Francisco Mendoza-Rodriguez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANCISCO MENDOZA-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70790
Agency No. A209-158-658
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 17, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Francisco Mendoza-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his cancellation of removal. In the
FILED
NOV 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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context of cancellation, we have jurisdiction to review questions of law, but we
may not review the IJ or BIA’s findings of fact. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D).
We review questions of law de novo. Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th
Cir. 2012). Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history
of the case, we need not recount it here. We deny the petition for review.
I
Whether the IJ applied the proper legal standard for “extreme and unusual
hardship” is a question of law over which this Court has jurisdiction. See
Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005); 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D). However, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the IJ did apply the
proper legal standard here. As required, the IJ considered the hardship to
Petitioner’s children individually, based on a variety of factors, and in the
aggregate. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63–64 (BIA 2001); In re
Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323–24 (BIA 2002); In re Gonzalez Recinas,
23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468–72 (BIA 2002). As to Petitioner’s son, the IJ considered
his health, age, living situation, caregivers, and sources of support. As to
Petitioner’s daughter, the IJ considered her caregivers and sources of support. And
as to both children, the IJ noted that neither would be “taken out of the schools that
they are presently attending, or taken away from their friends in Las Vegas, or
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taken away from any doctors or medical attention that they are receiving.”
Therefore, when the IJ decided that, “in the aggregate[,] . . . the respondent has not
established ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to his qualifying
relatives,” the IJ applied the correct legal standard.
II
Whether the IJ applied the proper standard when it declined to exercise
discretion in Petitioner’s favor is a question of law which this Court may review.
See Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2008), impliedly overruled
on other grounds in Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the IJ
applied the proper standard. The IJ considered both the positive and negative
factors in Petitioner’s case, and the IJ found that, on balance, the negative factors
outweighed the positive factors. Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1198, 1200–01
(9th Cir. 2012).
III
Finally, any deficiencies in Petitioner’s Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not
strip the IJ of jurisdiction. See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187,
1191 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (failure to include the time and location of removal
proceedings in an NTA does not divest the IJ of jurisdiction).
PETITION DENIED.
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