Sanjaykumar Prahladbhai Patel v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANJAYKUMAR PRAHLADBHAI
PATEL,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 23-282
Agency No.
A215-823-741
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Sanjaykumar Prahladbhai Patel, a citizen of India, seeks review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his motion to reopen immigration
proceedings on his 2019 removal order. “We review a BIA ruling on a motion to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 28 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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reopen for an abuse of discretion and will reverse the denial of a motion to reopen
only if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Martinez-
Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Patel’s motion to reopen. The
Immigration and Nationality Act allows an alien to file a single motion to reopen
within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(2). Patel does not dispute that he filed his motion to reopen outside that
90-day period but argues that an exception should apply. Because Patel has failed
to establish that his motion qualifies for such an exception, the BIA properly denied
his motion to reopen.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Patel’s motion to reopen for
lack of changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). As the BIA explained, Patel’s circumstances did not warrant
relief based on changed circumstances because Patel had not overcome his prior
adverse credibility determination. See generally Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d
1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The BIA is entitled to deny a motion to reopen where
the applicant fails to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.”
(citation omitted)). As we have held, the BIA “may rely on a prior adverse

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credibility determination to deny a motion to reopen if that earlier finding factually
undercuts the petitioner’s new argument.” Singh v. Garland, 46 F.4th 1117, 1120
(9th Cir. 2022) (citing Greenwood v. Garland, 36 F.4th 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 2022)).
In this case, Patel’s motion to reopen and accompanying materials did not
sufficiently resolve the prior inconsistent testimony and evidence on the question of
whether he was a farmer in India, which remains critical to his theory of future
persecution in India.
Patel points out that the BIA on a motion to reopen must address “new
evidence” that is “independent of the evidence that the IJ relied on in making the
adverse credibility finding.” Id. at 1122. But even assuming Patel has brought
forward new evidence that is independent of the earlier adverse credibility finding,
the BIA explained that Patel “has not articulated why this evidence was not or could
not have been submitted in a timely fashion during the proceedings before the
Immigration Judge or in conjunction with his appeal before us.” Patel has not shown
this determination reflects an abuse of discretion.
Finally, to the extent that Patel’s motion rests on changed personal
circumstances, the BIA properly concluded that it lacked authority to grant the
motion to reopen because changed personal circumstances alone cannot be a basis
for granting an untimely motion to reopen. See Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d
1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]hile changes in personal circumstances may be

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relevant to a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, a petitioner
cannot succeed on such a motion that ‘relies solely on a change in personal
circumstances,’ without also providing sufficient evidence of changed country
conditions.”) (quoting Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014)); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
PETITION DENIED.

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