Vicente Cortes-Bravo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VICENTE CORTES-BRAVO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-73370
Agency No. A096-399-944
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 5, 2024**
Portland, Oregon
Before: GOULD, BRESS, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Vicente Cortes-Bravo petitions our Court to vacate the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) determination that Petitioner was removable
because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner
initially raised a constitutional vagueness challenge to the phrase “crime involving
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 7 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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moral turpitude” and also contended that the state statute under which he was
convicted was not a categorical match for its federal counterpart. As Petitioner
recognizes, intervening Ninth Circuit case law has foreclosed these arguments. See
Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2019). Petitioner’s only
remaining argument is that the BIA erred in finding that his two convictions did
not “arise out of a single scheme of misconduct.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
An alien is removable if he has been convicted of “two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal
misconduct.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). “The determination whether there was
a single scheme of misconduct is a factual one” that we must affirm if supported by
substantial evidence. Leon-Hernandez v. U.S. I.N.S., 926 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir.
1991). The controlling standard “treat[s] ‘single scheme’ as ‘meaning there must
be no substantial interruption that would allow the participant to disassociate
himself from his enterprise and reflect on what he has done.’” Szonyi v. Barr, 942
F.3d 874, 895 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 509-
10 (BIA 1992)).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination1 that Petitioner’s
1 It appears that the Immigration Judge here did not analyze whether Petitioner’s
offenses were part of a single scheme of misconduct.

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crimes were not part of a single scheme of misconduct. The record is clear that
there was a substantial interruption between Petitioner’s offenses. Petitioner’s two
counts of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes were based on
communications that occurred on July 5, 2015, and July 26, 2015. In Szonyi, we
affirmed that six hours separating two offenses represented a substantial
interruption that allowed the petitioner to reflect on his actions. 942 F.3d at 895.
Here, Petitioner’s offenses were separated by 21 days. The BIA correctly
determined that this substantial interruption precludes Petitioner’s convictions
from constituting a single scheme of misconduct.
PETITION DENIED

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