Texte intégral
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAUL MENDEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARIES BOARD
OF TRUSTEES; MARY DEWALT,
Director of Ada Community libraries;
MERIDIAN LIBRARY DISTRICT BOARD
OF TRUSTEES; GRETCHEN CASSEROTI,
Director of Meridian Library District,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-35151
D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00589-DCN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2023**
Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Raul Mendez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of disputes regarding
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 5 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
-- 1 of 3 --
2 22-35151
public library access and taxes. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Meland v. Weber, 2 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2021) (dismissal for
lack of standing); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034,
1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mendez’s claims challenging state
taxes supporting public libraries because Mendez lacked standing to bring these
claims. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (explaining
that taxpayers generally lack standing to challenge state taxes because such an
alleged injury is neither “concrete and particularized” nor “actual and imminent”).
The district court properly dismissed Mendez’s First Amendment claim
because Mendez failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that his inability to
enter public libraries for several months during the Covid-19 pandemic was
unreasonable or not viewpoint neutral. See Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen.
Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining access rights
to government property).
The district court properly dismissed Mendez’s Americans with Disabilities
Act claim because Mendez failed to allege that he had a disability. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (prohibiting disability discrimination by public entities); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (defining disability); Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d
939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While we are mindful of the generous pleading
-- 2 of 3 --
3 22-35151
standards that apply to civil rights plaintiffs, a liberal interpretation of a . . . civil
rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not
initially pled.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendez’s motion
for reconsideration because Mendez failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.
2001) (setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for granting a motion
for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal protection “class of one” claim requires alleging that
plaintiff “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”); Serrano v.
Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth requirements for equal
protection discrimination claim based on membership in a protected class).
We reject as unsupported by the record Mendez’s contentions that the
district court failed to construe his pro se pleadings liberally or violated his due
process rights.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
-- 3 of 3 --