Shirlean Fant Rand v. United States of America; Donald J. Trump; Unknown Parties

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHIRLEAN FANT RAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
DONALD J. TRUMP; UNKNOWN
PARTIES,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-16257
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01220-DLR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 10, 2023 **
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Shirlean Fant Rand appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action alleging various claims, including under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 22-16257
de novo. Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2016) (dismissal of
FTCA claim); Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2009)
(dismissal under absolute immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rand’s claims against President Trump
on the basis of absolute immunity. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-53
(1982) (explaining that a president is absolutely immune from “damages liability
predicated on his official acts”).
The district court properly dismissed Rand’s FTCA claims because Rand
failed to establish that she could state viable claims against a private individual
under like circumstances under applicable state law. See Dugard, 835 F.3d at 918-
919 (the FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity
where the government would be liable under analogous state law); Prescott v.
United States, 973 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[P]laintiff bears the burden of
persuading the court that it has subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA’s
general waiver of immunity.”); see also Love v United States, 60 F.3d 642, 644
(9th Cir. 1995) (“The breach of a duty created by federal law is not, by itself,
actionable under the FTCA.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rand leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of

-- 2 of 3 --

3 22-16257
review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be
futile).
We reject as unsupported by the record Rand’s contentions that she was
entitled to a default judgment against defendants.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --