Jose Domingo Cisneros Suarez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE DOMINGO CISNEROS SUAREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-555
Agency No. A092-740-318
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 12, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: VANDYKE, SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** Because the court is of the unanimous opinion that the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented in the briefs and record and that oral argument would not
significantly aid the decisional process, we submit the matter on the briefs and record
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy III, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
FILED
SEP 12 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Petitioner Jose Domingo Cisneros Suarez seeks review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the denial by the Immigration Judge
(IJ) of asylum, withholding of removal, or deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT).
As a preliminary matter, the government contends we lack jurisdiction
because the petition was filed more than thirty days after the Department of
Homeland Security issued its order reinstating Petitioner’s removal. The
government argues that recent Supreme Court precedent—specifically, Nasrallah v.
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020), and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271
(2021)—undermine our previous rule that a “reinstated removal order does not
become final until the reasonable fear of persecution and withholding of removal
proceedings are complete.” Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir.
2012). Our court recently held our old rule remains valid following these recent
Supreme Court decisions. See Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, No. 15-72821, slip op. at
3–4 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2023). Because Petitioner filed his petition for review within
thirty days after the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of withholding, his petition is timely
and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Id.
Reaching the merits, we deny the petition. Where, as here, “the BIA issues
its own decision but relies in part on the immigration judge’s reasoning, we review
both decisions.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022)

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(quotation omitted). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for substantial evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742,
748 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). To show that the agency lacked substantial
evidence, the petitioner must show that “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“Withholding of removal requires the petitioner to demonstrate his or her life
or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the petitioner’s race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). The petitioner
may show that his life or freedom would be endangered by showing either past
persecution, which creates a presumption of future persecution, or “through an
independent showing of clear probability of future persecution.” Id. To show a
“clear probability,” the petitioner must show it is “more likely than not” that he will
suffer persecution on account of a protected ground. Id. (quotation omitted).
Petitioner raises no objection to the BIA’s determination that he waived his
CAT claim, any claim based on his nationality or political opinion, and any objection
to the IJ’s finding that he did not suffer past persecution. W. Radio Servs. Co. v.
Qwest Corp., 678 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 2012). This petition thus raises one
straightforward issue: does the record compel the conclusion that Petitioner will

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more likely than not suffer persecution on account of his family membership if
returned to Ecuador? It does not.
The BIA found that Petitioner “ha[d] not established that he was or would be
persecuted on account of his membership” in the “Suarez Mariduena family.”
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioner does not face a
“clear probability” of future persecution upon his return to Ecuador. Tamang, 598
F.3d at 1091. Petitioner’s mother, also a Suarez, returned to Ecuador for a month in
2015 to investigate the murders of her nephew’s family, and there is no evidence she
suffered any harm. See Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir.
2005) (reasoning that “return trips” to the country where persecution was feared
undermines the likelihood of future persecution). Petitioner was also able to safely
relocate within Ecuador when he returned to Ecuador in 1996, living there for three
years without suffering harm.
Petitioner has not shown the record compels the conclusion that he will more
likely than not suffer persecution on account of his family membership. Petitioner
argues that the murders of his cousin Robin and Robin’s immediate family were
fulfilling a threat issued against Robin’s family to stop Gladys, Robin’s wife, from
prosecuting two Colombian mafia members. But the agency reasonably found that
the murders were not due to Robin or Gladys’s involvement in prosecuting
Colombian mafia members and that the record did not establish that “the assailants

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have a vendetta against every individual in the ‘Suarez Mariduena family.’” Given
the inconsistencies in Petitioner’s and his mother’s testimony about these murders,
the agency reasonably found their testimony unpersuasive. See Garland v. Ming
Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1681 (2021) (observing that inconsistencies may render
testimony unpersuasive). Petitioner does not show the agency’s finding lacks
substantial evidence.
Petitioner also argues that the agency erred in not finding systematic
persecution of the Suarez Mariduena families, such that a “pattern of persecution
closely tied to” Petitioner would be shown to exist. Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937
F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991). He contends that the agency erred in discounting the
murders of two other “individuals of the Mariduena family,” and in “discounting the
relationship between the Suarez and Mariduena families.” Because the BIA
concluded that he did not challenge the IJ’s finding that there was insufficient
evidence these latter murders occurred and because Petitioner does not challenge
that determination here, we do not disturb it. And even if the record compelled the
conclusion that the murders occurred, two sets of unrelated murders do not compel
the conclusion that someone is “systematic[ally]” persecuting members of
Petitioner’s family, especially as the record does not reveal a relationship between
the murders. See Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A]ttacks on

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family members do not necessarily establish a well-founded fear of persecution
absent a pattern of persecution tied to the petitioner[].”).
Finally, Petitioner’s remaining two arguments, that the agency ignored his
mother’s testimony and “discount[ed] the relationship between the Suarez and
Mariduena families,” are not borne out by the agency’s decisions.
PETITION DENIED.

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