United States v. 2020-04-16 | 18-56267 | JOHN TORRES V. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN CARLOS TORRES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-56267

D.C. No. 5:17-cv-01527-DSF-JEM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7, 2020
**

Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

John Carlos Torres appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) and state law arising out of foreclosure proceedings on his property.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

APR 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-56267
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Torres’s FDCPA
claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because Torres failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether defendants’ conduct was unfair or unconscionable.
See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999)
(“Summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his]
case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Torres’s claims
under §§ 1692d(1), 1692e, 1692g(b), 1692i, 1692j of the FDCPA because Torres
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated
any of these provisions. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805-06.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Torres’s motion for
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because Torres failed
to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and factors for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.