United States v. 2024-02-21 | 21-1030 | ROMERO-AMAYA V. GARLAND | nonprecedential | memorandum…

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MARTA SILFIDA ROMERO-AMAYA
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
, No. 21-1030
Agency No. A212-953-218
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of a
Final Order of Removal
Submitted February 16, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: TALLMAN, IKUTA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges
Marta Silfida Romero-Amaya, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision upholding the determination
by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) that she does not have a
reasonable fear of future persecution or torture in El Salvador. As the parties are
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 21 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. The IJ’s reasonable fear determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018). We will
not disturb a reasonable fear determination “unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Here, an asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear interview and concluded that
Romero-Amaya failed to establish that she suffered past persecution or torture
and to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution or torture. Upon
Romero-Amaya’s request, an IJ conducted an independent reasonable fear review
proceeding at which she was represented and assisted by an interpreter. The IJ
concluded that Romero-Amaya failed to offer evidence that there was a
reasonable possibility that she would be persecuted on the basis of a protected
ground or that she would be tortured.
The IJ found that Romero-Amaya did not establish entitlement to relief
under the Refugee Act after she “testified she has not been harmed or threatened
or fears harm in the future on account of her race, nationality, religion or any
political opinion she has,” nor had she ever “been threatened or harmed by anyone
in the El Salvadoran government or any police official in El Salvador.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Specifically, the IJ concluded that although Romero-
Amaya “appear[ed] to be the unfortunate victim of a scam that was committed by
an unidentified criminal perpetrator,” the perpetrator “was clearly motivated by

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financial gain at the applicant’s expense.” Furthermore, aside from the number
of threatening phone calls, she “was never personally confronted by the
unidentified caller, nor was she ever physically harmed.” The IJ further found
that no evidence was presented that Romero-Amaya would be persecuted in the
future, and that Romero-Amaya in fact “unequivocally testified that following
2015 when she changed her phone number after the last threat she did not receive
anymore calls from the unidentified caller.” Lastly, the IJ found that Romero-
Amaya further failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that she would be
tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador,
on the basis that she testified that she did not fear anyone other than the
unidentified caller, and that she has never had any problems with the police or
government officials in El Salvador.
The IJ’s adverse reasonable fear determination relied on Romero-Amaya’s
own testimony, provided with the aid of representation and an interpreter. The IJ
found that: 1) Petitioner feared returning to El Salvador solely due to a number
of phone calls she received from an anonymous caller over five years ago; 2) she
was never personally confronted by the unidentified caller, nor was she ever
physically harmed; 3) when she changed her phone number she did not receive
any more calls from the unidentified caller; 4) she does not fear anyone other than
the unidentified caller; and 5) she never had any problems with police or any
government official in El Salvador. In light of this record, the IJ’s reasonable
fear determination is supported by substantial evidence.

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Because Romero-Amaya fails to identify any error in the IJ’s determination
and because that determination is supported by substantial evidence, the Court
declines to entertain her new arguments raised for the first time in her brief to this
Court. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023)
(“Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal claim to the court on appeal to
have first been raised in the administrative proceedings below . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
PETITION DENIED.

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