Stacy G. Hall v. Buddy Myotte;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STACY G. HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BUDDY MYOTTE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-35603
D.C. No. 6:16-cv-00058-DLC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2022**
Before: WALLACE, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Montana state prisoner Stacy G. Hall appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and compelled him to
work in unsafe conditions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hall’s deliberate
indifference claim arising from the medical treatment defendants provided because
Hall failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant
was deliberately indifferent to Hall’s shoulder injury. See id. at 1057-60 (prison
officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard a risk
to the prisoner’s health; medical malpractice, negligence or difference of opinion
concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants Myotte and Fode
on Hall’s unsafe working conditions claim arising from his assignment to clean an
inmate isolation cell, concluding that there is nothing inherently dangerous about
cleaning ceilings and walls without a step stool or ladder, and that Hall failed to
show actual injury resulting from the exposure to fecal matter. However, the
evidence that Hall was denied proper equipment to clean high surfaces, and instead
instructed to stand on furniture and fixtures in the cell, raised a triable dispute as to
whether defendants created dangerous conditions that caused Hall’s slip and fall
accident. Moreover, Hall raised a triable dispute as to whether he faced a risk of
substantial injury resulting from his exposure to biologically hazardous material
even if such harm did not occur. See Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045

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(9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth requirements for an Eighth Amendment claim in the
prison work context); cf. Mendiola–Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1251-54
(9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment improper where plaintiff raised a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the use of restraints during labor and post-
partum recovery presented a substantial risk of harm to her and her baby).
The district court granted summary judgment to supervisory defendant
Beeson on Hall’s unsafe working conditions claim, concluding that Hall failed to
allege Beeson was personally involved with the working conditions at issue.
However, Hall’s verified first amended complaint alleged that he was told by both
Myotte and Fode that Beeson had made the decisions to deny Hall hazardous
materials training and to deny Hall the use of a step ladder to perform the cleaning
work, which raised a triable dispute as to whether Beeson is subject to supervisory
liability. See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th
Cir. 2018) (explaining that a supervisory official is liable under § 1983 “if there
exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,
or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct
and the constitutional violation”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Hall’s action
against the unserved defendants without prejudice because Hall failed to effect
proper service of the summons and complaint and otherwise failed to show good

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cause for his failure to serve the summons and complaint in a timely manner. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Oyama v. Sheehan (In re Sheehan), 253 F.3d 507, 511 (9th
Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review); Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754,
757 (9th Cir. 1991) (“An [in forma pauperis] plaintiff must request that the marshal
serve his complaint before the marshal will be responsible for such service.”).
We reject as without merit Hall’s contentions regarding judicial bias.
We reverse the district court’s judgment as to defendants Myotte, Fode and
Beeson, and remand to the district court for further proceedings on Hall’s unsafe
working conditions claim against these defendants. We affirm the district court’s
judgment as to all other defendants.
Each party will bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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