United States v. 2020-06-12 | 18-70522 | SALEM MATAR V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SALEM HABIB MATAR,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 18-70522
Agency No. A070-818-836
MEMORANDUM
*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 10, 2020
**
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Salem Habib Matar (“Matar”) seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen, which alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel and changed country conditions in Lebanon. We
deny the petition.
FILED
JUN 12 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Matar’s untimely motion to
reopen, which was filed fifteen years after the final order in his case. Although Matar
contends he is entitled to equitable tolling based on ineffective assistance of counsel,
he has failed to show he exercised due diligence in discovering his counsel’s alleged
shortcomings. Compare Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 1000 & n.7 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that a petitioner acted with due diligence where he “demonstrated a
steadfast pursuit of his case” despite his “complete ignorance” of his original lawyer’s
errors), with Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
a petitioner had not acted with due diligence where he took no action for six months
“to definitively learn of [his lawyer’s] fraud after he became suspicious of the fraud”).
In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Matar had not
established prejudice from his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Matar failed to
demonstrate plausible grounds for relief on his underlying claims and does not point
to any error in the immigration judge’s original decision, which found him not
credible and statutorily ineligible for asylum. Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,
826 (9th Cir. 2003).
Matar also sought to reopen under the exception for changed circumstances in
the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Matar has a heavy burden and
must demonstrate that “circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who
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previously did not have a legitimate claim” now does, Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d
942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004), and that his predicament is “appreciably different from the
dangers faced by [his] fellow citizens.” Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in
holding that the current conditions evidence submitted with Matar’s motion to reopen
is not qualitatively different from the previous evidence and does not show an
individualized risk of persecution, especially after being out of the country for over
two decades. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010).
PETITION DENIED.
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