United States v. 2020-08-07 | 19-15277 | MIDLAND INNOVATIONS, NV V. WEN WANG | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIDLAND INNOVATIONS, NV,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WEN WANG,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

WEILAND INTERNATIONAL INC.,

Defendant,

WEIPING CHEN; HONGDI REN,

Real-p arty-in-interest.

No. 19-15277

D.C. No. 4:07-mc-80257-CW

MEMORANDUM
*

MIDLAND INNOVATIONS, NV,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WEN WANG,

Defendant-Appellant,

No. 19-17391

D.C. No. 4:07-mc-80257-CW

*
This disp osition is not appropriate for p ublication and is not p recedent
excep t as p rovided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED

AUG 7 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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19-17391

and

WEILAND INTERNATIONAL INC.,

Defendant.

Ap peals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 5, 2020
**

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated appeals, Wen Wang ap peals p ro se from the district
court’s orders denying his p ost-judgment motions seeking to vacate a judgment in
Midland Innovations, NV’s (“Midland”) p atent infringement action filed in the
Southern District of New York. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s order denying a motion to vacate a judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Fid. Nat. Fin., Inc. v. Friedman,
803 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015). We review for an abuse of discretion the
district court’s denial of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 motion, serving as
a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(2);
United States v. Asarco, Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

**
The p anel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. Ap p. P. 34(a)(2).

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The district court properly denied Wang’s motion to vacate the default
judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) because Wang failed to demonstrate any basis for
such relief. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271
(2010) (Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the “rare instance” where a judgment is
p remised on a certain typ e of jurisdictional error or on a deprivation of a party’s
notice or op portunity to be heard; relief based on a jurisdictional defect is reserved
“only for the exceptional case in which the court that rendered judgment lacked
even an ‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction” (citations omitted)).
To the extent Wang sought relief under Rule 60(d)(3), the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Wang’s motion because Wang failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that Midland committed a “fraud on the
court.” United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443-45 (9th Cir. 2011)
(standard of review and Rule 60(d)(3) requirements).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying on the merits
Wang’s motion for an indicative ruling because Wang failed to demonstrate any
basis for such relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(2); see also Casey v. Albertson’s
Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rule 60(b)(3) requirements); Coastal
Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Rule 60(b)(2) requirements).
We rejected as unsupported by the record Wang’s contentions regarding the

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district court’s consideration of the parties’ evidence.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the op ening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Wang’s motions for judicial notice and opposed evidentiary objection are
denied.
AFFIRMED.