United States v. 2020-08-12 | 19-60014 | MINON MILLER V. EDWARD GILLIAM | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: MINON MILLER,

Debtor.

------------------------------

EDWARD GILLIAM,

Appellant,

v.

MINON MILLER,

Appellee.

No. 19-60014

BAP No. 18-1267

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Spraker, Faris, and Lafferty, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted August 5, 2020
**

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Edward Gilliam appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

AUG 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-60014
(“BAP”) judgment reversing the bankruptcy court’s order granting Gilliam’s
motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions and
apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s
ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The BAP properly concluded that Gilliam lacked standing to pursue the
motion for sanctions after Gilliam failed to list the pending sanctions claim on his
bankruptcy schedules. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (debtor’s duties in connection with
bankruptcy filing), § 554(c), (d) (scheduled property not otherwise administered at
the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor; property that is not
abandoned and not administered remains property of the estate); Cusano v. Klein,
264 F.3d 936, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining debtor’s affirmative duty to
schedule assets and liabilities carefully, completely, and accurately).
We reject as unsupported by the record Gilliam’s contention that in
reversing the bankruptcy court’s order, the BAP misapplied the judicial estoppel
doctrine.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.