Nima Vaezi; Agustin Aguilera; James Horejs v. Warren Stanley; Daniel Minor; Christopher Margaris; Melissa Hammond; Martin Geller

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NIMA VAEZI; AGUSTIN AGUILERA;
JAMES HOREJS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WARREN STANLEY; DANIEL MINOR;
CHRISTOPHER MARGARIS; MELISSA
HAMMOND; MARTIN GELLER,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
STATE OF CALIFORNIA;
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL,
Defendants.
No. 21-56273
D.C. No.
2:21-cv-03027-JFW-E
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2022
Pasadena, California
FILED
JAN 10 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Before: BEA, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Nima Vaezi, Agustin Aguilera, and James Horejs, former
California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers assigned to the East Los Angeles Area
(ELA) station, appeal a district court order dismissing their claim for judicial
deception against CHP investigator Sergeant Martin Geller. Because the parties
are familiar with the facts, we do not restate them here. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate the district court’s order and remand
with an instruction to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
1. The district court concluded there were two independently sufficient
reasons for dismissal. First, relying on the Central District of California’s Local
Rule 7-2, the court dismissed the operative complaint because plaintiffs failed to
lodge a proposed statement of decision as required by the court’s standing order.
The district court’s standing order cautioned that failure to comply with the order
would be a ground for dismissal, but the court did not enforce this rule when
dismissing an earlier iteration of plaintiffs’ complaint. A district court has
discretion to dismiss a complaint for failure to follow the court’s local rules,
Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995), but under the circumstances
here, we conclude the court’s reliance on the local rule was an abuse of discretion.
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We weigh the district court’s dismissal against the five factors set forth in
Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). See Ghazali, 46 F.3d
at 53–54. The district court did not explicitly analyze these factors. Assessing
them independently, we conclude the public’s interest in expeditious litigation and
the district court’s interest in managing its docket may weigh in favor of dismissal.
See Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423. But the remaining Henderson factors weigh
heavily against dismissal: (1) neither Sergeant Geller nor the other defendants were
prejudiced by plaintiffs’ failure to submit a proposed statement of decision because
defendants’ motion to dismiss was fully briefed, id.; (2) the public policy in favor
of deciding cases on their merits is especially weighty here because this case raises
allegations of public corruption or misconduct, and though the complaint is
opaque, we conclude amendment is not futile, id.; cf. Dobronski v. FCC, 17 F.3d
275, 278 (9th Cir. 1994); and (3) the district court had less drastic sanctions
available, Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423. Because the district court addressed the
merits, and the five Henderson factors weigh so strongly in favor of doing so, the
district court’s reliance on the local rule was an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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2. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
claim and the district court’s decision to deny leave to amend for futility. See
Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp., 977 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2020). To state a
claim for judicial deception under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a
defendant deliberately or recklessly made false statements or omissions in the
affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant and that the statements or
omissions were material to the magistrate judge’s probable cause finding. Chism v.
Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 386 (9th Cir. 2011). A statement or omission is
“material if ‘the affidavit, once corrected and supplemented,’ would not have
provided a magistrate judge with a substantial basis for finding probable cause.”
Id. at 389 (quoting United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 782 (9th Cir.), amended
on denial of reh’g, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Plaintiffs argue that the complaint alleged that Sergeant Geller omitted
material information that would have shown plaintiffs lacked specific intent to
commit theft under California law. Sergeant Geller argues that plaintiffs’ specific
intent argument was raised for the first time on appeal, but plaintiffs’ opposition to
the motion to dismiss argued that they lacked criminal intent to commit theft under
California law. See People v. Gonzales, 392 P.3d 437, 442 (Cal. 2017) (explaining
that theft by false pretenses is encompassed by the statutory offense of “theft”);
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People v. Ashley, 267 P.2d 271, 282 (Cal. 1954) (holding that theft by false
pretenses is a specific intent crime). Plaintiffs were not required to make explicit
the link between the policy authorizing their actions, and why that policy was
material to probable cause because, closely read, the operative complaint
“sufficiently alleged facts in support of a reasonable inference that [Geller]
committed judicial deception.” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134,
1146 (9th Cir. 2021).
For the most part, the complaint implies that plaintiffs relied on only an
informal custom or practice when claiming overtime that they did not work. But
the complaint also alleged that Sergeant Geller made material omissions in his
affidavit by knowingly withholding information about an official Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) at ELA station, and that plaintiffs’ supervisors
authorized their billing practices. Specifically, at pages 7–8 and footnote 1, the
complaint clarified that the SOP was an official written policy adopted by
plaintiffs’ supervisors, not merely a custom or practice. Plaintiffs contend that had
Sergeant Geller included the SOP in the materials submitted to the magistrate
judge, the SOP would have demonstrated that plaintiffs lacked the specific intent to
commit theft as required by California law because theft by false pretenses requires
proof that “any misrepresentations of fact . . . were made knowingly and with
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intent to deceive.” Ashley, 267 P.2d at 282 (emphasis added); Judicial Council of
California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), No. 1804 (explaining the State
must prove that defendant “intended to deceive” the victim). We have held that
while “an officer need not have probable cause for every element of the offense,”
“when specific intent is a required element . . . the arresting officer must have
probable cause for that element in order to reasonably believe that a crime has
occurred.” Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994). If
plaintiffs’ practice of claiming compensation for hours they were “on call,” but not
working, was authorized by CHP’s official SOP and the relevant supervisors, it is
plausible this information would have negated the magistrate’s substantial basis for
finding probable cause. However, claims for judicial deception must comport with
the pleading standards found in Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1147–49. We conclude that the allegations in the
operative complaint were insufficiently specific regarding the alleged shortcomings
of Sergeant Geller’s affidavits, and the extent to which the SOP was an officially
adopted policy rather than a customary practice. See, e.g., Vess v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). Without such particular
allegations, plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim, but the district court
erroneously concluded that any amendment would be futile. See Kroessler, 977
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F.3d at 815. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal order with an instruction to
provide plaintiffs one final opportunity to plead their judicial deception claim.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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