United States of America v. ELMER JON BUCKARDT, AKA E. J. Buckardt, KAREN A. BUCKARDT, AKA K. A. Buckardt

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ELMER JON BUCKARDT, AKA E. J.
Buckardt, KAREN A. BUCKARDT, AKA
K. A. Buckardt; D’SKELL AGAPE
SOCIETY,
Defendants-Appellants,
SNOHOMISH COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-35055
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00052-RAJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 29, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 3 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

1
Elmer Jon Buckardt, Karen A. Buckardt, and D’Skell Agape Society
(“D’Skell”) appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for the
United States in its action to collect the appellants’ unpaid and delinquent federal
taxes from the 2002–2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 tax years and to foreclose
on their property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Government
asserts that the district court’s order is not final because it did not direct the sale of
the property in question, but this formality does not render the order unappealable.
See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (“A question
remaining to be decided after an order ending litigation on the merits does not
prevent finality if its resolution will not alter the order or moot or revise decisions
embodied in the order.”). We review de novo. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d
531, 541 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the United States
because appellants failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
the tax assessments against them or the liens against their property were invalid or
whether D’Skell served as their alter ego. See 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c) (authorizing the
district court to decree a sale of property subject to a federal tax lien); Palmer v.
IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the Internal Revenue
Service’s deficiency determinations are entitled to the presumption of correctness
unless the taxpayer submits competent evidence that the assessments were

-- 2 of 3 --

2
“arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); United States v. Polk, 822 F.2d 871,
873 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a federal tax lien is presumptively valid if Form
668 is properly completed and filed in the correct location).
In determining whether an entity is a nominee in the tax-lien context, courts
must “look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the
property the Government seeks to reach.” Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58
(1999). Washington state law recognizes the nominee or alter-ego doctrine: where
one individual “so dominates and controls a corporation that such corporation is
[the individual’s] alter ego, a court is justified in piercing the veil of corporate
entity and holding that the corporation and private person are one and the same.”
Rapid Settlements, Ltd.’s Application for Approval of Transfer of Structured
Settlement Payment Rts. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., 271 P.3d 925, 930 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidence is
overwhelming that the Buckardts completely dominate and control D’Skell, and
appellants have failed to advance any persuasive arguments to the contrary.
AFFIRMED.1
1 Appellants’ motion to expedite (Dkt. No. 33) is denied as moot.

-- 3 of 3 --