Lynda Tanielu v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LYNDA TANIELU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-35124
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05100-TSZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 2, 2021
Seattle, Washington
Before: RAWLINSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and MOSKOWITZ,** District
Judge.
Appellant Lynda Tanielu (Tanielu) appeals the district court’s order
affirming the denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits by Appellee
FILED
MAR 10 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 4 --

Commissioner of Social Security. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.
Substantial evidence supports the determination of the administrative law
judge (ALJ) that Tanielu was not disabled because she was capable of performing
sedentary work with certain limitations resulting from her physical and mental
impairments. Although the ALJ arguably erred in discounting the opinions of two
examining psychologists on the basis of Tanielu’s self-reporting, see Buck v.
Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017), the ALJ nonetheless provided
additional specific and legitimate reasons for providing “limited weight” to these
opinions. These reasons included Tanielu’s routine and conservative mental health
treatment, successful use of medication for her mental condition, and the more
recent opinion of an examining psychologist who determined that Tanielu was
capable of performing an array of daily activities. Specifically, that psychologist
determined that her “thought process appeared clear and intact during the
evaluation;” she did not have a history of psychiatric hospitalizations; she
acknowledged that her medication “helps her mood;” and she “could not tell [the
examining psychologist] the last time she had a major depressive episode.” See
Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “[i]f the
opinion of an examining doctor is contradicted by another doctor, it can only be
2

-- 2 of 4 --

rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial
evidence in the record,” and that “the court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when
the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation”) (citations,
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ did not err in considering the evaluation performed by an advanced
registered nurse practitioner (ARNP). Although the ALJ did not explicitly
reference the ARNP ’s statement that Tanielu would be unable to engage in full-
time employment for six months, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC)
finding was consistent with the opinion of an examining physician that Tanielu
was able to perform light work. The ALJ adopted an even more cautious approach,
determining that performance of light work might exceed Tanielu’s capabilities,
and assessing a RFC for less demanding sedentary work. As a result, the ARNP’s
statement concerning the extent of Tanielu’s disability was not dispositive in light
of the other medical evidence. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2008) (articulating that “the court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for
harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error
was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Tanielu’s physical impairments did not prevent her from
3

-- 3 of 4 --

performing sedentary work with certain limitations. The ALJ reviewed the records
of each medical provider and resolved any discrepancies in the medical opinions.
See Ahearn v. Saul, No. 19-35774, – F.3d –, 2021 WL 609825, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb.
17, 2021) (stating that “[t]he ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities,” and “we
reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole”) (citations and alteration omitted).
The ALJ also provided the requisite “specific, clear, and convincing
reasons” for discounting Tanielu’s testimony that her physical and mental
impairments entirely precluded her from engaging in work activities. Tommasetti,
533 F.3d at 1039 (citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Tanielu “received very little treatment overall” for her mental
condition, and the objective medical evidence did not support Tanielu’s testimony
concerning the severity of her impairments. Tanielu acknowledged that her
depression medication was working, and the mental health treatment notes do not
support the severe limitations to which Tanielu testified. See id. (recognizing that
conservative medical treatment is a clear and convincing reason to discount
testimony regarding severity of an impairment).
AFFIRMED.
4

-- 4 of 4 --