

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