Marcela Castillo-Santana v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCELA CASTILLO-SANTANA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1220
Agency No.
A072-989-520
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 28, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Marcia Marcela Castillo-Santana, a native and citizen of Mexico,
seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 1 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 22-1220
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny
the petition.
“When the BIA affirms without opinion under its streamlining procedures,
the BIA endorses the result reached by the IJ,” so “[t]he IJ’s decision is the final
agency determination.” Landin-Molina v. Holder, 580 F.3d 913, 917 n.6 (9th Cir.
2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)). Accordingly, “we review the IJ’s decision
as we would a decision of the BIA.” Id. (citing Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917,
925 (9th Cir. 2004)). “We review purely legal questions de novo, and the agency’s
factual findings for substantial evidence.” Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788,
792 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the substantial evidence standard, “administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. When, as here, the BIA holds that a petitioner’s application for asylum
was untimely, we review the BIA’s determination of whether the undisputed facts
constituted “changed or extraordinary circumstances.” Al Ramahi v. Holder, 725
F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). Petitioner alleges that she began receiving
threatening letters in or around 2014. But she did not apply for asylum until June
2017—two to three years after she began receiving the letters and more than one
year after the Government initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner also failed to
submit any evidence as to conditions in Mexico in 2014 to show changed country

-- 2 of 3 --

3 22-1220
conditions. Accordingly, Petitioner’s asylum claim fails.
2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of withholding of removal.
Petitioner has not identified evidence that compels the conclusion that her
proposed particular social group is socially distinct in Mexican society. See Matter
of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2014) (describing social distinction),
vacated and remanded in part on other grounds by Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125,
1143 (9th Cir. 2016). Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013)
(en banc), is not applicable because Petitioner did not testify as a witness in a
criminal proceeding.
3. Finally, regarding CAT protection, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of
proving that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if returned to
Mexico. See Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating
standard). Petitioner has never been tortured in Mexico in the past, and she has
traveled to and from Mexico, without incident, for more than a decade. Petitioner
attributes her fear of being tortured to the 2016 kidnapping and torture of her
partner in Tijuana. But she failed to establish a “particularized threat of torture”
against her. Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the BIA permissibly ruled that relocating
to another part of Mexico remains a reasonable option for her.
PETITION DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --