James Kevin Shelton; Ben Shelton Iii; Sami Saad v. Liquor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES KEVIN SHELTON; BEN
SHELTON III; SAMI SAAD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LIQUOR AND CANNABIS BOARD OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, AKA
LCB; RICK GARZA, Director of LCB, In
his Individual and Official Capacities; CITY
OF SEATTLE; STEVE HOBBS,
Washington Secretary of State,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-35647
D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05135-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 20, 2024**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
James Kevin Shelton, Ben Shelton III, and Sami Saad (“the Owners”) appeal
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 20 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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pro se from a district court order dismissing their complaint. Because the facts are
known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.
I
The district court did not err in dismissing the federal claims and tortious
interference claim because these claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Washington imposes a three-year statute of limitations for tort and personal injury
claims, Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2), and the same limitation applies to claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal.,
766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (§ 1983); Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653
F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (§ 1981); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942
F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (§ 1985). The Owners knew of their alleged injury
in 2016 when, they allege, agents of the Liquor and Cannabis Board improperly
caused them to cease operations. But the Owners did not bring their complaint until
2022, long after the three-year statutory period had run. See Bird v. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing the discovery rule); Green v.
APC, 136 Wash. 2d 87, 95-96 (1998) (same).
II
The district court did not err in dismissing the Owners’ claims for the offenses
of leading organized crime and criminal impersonation in the first and second
degree. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.60.040, 9A.60.045, 9A.82.060. The statutes

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cited in the complaint are criminal statutes and do not create a private right of action.
See Schorno v. Kannada, 167 Wash. App. 895, 900-01 (2012); accord Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979).
III
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to
allow a court reasonably to infer that the defendants are liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Here, the complaint does not include sufficient facts to
allow a court reasonably to infer that Saad and the Sheltons lost their business
licenses because of actions by the defendants. Accordingly, the district court did not
err in dismissing the claim for declaratory judgment.
All pending motions are DENIED.
AFFIRMED.

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