Jose Meza v. STUART SHERMAN, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE MEZA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STUART SHERMAN, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 19-15733
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00599-JD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 10, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Jose Meza appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, except
as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We affirm the decision of the district
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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court.
The California appellate court’s determination that Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004), governs a Confrontation Clause analysis was not contrary to,
nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in a
criminal case, the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the
Supreme Court “recognized that, in joint trials, when one nontestifying
codefendant’s confession is admitted only against that codefendant, there is
unavoidably a ‘substantial risk that the jury . . . [will] look[] to the incriminating
extrajudicial statements in determining [the other defendant’s] guilt.’” Lucero v.
Holland, 902 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126). The
Court, therefore, held that a defendant is deprived of his constitutional “right of
confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying
codefendant is introduced at their joint trial.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481
U.S. 200, 207 (1987)).
The Supreme Court revisited the protections of the Confrontation Clause in
Crawford. See 541 U.S. at 50–51. In “establish[ing] a new general framework for
enforcing this confrontation right,” the Court in Crawford held that the
constitutionality of a statement entered at trial “hinge[s] on the ‘testimonial’

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character of [that] statement.” Lucero, 902 F.3d at 896–97 (quoting Crawford, 541
U.S. at 50, 68). Thus, post-Crawford, “a statement of a nontestifying witness that is
testimonial and offered for its truth” cannot be admitted at trial, “absent
unavailability and a prior chance for cross-examination.” United States v. Brooks,
772 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014).
Here, the California appellate court rejected Meza’s argument that “the
Aranda-Bruton rule applies when the codefendant’s confession amounts to a non-
testimonial statement under Crawford,” holding that pursuant to Crawford, “the
Sixth Amendment applies only to testimonial statements.” Accordingly, the district
court properly held that the state appellate court did not err.
Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Meza’s co-
defendants’ out-of-court statements were nontestimonial is not contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court authority, and is not an unreasonable
determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We apply the “primary
purpose” test to determine whether a statement qualifies as testimonial. Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). “Under that test, statements are testimonial
when they result from questioning, ‘the primary purpose of [which was] to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Lucero, 902
F.3d at 989 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). In determining the “primary purpose”
of a statement, the court “objectively evaluate[s] the circumstances in which the

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encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.” Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 359 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “[f]ormality
is not the sole touchstone of [the] primary purpose inquiry,” it is a factor in the
analysis. Id. at 366, 377; see also Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247 (2015) (noting
that the nontestimonial statements at issue were “informal and spontaneous” and
occurred in an “informal setting”).
The record reflects that Meza’s co-defendants’ out-of-court statements were
nontestimonial. The statements were spoken to fellow gang members, effectively
bragging about the shooting. The informality of the statements is further evinced by
the speakers’ use of nicknames and slang words, the discussion of things other than
the shooting, including buying guns and obtaining money from the gang, and the
location of the conversation: a co-defendant’s own home. See Clark, 576 U.S. at
247. Accordingly, the primary purpose of the pertinent conversations was not “to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
AFFIRMED.

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