Darlene Jackson v. Mesa Community College

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARLENE JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MESA COMMUNITY COLLEGE; SONYA
PEARSON, Dr., in her official capacity as
Vice President of Student Affairs, Title IX
Investigator for Mesa Community College;
CYNTHIA K. JEPSEN, in her official
capacity as Coordinator, College
Compliance, Title IX Investigator for Mesa
Community College; SHANEL CARTER, in
her official capacity as Employment
Development Manager, Title IX Investigator
for Mesa Community College,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-17051
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01869-DWL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2022**
Before: WALLACE, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 21-17051
Darlene Jackson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), and state law arising out of her nursing
education. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Redlin v. United States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she suffered a
constitutional violation as a result of an official policy or custom. See Castro v.
County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(discussing requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to establish
custom.”).
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s RA claim as barred by the
statute of limitations because Jackson amended her complaint to add the claim
after the two-year statute of limitations had expired and the amendment did not
relate back to her original complaint. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (providing
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Ervine v. Desert View

-- 2 of 3 --

3 21-17051
Reg’l Med. Ctr. Holdings, LLC, 753 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that
analogous state law provides the statute of limitations for RA claims and applying
state statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(B) (providing that an amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading when it asserts a claim that “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading”); Echlin v. PeaceHealth, 887 F.3d
967, 978 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n amendment will not relate back where the
amended complaint ‘had to include additional facts to support the [new] claim.’”
(citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s state law claims because
Jackson failed to comply with Arizona state law Notice of Claim rules. See Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01 (requiring plaintiffs to serve notice of claims against a
public entity within 180 days of accrual of cause of action).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --