Juana Maria Arroyo- Ceron; Mario Santillan- Arroyo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUANA MARIA ARROYO-
CERON; MARIO SANTILLAN-
ARROYO,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-604
Agency Nos.
A095-690-033
A095-718-052
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 27, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Juana Maria Arroyo-Ceron and her adult son, Mario Santillan-Arroyo, are
natives and citizens of Mexico. They seek review of an order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying their third motion to reopen removal
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 11 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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proceedings. The petitioners contend that the BIA abused its discretion by
concluding that their evidence of changed country conditions failed to support
their untimely and number-barred motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
The petitioners unlawfully entered the United States in 1997, and the
government initiated removal proceedings against them in 2008. Following a
merits hearing on December 6, 2011, an immigration judge denied the petitioners’
applications for cancellation of removal and granted voluntary departure. The
petitioners appealed that decision to the BIA, and the appeal was dismissed on
September 7, 2012. The petitioners filed two motions to reopen. The BIA denied
both.
On March 28, 2019, the petitioners filed their third motion to reopen.
Although this motion was untimely and number-barred, the petitioners argued
that the BIA could still consider it because materially changed country conditions
in Mexico supported new claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). But the BIA denied this
motion too. It concluded that the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish changed country conditions.
1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the petitioners’ motion
to reopen because they failed to establish changed country conditions. Rodriguez
v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (standard of review). Even if a
motion to reopen is untimely and number-barred (as is the case here), a petitioner

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can still rely on the changed-country-conditions exception. To meet this
exception, a petitioner must “clear four hurdles: (1) he must produce evidence
that country conditions have changed, (2) the evidence must be material, (3) the
evidence must not have been available previously, and (4) the new evidence
would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Id. (cleaned up); 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
Here, the petitioners contend that country conditions in Mexico have
materially changed because the country has seen increased organized-crime
activity as well as increased mistreatment of persons with disabilities and
deteriorating health. The petitioners support their contention by relying on
personal declarations and a 2017 human rights report.
The BIA reasonably concluded that the petitioners’ proffered evidence did
not establish changed country conditions. The BIA correctly discarded the
personal declarations because they focused on circumstances outside of the
relevant period—2011 to 2019. Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.
2016) (stating that the relevant circumstances are those that occur between the
previous hearing and the motion to reopen). And the 2017 report alone is
insufficient to establish changed country conditions. That is because the report
may provide a picture of the current conditions in Mexico, but that is only one
side of the equation; without any evidence of conditions in 2011, the petitioners
fail to meet the requirement for reopening that conditions have changed since
2011. Rodriguez, 990 F.3d at 1209–10. Finally, Ms. Arroyo-Ceron’s statement

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that her health has deteriorated since the merits hearing does not advance her
claim, as a change in personal circumstances does not eliminate the requirement
for a change in country conditions. See id. at 1209 (“[A] petitioner cannot
succeed on [a motion to reopen] that ‘relies solely on a change in personal
circumstances,’ without also providing sufficient evidence of related changed
country conditions.” (quoting Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir.
2021))).
In addition, the BIA’s generous reading of the 2017 report—that it may
establish a “continuation of problems” for persons “with disabilities or
deteriorating health”—does not undermine its decision to deny the motion to
reopen. See id. at 1210 (“General references to ‘continuing’ or ‘remaining’
problems is not evidence of a change in a country’s conditions.” (citing
Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2010))).
2. We will not consider the petitioners’ arguments related to the 2010
human rights report because they are unexhausted. The petitioners failed to
mention the 2010 report in their motion to reopen and thus did not put the BIA
on notice that any contrast between the 2010 and 2017 reports was at issue. See
Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020).
PETITION DENIED.

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