Texte intégral
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRAVIS DAVID WARREN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OLE HANSEN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
LANE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; et
al.,
Defendants.
No. 20-35053
D.C. No. 6:18-cv-00329-YY
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted October 12, 2021***
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Travis David Warren appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment.
Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir.
2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Battle
because Warren failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Battle’s conduct in the course of treating Warren’s elbow pain was objectively
unreasonable. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir.
2018) (setting forth elements of a pretrial detainee’s inadequate medical care claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Hansen and Gulick because Warren failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
these defendants were deliberately indifferent in the treatment of his elbow pain.
See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate
indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a
difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to
deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Warren’s motions
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for appointment of an expert because such appointment was not necessary for the
court to make its determination. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term
Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of
review for appointment of an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Warren’s motion for telephone hearing (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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